Escape Hatch Blocked

What Happened / Narrative

During a general walk around on a vessel an electrical transformer was discovered as pictured below. After checking it transpired that the transformer had been left by a contractor who had placed it on top of an escape hatch because the cable was too short to reach a ships power socket.

This was despite the top of the hatch being marked “Escape”.

It is likely that the extra weight on top of the escape hatch would have made it extremely difficult if not impossible to open.

Discussion was held on whether the hatch should have been painted red and if this would have stopped the contractor placing any items on top of the hatch? 

It was unclear if it would have deterred him but it may have made him think a little!

It is important to remember that contractors don’t know the ship in quite the same way as staff and It is doubtful that they would understand the severity of actions such as this.

Recommendations

When contractors are onboard, it is important to:

• Conduct a full and proper Tool Box Talk at the worksite; understand the scope of work and how the contractor intends to carry out the task / what tools are they going to use and any other requirements they may have.

• Conduct impromptu inspections of the worksite, as is required under the Control of Work.

• Ensure that worksite is safe at all times. Prior / during / and on completion of the task.

• It may have been a contractor who did this, however responsibility ultimately stops with you!

Report may be read at,

http://www.marinesafetyforum.org/images/msf-safety-alert-18.05.pdf

NTSB issues final report on El Faro sinking

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released Wednesday its full report on the sinking of the ‘El Faro’ cargo ship in October 2015, the deadliest shipping disaster involving a US-flagged vessel in more than 30 years, confirming that the tragedy was attributable to the captain’s insufficient action.

The 790-foot, cargo vessel, S.S. El Faro, en route from Jacksonville, Florida, to San Juan, Puerto Rico, sank on 1 October 2015, in the Atlantic Ocean during Hurricane Joaquin, taking the lives of all 33 aboard. 

 

Probable Causes

·         NTSB determines the captain’s insufficient action to avoid Hurricane Joaquin, his failure to use the most current weather information, and his late decision to muster the crew, as the main cause of the accident.

Contributing were:

·         Ineffective bridge resource management on board El Faro, which included the captain’s failure to adequately consider officers’ suggestions.

·         Inadequacy of both TOTE’s oversight and its safety management system.

·         Flooding in a cargo hold from an undetected open watertight scuttle and damaged seawater piping;

·         Loss of propulsion due to low lube oil pressure to the main engine resulting from a sustained list; and subsequent down flooding through unsecured ventilation closures to the cargo holds.

·         Lack of an approved damage control plan that would have assisted the crew in recognizing the severity of the vessel’s condition and in responding to the emergency.

·         Lack of appropriate survival craft for the conditions.

The US Coast Guard also released its Final Action Memo on El Faro in late December, approving the findings of the Marine Board of Investigation, concluding that the main cause of the casualty was the decision to navigate El Faro too close to the path of Hurricane Joaquin.

Recommendations

NTSB advised USCG, among others, to revise regulations to increase the minimum required propulsion and critical athwartships machinery angles of inclination, to propose to IMO to require that all watertight access doors and access hatch covers normally closed at sea, that new cargo vessels be equipped and retrofitted with bilge high-level alarms in all cargo holds, and that all cargo ships have damage control plans and booklets onboard that meet current standards. USCG was also recommended to publish policy guidance to approved maritime training schools offering management-level training in advanced meteorology.

The owner company TOTE was advised to establish standard operating procedures for heavy weather, to ensure damage control plans and booklets onboard, to revise SMS and bridge resource management programs, as well as provide expertised crew trainings. 

The NTSB made additional safety recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission, NOAA, IACS, ABS, and Furuno.

Explore more by reading the full report:

https://www.safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/NTSB-Sinking-of-US-Cargo-Vessel-SS-El-Faro-Atlantic-Ocean-Northeast-of-Acklins-and-Crooked-Island-Bahamas-2018_02.pdf

Laytime and demurrage in wet cargo trade

Introduction

For those in the business of shipping, delays can be costly. It is common practice for ship owners to charter vessels in return for freight. When calculating freight, ship owners take into consideration the period of the charter. Therefore, where a ship owner has calculated freight based on the time for which the vessel will be in the charterer's possession and the charterer is then delayed, the owner will lose profit. However, the law provides the ship owner with a possible remedy.

'Laytime' and 'demurrage' are important terms in a charter party and carry significant financial implications:

·         'laytime' refers to the time allowed in a voyage charter for cargo to be loaded on to or unloaded from a vessel; and

·         'demurrage' is incurred after the permitted laytime is spent.

Both terms involve the time allocated for a vessel to be loaded or unloaded and the penalty incurred where the vessel has been unjustly delayed. In order to protect the ship owner from suffering loss, charter parties usually provide for compensation if the charterer is delayed.

When does laytime commence?

Before a vessel is ready to commence loading or discharging, it must be at the destination as specified in the charter party and ready to take on or discharge cargo. Further, where required, a notice of readiness must be issued to the charterer of the vessel, notifying him or her that the vessel is ready. When these conditions have been fulfilled, the vessel is classed as an 'arrived ship'.

In Alfortrin Limited (The Owners of M/V Fotini) v The AG of the Federation (Vol 6 327-366) the Supreme Court was faced with the question of what constitutes 'demurrage'. Justice Iguh stated that:

"'demurrage' connotes reasonable compensation or damages to be paid for delay or allowed detention of a chattel, such as a ship or truck on hire or charter beyond the agreed period of such hire or charter… Indeed in the mercantile world, demurrage is often used in a wider sense as including both demurrage strictly speaking and damages for detention."

The appellant's vessel had been diverted from Lagos to Tema, Ghana, after congestion at the port in Lagos had prevented it from being able to discharge cargo. Ighu further opined that:

"In the present case, the original contractual carrying voyage with accrued demurrage came to an end as soon as the offer in respect of the latter carrying voyage from Lagos to Ghana was made by the Respondents and accepted by the Appellants. As at that stage, the vessel… was already in demurrage… The maxim is firmly settled that once on demurrage, always on demurrage until the vessel is fully discharged unless of course, the owners removed it for their convenience. There is no suggestion in the present case that the Appellants at any stage removed their vessel for their own purpose or convenience."

Do all delays count as laytime?

The tanker voyage charter party Asbatankvoy provides for instances where a charterer may avoid paying demurrage or pay at a significantly reduced rate. This is possible where:

·         a vessel suffers delay at berth, even after giving a notice of readiness, and the charterer has no control over such delay (Clause 6);

·         the delay is due to the vessel's condition or inability to load or unload cargo within the time permitted by the charter party (Clause 7); or

·         demurrage is incurred at a port of loading or discharge due to stoppage, restraint of labour, breakdown of machinery or equipment ashore, or an explosion. In this case the rate of demurrage will be halved (Clause 8).

Owing to the nature of the discharge operation in the wet cargo trade, charterers may be concerned as to where Clause 8 will apply (eg, how the court will interpret "the breakdown of machinery or equipment"). Although there appear to be no Nigerian cases which interpret this principle, a number of English cases have provided appropriate guidance.(1)

Comment
While delay can be expensive for a ship owner which suffers loss where a charterer delays the loading and discharge operation, a charterer should not have to pay demurrage for such delay where it can be proven that it was not at fault. It is imperative to ensure that, before executing the contract of carriage, both parties are clear on the laytime and, most importantly, on clauses which stipulate where a charterer is relieved of its obligation to pay demurrage or where the rate payable is reduced by half. Failure to do so could prove costly.

Guidance on use of LNG as a ship fuel

EMSA released a report aiming to support port authorities and administrations backing the use of LNG as a ship fuel, as part of a joint effort to increase safety and sustainability. The guidance was prepared in cooperation with the European Commission (DG MOVE), member states and industry within the context of the European Sustainable Shipping Forum.

LNG has been increasingly adopted as a strategy for environmental compliance. The use of LNG as fuel in maritime transport is highly favoured by a relevant multi-layered regulatory frame. At international level MARPOL Annex VI defines gradual and tiered approaches to the reduction of both SOx and NOx.

This reports presents the International Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or other Low-flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code), which will be launched on 1st January 2017. This Code sets the requirements for safe design, construction, and operation, of LNG fueled vessels. On the EU frame the Sulphur Directive and the Directive on the deployment of an Alternative Fuels Infrastructure establish the European framework for the development of LNG as an alternative fuel for shipping.

EMSA says that the adoption of LNG as an alternative fuel for shipping has been remarkably fast, with the involvement of ship operators, shipyards, Class Societies and different national competent authorities. This can be seen by the technological advancements for the design of LNG fueled vessels and LNG bunkering operations, which have been fast. In this development, shipping industry played a key role, by adopting a good part of the LNG knowledge.

However, the report adds that the full potential of LNG has not yet been discovered. According to numerous studies regarding LNG, they present foundings that show that the adoption of LNG as a ship fuel will be seen in the near future. Factors that will slow down the adoption of LNG, such as fuel oil prices, will exist. But, despite this, LNG as a fuel is a reality which will soon be established in maritime transport.

The same applies to port as well. EMSA mentions in its reports that ports have to consider aspects that will ensure the promotion of LNG, such as specific technical and business feasibility, risk, and safety.

“The present guidance is proposed as an additional tool to assist Port Authorities to welcome LNG as fuel in a clear and safe manner,” EMSA noted.

For further information regarding EMSA’s guidance about the use of LNG as a ship fuel, you can consult the PDF here below,

http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3207-guidance-on-lng-bunkering-to-port-authorities-and-administrations.html

 

What is the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV regulation)?

New rules affecting shipping often come into effect at the turn of the year and from 1 January 2018 the major change for ships above 5,000gt will be the requirement to comply with the EU’s Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV regulation).

The MRV regulation is the regulator’s response to the accusation that shipping is not doing enough to reduce its CO2 emissions. Quite clearly putting a lower limit of 5,000gt on the regulation will exclude huge numbers of ships, but those that are covered are considered to be responsible for around 90% of CO2 emissions from ships.

Under MRV regulation rules, ships will be required to monitor the CO2 emissions from ships, make an annual report of those emissions to an approved third party verifier and for the verified reports to be submitted to appropriate authorities where they will be aggregated. The information gathered will then be used to determine future efficiency regulation and also very likely to be used as grounds for including shipping into some market-based measure that will raise money to supposedly offset the effect of those emissions.

There are two MRV regulation regimes that will be operating. The first of these to come into effect is an EU regime with the IMO’s own similar but not identical regulation coming into effect later in 2018. The EU regime applies only to ships planning to make calls to ports in the EEA – effectively any EU member state plus Iceland and Norway. The governing rules are laid out in Regulation (EU) 2015/757 which is supplemented by Regulation (EU) 2016/2072 (accreditation and appointment of verifiers) and Regulation (EU) 2016/1927 (requirement for monitoring plans).

It is important to read all of the regulations together because shipowners need to follow designated pathways to making reports and must have a documented plan in place that will need to be followed. The January 2018 date is in fact the second of two deadlines in the EU regulation as the requirement for an approved plan for the company to be in place was back in August 2017.

EU and EEA shipowners will have been made aware of the requirements by flag states but for ships registered in other countries the owners may have been unaware of the exact requirements especially the fact that the verifier must have been approved by one of the member states of the EEA. The fact that one of the deadlines has already passed is not a huge obstacle as under Article 6.2 of the EU rules, the owner will have two months from the date of any affected ships first port call to put all requirements in place. For any owner still lagging in implementing the requirements, the 2016/1927 Regulations which can be downloaded from a number of sources includes a very useful plan template.

MRV regulation – Gathering facts

Although there may be some grace period for ships which do not yet have a reporting plan in place, it will be important that they at least understand the requirements so that appropriate records and documentation can be kept. For each ship this will include fuel consumption and other parameters, such as distance, time at sea and quantity of cargo carried. The quantity of cargo carried is included because the EU ETS (Emission Trading System) that the owners may have to participate in is about the amount of work done by cargo and distance which is in contrast to the IMO’s simpler variant which just records distance.

The monitoring plan is required to describe the vessel and its installed combustion machinery, and provide information in a complete and transparent manner. What kind of fuel will be used and which of the provided methods for the determination of fuel oil consumption for monitoring and reporting CO2 emissions or other relevant information is chosen.

There are four available methods for determining consumption; Bunker fuel delivery note (BDN) and periodic stocktakes of fuel tanks, Bunker fuel tank monitoring on board, Flow meters for applicable combustion processes and finally Direct CO2 emission measurements using calibrated equipment. It is permissible to use a combination to improve accuracy. Shipowners need to consider how to measure emissions which may involve purchasing and installing emission monitoring systems some of which can simultaneously measure and record other exhaust emissions such as NOx and SOx.

MRV regulation – Getting help

It will be some relief to shipowners to know that assisting them in complying with the EU rules has been prioritised by several organisations especially classification societies, software and hardware producers and more beside. Almost without exception, the class societies that are part of IACS have been approved as verifiers and many of these have also developed their own plan templates that owners can use to build their own specific plans. Software that records voyage data can be useful as can the products offered by engine management and control systems manufacturers.

IMO rules differ

Unlike the EU, which has made no secret of the fact that the collection of data is intended to bring shipping into an ETS, the IMO’s rules to gather information on CO2 emissions are at present merely an attempt to quantify exact figures. What may evolve thereafter will eb a matter for national delegations to the IMO to decide and that looks to eb a very contentious debate.

The rules governing IMO data also cover only ships above 5,000gt and they are to be found in chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex VI under Regulation 22A. In addition, new appendices have been developed outlining ‘Information to be submitted to the IMO, including ‘Ship Fuel oil Consumption Database’ (Appendix IX), and ‘Form of Statement of Compliance – Fuel Oil Consumption Reporting’ (Appendix X). These rules come into effect from March 2018 and the first reporting period will be for the full year 2019.

The data that is collected under the IMO regime is reported to flag states which will aggregate it and submit the data for the f lag to the IMO for inclusion into an IMO database. The data to be submitted includes the fuel consumption data (by fuel type and in metric tonnes), as well as distance travelled and time at sea, from berth to berth.

There are other consequences of the IMO rules that will affect all shipowners including those subject to the EU regulations. All shipowners will have to ensure that by 31 December 2018, the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) onboard each of their vessels has been amended to include the methodologies that will be used for collecting the required data and reporting that data to the flag state.

The table below sets out the core components of the two systems alongside each other for ease of comparison.


Future Developments

The EU intends to use the data gathered as a basis for including shipping in its ETS from 2023/24 if by 2023 the IMO has not established a means for immediate reduction in CO2 emissions from the industry.
At MEPC 72 in April 2018, the issue will be high on the agenda but while there is an acceptance of the need for shipping to become more efficient the method of doing this remains the subject of fierce debate.
The IMO has included the issue as one of its strategic developments adopted at the IMO Assembly in December 2017 and Shipping industry bodies have also submitted proposals. The IMO is planning the adoption of a revised strategy in 2023 to include short-, mid-, and long-term further measures, as required, including implementation schedules. However, there is no evident consensus on the ways to proceed as things stand.

Full details may be read at,

https://shipinsight.com/mrv-regulation/

 

Unsafe Condition – Anomaly During Lifeboat Lowering

During lowering of a lifeboat, the davits initially failed to lower due to an indentation in the face of the gripe cam on the forward arm.

Read the full report at,

http://www.marinesafetyforum.org/images/msf-safety-alert-18.02.pdf

 

Requirements of MARPOL ANNEX V as amended by MEPC.277(70)

At the seventy session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 70) held on October 2016, amendments to MARPOL V was adopted and amended MARPOL V adopted by MEPC.277(70) will enter into force on 1 March 2018. Please also refer to ClassNK Technical Information No.TEC-1103 issued on 10 March 2017.

And, also, implementation guideline of MARPOL V was amended by MEPC.295(71).

By the amendment, handling procedure, management method, and record keeping method regarding garbage from ships were changed. Therefore, vessels are required to implement the followings by 1 March 2018:

1. Solid bulk cargoes other than grain shall be classified in accordance with appendix I of MEPC.277(70), and declared by the shipper as to whether or not they are harmful to the marine environment.

2. Amended form (including amendment of garbage category for the purpose of recording) of Garbage Record Book has to be kept onboard and entries shall be made in the amended form. Please refer to appendix II of MEPC.277(70).

3. Garbage is to be handled taking into account amended garbage category.

Similar to before, no statutory certificate or mandatory inspection is regulated under the MARPOL V.

So far, Class NK has done many appraisal services related to MARPOL V under voluntary basis as requested by ship owners (refer to Class NK Technical Information No.TEC-1076). Now, we will continue this service according to the revised MARPOL V.

In case you require statement of fact according to the amended MARPOL V or examination of Garbage Management plan (including Garbage Management plan examined in accordance with existing MARPOL V), please contact the convenient Class NK survey site with the following necessary documents.

Required documents for the survey,

1)      Application 1 set

2)      Documents for the ship (Placards, Garbage Management plan and Garbage Record book) 2 sets each

3)      Documents for reference (Specification of (e.g. equipment for the handling of garbage)) 1 set

Both examination of Garbage Management Plan and onboard inspection are required to issue the appraisal certificate. (Only examination of Garbage Management Plan can be done without onboard inspection, but in this case appraisal certificate will not be issued)

 

Related IMO Circular may be downloaded at,

http://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/pdf/tech_info/tech_img/T1135e.pdf