The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) issued safety recommendations to the managers and parent company of the cargo ship BBC Rhonetal, following an investigation into a fire in the hold of the vessel at Port Hedland, Western Australia.
The incident
At 0420 Australian Western Standard Time1
on 24 March 2021, the geared general cargo ship BBC Rhonetal (Cover image)
berthed at number two berth in Port Hedland, Western Australia. The ship was to
discharge cargo which consisted of project cargo2 and large metal structures of
various shapes and sizes.
While the ship had been at sea, the cargo had been lashed to sea fastenings; metal D-ring brackets that had been welded to the ship’s cargo areas at various locations to keep it from shifting (see the section titled Cargo securing arrangements). These fastenings needed to be removed through hot work such as cutting and gouging before the cargo could be discharged.
After arriving, the ship’s chief mate convened a safety meeting at 0430 to discuss removal of the sea fastenings using a plasma torch and to review the existing hot work risk assessment and procedure.3 This 10-minute meeting was attended by the master, chief mate, second mate, a junior officer, the bosun, two ordinary seaman (OS), two able seaman and two deck cadets. A safety meeting form was printed out and each crew member signed it to confirm their attendance. The chief mate then issued a hot work permit which was to commence at 0500 and remain in effect for the following 24-hour period.
At about 2358 on 24 March, the bosun and an OS, along
with the second mate as supervisor, arrived on deck to assume the cargo watch.
Shortly after, they started preparations as planned to cut the sea fastenings.
In anticipation of this hot work, several crew members on the earlier watch had
opened the hatch covers to number two cargo hold and prepared firefighting
equipment on the tween deck in the hold.
CCTV images of the hot work with the
locations indicated on the stowage plan / Credit: : Briese Schiffahrts and
Pilbara Ports Authority
At 0030 on 25 March, the bosun began using the plasma
torch to remove sea fastenings at the forward end of the tween deck. The
cutting gradually progressed towards the aft end of the deck. Stevedores
followed the bosun’s progress aft, using the ship’s crane to discharge items of
cargo as the fastenings were removed. Meanwhile, the OS maintained a fire watch
in the lower hold, directly below the hot work progressing on the tween deck.
He was ready with a fire extinguisher, two buckets of water, a flashlight and a
handheld radio. During this time, the OS saw sparks from the plasma cutting
above falling into the lower hold and extinguishing before reaching the bottom
of the hold. As the work continued, the second mate remained on the tween deck
to supervise and oversee both the hot work and the cargo operations.
At about 0250, the bosun called the OS using a
handheld radio and instructed him to conduct a final inspection of the lower
hold and then go to the tween deck to assist with removing the sea fastenings.
At 0300, having checked that there were no sparks or signs of fire in the lower
hold, the OS started working at the forward part of the tween deck, using a
grinder to remove remnants of the fastenings left after the plasma cutting.
Meanwhile, the bosun continued using the plasma torch
and had progressed to the aft part of the tween deck, located above the
plastic-wrapped screen assemblies in the lower hold below. At that time, sparks
from the plasma cutting were spreading across a broad area. A smaller quantity
of sparks was also generated by the grinding work forward.
At 0309, the second mate on the tween deck saw smoke
rising from the aft part of the lower hold. The smoke intensified quickly and
began billowing over the cargo hold and the wharf. The stevedores also saw the
smoke and quickly left the ship, leaving behind an item of cargo on the tween
deck connected to the crane hook in preparation for discharge.
At about 0312, the second mate rushed up to the
navigation bridge, sounded the general alarm and made an announcement on the
public address system. At about the same time, Port Hedland vessel traffic
service (VTS) received a telephone call from security personnel on the wharf
reporting the fire. At about 0315, the master and chief mate arrived on the
bridge, and the master called VTS via VHF radio and requested harbour tugs to
assist the firefighting efforts.
The crew’s attempts to extinguish the fire with hoses
were unsuccessful, so the master ordered them to evacuate the hold, intending
to use the ship’s fixed carbon dioxide (CO2) extinguishing system for the
holds. The hatch covers, however, could not be closed due to the cargo
connected to the crane’s hook. A short time later, the chief mate, wearing a
self-contained breathing apparatus, climbed up to the crane operator cabin and
landed the cargo onto the wharf.
At 0410, on the master’s orders, the ship’s crew closed the hatch covers and then released carbon dioxide into the hold. At about this time, the second mate began feeling unwell due to smoke inhalation and was taken to hospital.
Analysis
#1 Origin of the fire
Shortly before smoke was observed rising from the
lower hold, the bosun had been cutting fastenings with a plasma torch in an
area on the tween deck which was located above a vibrating screen assembly
stowed in the lower hold. The screen was later identified by firefighters from
the Western Australia Department of Fire and Emergency Services as the origin
of the fire.
The fire started when sparks and globules of molten
metal generated by the plasma cutting fell through gaps in the tween deck and
down onto the screen below. The hot material swiftly melted through the
protective plastic covering on the screen and then onto its combustible
internal components, which ignited shortly afterwards.
#2 Fire watch
The shipboard safety management system (SMS) provided
guidance for performing hot work safely. It required fire watches to be in
place at all times during the work, including in adjacent compartments where
appropriate, and fire rounds to be made for at least 2 hours following the
conclusion of hot work.
However, the recall and reassignment of the ordinary
seaman (OS) on fire watch to other duties meant that there was no fire watch in
the lower hold while the bosun continued hot work activity above. At the time
the OS was recalled, there was no sign of fire or smoke in the lower hold. This
indicates that the fire almost certainly developed after the OS was recalled
and left his post.
Had a continuous fire watch been maintained, it is
likely that the sparks and molten metal falling from above would have been
immediately identified and smothered by the OS before they ignited the
combustible cargo. In the unlikely event that they did catch fire, the OS would
have been stationed to promptly raise the alarm and attempt extinguishing the
fire with the firefighting equipment at hand.
#3 Fire risk assessment
Hot work practices on board indicated some general
awareness of the fire risk associated with removing sea fastenings. This was
evidenced by the completion of a hot work permit, availability and deployment
of firefighting and fire prevention equipment and assigning a fire watch.
However, no efforts were made to assess or address
specific fire risks associated with the flammability of vibrating screens in
the lower hold. As a result, the cargo was not protected with specific,
effective measures such as fire-retardant coverings and a continuous fire
watch.
#4 Safety management system
implementation
The evidence shows that this fire resulted because the
SMS procedure and guidance were not properly followed. A proper inspection for
fire risks at the work site and surrounding areas was not undertaken. The risk
assessment procedure was not followed to ensure specific risks associated with
the task were identified, documented and mitigated and a continuous fire watch
was not maintained for the duration of the hot work. While a safety meeting was
held for the planned hot work, it was not effectively executed so as to prepare
the crew for carrying out the task safely.
Non-adherence to basic safety precautions and hot work
procedures have been a common factor in fires on board Briese ships. The number
and frequency of these incidents in recent years, together with the
circumstances of this fire, shows that the company had not effectively
implemented its SMS procedures across its fleet.
Findings
From the evidence available, the following findings
are made with respect to the fire within cargo hold number two on board BBC
Rhonetal, Port Hedland, Western Australia on 25 March 2021.
#1 Contributing factors
- Sparks and molten metal generated from the
removal of sea fastenings from the tween deck using a plasma cutting torch
fell through gaps in the deck and ignited combustible cargo stowed in the
cargo hold below.
- Hot work continued on the tween deck after the
fire watch had been asked to leave the lower hold to perform other duties.
As a result, no one was in a position to immediately identify and respond
to the fire that developed in the lower hold.
#2 Other factors that increased risk
- Items of cargo stowed in the lower hold below the
work site were not adequately assessed as a fire risk and protected before
starting the hot work.
- BBC Rhonetal’s managers had not effectively
implemented the shipboard safety management system procedures in place to
prevent the fire. This was the tenth such fire on a company ship in the
past 14 years, and the fourth investigated by the ATSB, identifying
similar contributing factors
https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ATSB-Fire-onboard-BBC-Rhonetal-2022_09.pdf
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