1-ECDIS is not an Alarm Clock
Narrative
It
was a fine summer night and a live fish carrier was on passage; the bridge was
manned by the OOW and an AB lookout. It was still dark at 0430 when the AB left
the bridge to prepare painting materials for the next watch.
Thereafter,
the OOW was alone and sitting in the bridge chair. The OOW did not feel tired
but must have drifted off to sleep as he was suddenly woken by the ECDIS safety
depth alarm indicating that the water depth was less than 10m.
The
OOW applied astern power and turned to port in an attempt to avoid shallow
water. But it was too late, and the vessel was still underway at 4kts when it
grounded (see figure). The master was called to the bridge, and an initial
assessment found no internal damage. The crew refloated the vessel using its
own power around 30 minutes after the grounding and headed for harbour. Once
the vessel was within mobile phone range, the coastguard was informed. An
inspection by divers found some minor damage and the vessel proceeded to dry
dock for repairs.
The
Lessons
1.
An alarm is only of value if it provides sufficient warning for the OOW to make
sense of what is wrong and take action accordingly. In this case the depth
alarm came too late to be effective as the seabed shelved steeply around the
island and the water depth decreased rapidly. Neither the ECDIS off-track
alarm, which would have alerted the OOW to the missed course alteration, nor
the BNWAS, which would have alerted the crew to the inactivity on the bridge,
had been set. Had either alarm sounded there might have been sufficient time to
avoid the grounding.
2.
There have been many incidents caused by lone watchkeepers falling asleep on
the bridge. After a previous grounding incident under similar circumstances,
the company involved in this case had required that a lookout be posted in the
hours of darkness. When the lookout left the bridge to perform other duties
while it was still dark the OOW was left alone and vulnerable to falling
asleep.
3.
Fatigue can creep up on you. Even if you do not feel tired it is important to recognize
that falling asleep is a real risk when working at night, particularly in the
pre-dawn hours where circadian rhythms mean the body is most primed for sleep.
4.
Alerting the coastguard should be one of the first actions after an incident –
not the last. Although the vessel was refloated without assistance, an early
call to the coastguard would have been invaluable had the situation escalated. The
ship was within VHF coverage and could easily have communicated with the
coastguard without delay.
2-A
Splash of Danger
Narrative
The
crew of a cargo vessel were preparing for departure from their regular port,
and a tug was connected at the bow and waiting to assist. All the mooring lines
were still fast and the bosun was preparing to single up the forward lines,
which would have included releasing the mooring winch brakes. However, instead
of releasing the mooring winch brakes, the bosun released the port anchor
windlass brake, inadvertently freeing the port anchor, which dropped into the
water extremely close to the tug (Figure 1). There was no damage to either
vessel, and the departure proceeded without further incident after the port
anchor had been retrieved.
The
Lessons
1. The brake release handles for the mooring winch and anchor windlass were next to each other (Figure 2). Tis arrangement is not unusual but does introduce the risk of inadvertent release of the wrong handle. On this vessel, the crew had painted the anchor release red to assist with distinguishing between the handles. Nevertheless, when preparing to depart from harbour the bosun operated the wrong handle, resulting in the accidental release of the anchor. This occurred because in all other respects the anchor was ready for letting go, removing any safety barrier to prevent inadvertent release.
2. The bosun was experienced and familiar with the mooring and anchor arrangements; it was daylight, good weather conditions and the crew were rested, so fatigue was not a factor. Therefore, there were no clearly identified causal factors for the bosun’s erroneous action. Events like this can happen, and it highlights the need for carefully following procedures, teamwork and maintaining high levels of supervision when working on deck.
3.
The anchor fell extremely close to the waiting tug. Had the tug been directly
underneath the anchor with crew on deck, this accident could have had severe
consequences. Tis serves as an excellent reminder of the hazards that exist for
tugs, workboats or line handling boats when operating in close proximity to
larger vessels.
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