Learn from the past: Bow Mariner incident

Fourteen years ago on this day, the Singapore-flagged chemical tanker ‘Bow Mariner’ sank off Virginia after a fire broke out while its crew was engaged in cleaning residual from cargo tank, resulting in the death of 21 people, total loss of the ship, as well as significant marine pollution. The accident is defined as a very serious casualty and one of worst ever deep-sea chemical tanker disasters in terms of loss of life.

The accident

At 1805 on Saturday, 28 February 2004, the Odfjell-owned ‘Bow Mariner’ was en route from New York to Texas, with a cargo of 11,570 tons of industrial ethanol, when it caught fire and exploded, while the crew was engaged in cleaning residual Methyl Tert Butyl Ether (MTBE) from cargo tank number eight starboard. The fire was followed by two significant explosions that occurred less than two minutes apart, at 1806 and at 1808. The explosions caused catastrophic structural damage and led to immediate flooding. The ship sank by the bow at 19.37, one hour and 32 minutes after the first explosion, about 45 nm east of Virginia. The Bow Mariner spilled about 3,188,711 gallons of ethyl alcohol, 192,904 gallons of HFO, 48,266 gallons of LFO, and an unknown quantity of slops in US waters.

Fatalities

Of the 27 crew onboard:

• Six abandoned the ship and were able to make it to an inflatable life raft and were rescued by the USCG.
• Three were found dead: An unknown number of other crew members abandoned the ship to the water, one of whom were recovered deceased and two of whom were recovered alive by USCG and good Samaritan vessels, but died before reaching to hospital.
• 18 crew remain missing and are presumed dead.

USCG Investigation

The explosion was caused by the ignition of a fuel/air mixture, either on deck or in the cargo tanks, that was within its flammable units, leading to a fire on deck. However, the ignition source could not be determined. Possible sources of ignition included electrostatic discharge, mechanical sparks or electrical sources, while less possible sources include cell phones, sabotage, smoking.

In its investigation report, the US Coast Guard has laid particular emphasis on the Master's order to open for cleaning the lids of 22 tanks that had been carrying MTBE, which caused flammable vapors heavier than air to accumulate on deck and diluted the fuel-rich atmosphere in the cargo tanks with oxygen, bringing them to flammable range. This action was “breach of normal safe practices for a tank ship and defies explanation or excuse,” USCG noted.

Contributing to the casualty was failure of the operator and the senior officers of the ship to properly implement the company’s Safety, Quality and Environmental Protection Management System (SQEMS). This is the first time in history that noncompliance and failure of Operator and crew to properly implement SQEMS has been recorded as a contributing cause to an accident.

Investigators also noted the crew was inefficiently unprepared for an emergency, because fire and boat drills were rarely performed.

Another significant issue was the lack of immersion suits that also contributed to loss of life, as there was sufficient time for survivors of the explosion to don immersion suits before entering the water, had there existed any.

USCG recommendations

On the aftermath of the casualty, the USCG recommended the manager company to review their internal policies and procedures in the workforce interaction and cooperation.

The USCG also proposed IMO, INTERTANKO and ICS to jointly examine the causes of all tank vessels explosions involving tank cleaning in the previous five years.

It also advised Commandant to send a message to all marine safety field units emphasizing the importance of randomly verifying a tank vessel’s compliance with SMS for tank cleaning, confined space entry and tests and inspections of equipment.

Lessons to be learned

This maritime casualty, along with many others, underlines the disaster that can be provoked by the lack of simple compliance with procedures:

The importance of implementing the SQEMS: The cargo tanks were not inerted during the discharge of MTBE in New York and they were not required to by the US law, because the ship was built before 1986. If simply the tanks had remained closed, the explosion would not have occurred.

The opening of the 22 cargo tanks that had previously held MTBE was a major safety violation by the Captain, defying any explanation, according to the USCG. This caused flammable vapors heavier than air to accumulate on deck and diluted the fuel-rich atmosphere in the cargo tanks with oxygen, bringing them to flammable range.

Even more, the accident highlights the need to follow procedures in an emergency: The insufficient emergency response, the lack of immersion suits onboard, and the Captain leaving the ship without distress calls and without conducting a muster for the injured crew, as well as without attempting to launch primary lifesaving appliances were a deadly mix for the aftermath of the explosion.

The USCG report notes that this improper preparedness was resulted from insufficient training, as the Captain did not conduct regular boat drills: In this casualty, the officer on watch failed to sound the general alarm and to send a distress signal, while there had been panic at the time, with no crewman reported to their muster stations with the equipment they had to bring and with no one knowing what to do.

As such, concerns on procedural compliance are further extended to concerns of effective leadership: The explosion and sinking of Bow Mariner leaves the shipping community with thoughts regarding hierarchy and dysfunctional leadership aboard ships and behavior culture.

 

Please see the following you-tube video,

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rk7a1dh1lSg 

 

 

 
 

Lessons Learnt: Collision with sailing vessel

Vessel Type: Tanker / Incident description

The incident occurred in open water during the hours of darkness with the sea state described as rough, wind BF 6-7 and good visibility.

Apart from the officer of the watch (OOW), an AB was also present on the bridge as look-out and steering was on autopilot. Midway through the watch, the OOW permitted the AB to perform cleaning and housekeeping duties in the accommodation and therefore became the sole lookout. Shortly after taking an azimuth bearing to check the compass error, the OOW sighted a white light almost dead ahead and apparently at very close range. Before effective avoiding action could be taken by the OOW, a yacht under sail was seen passing along the port side hull, at which point he called the Master. The yacht crew transmitted a distress message by VHF radio reporting that they had been struck by another vessel, sustaining serious damage and flooding. The tanker then maneuvered to make a lee for the yacht and successfully rescued the crew.

Analysis

The decision by the OOW in allowing the AB to leave the bridge to carry out other duties at night was a serious breach of Rule 5 of the COLREGS and STCW requirements for the keeping of a safe navigational watch. The absence of the AB meant that it was not possible to maintain a proper look-out taking into consideration the requirement of the OOW to perform other navigational duties. Although a sole look-out may be permissible during daylight hours in certain favorable circumstances, the OOW should not be the sole look-out during hours of darkness.

Later examination of the evidence and preserved VDR recordings was able to show that the yacht appeared consistently on the radar display at a range of about 3 miles from the tanker. If a proper look-out had been maintained on the tanker by sight and all other available means, sufficient time would still have been available to the OOW to assess the situation and take necessary avoiding action.

Lessons Learnt

·         The OOW should never be the sole look-out during hours of darkness

·         Masters should ensure that standing and night orders make it clear that the keeping of a proper lookout in strict accordance with the COLREGS and STCW requirements is of paramount importance

·         Although a vessel may be navigating in open water and/or conditions of apparently light traffic, a diligent look-out should still be maintained.

·         OOW’s should always be vigilant to the possibility that small craft may only be detected visually or on radar at relatively close range

ECDIS – A new chapter begins

It is twenty years since the first ever ECDIS type-approval certificate to the IMO performance standards was issued by the Russian authorities on 29 March 1998 to Transas’ Marine NaviSailor 2400 although it is just six years since ships have been obliged to be fitted with one.

There had been earlier systems described as ECDIS but that was before the IMO adopted its first performance standard. After that, any systems built to earlier standards were reclassified as electronic chart systems or ECS. The IMO performance standards were revised in 2006 but mainly because of a lack of electronic charts, the IMO did not decide to make ECDIS mandatory until 2009, with the carriage requirement coming into force in 2012.

After first becoming mandatory on new passenger vessels of 500gt and above and new tankers over 3,000gt in July 2012, the rollout of ECDIS reaches its finale in July when all existing cargo ships other than tankers, of between 10,000 and 20,000gt will become liable to fit an ECDIS at their first survey after that date.

What constitutes the ‘first survey is defined in MSC.1/Circ.1290 and is ‘the first annual survey, the first periodical survey or the first renewal survey whichever is due first after the date specified in the relevant regulation or any other survey if the flag state deems it to be reasonable and practicable.

Unlike some of the more expensive equipment items that have been mandated in recent years, ECDIS was extensively taken up on a voluntary basis long before any requirement to do so was written into SOLAS. This final retrofit rollout will be the last opportunity for ECDIS makers to benefit from a mass market for after this, it will be only for new vessels and replacements that systems will be needed.

Last September was the deadline for upgrading ECDIS systems to the IHO S-52 presentation library standard released in 2015. Initially the upgrade was to have been completed in 2016, but due to some delays in preparing the new software by some system makers, the deadline was extended by the IMO. All new systems installed after 31 August last year should be compliant.

This was the first major upgrade to ECDIS and while most systems were upgraded successfully, there were problems with some makes and machines needed to be replaced completely. There is a lesson to be learned here because a mandatory software upgrade to machines that in some cases were just a few years old is an expense that shipowners had not expected.

There will inevitably be more updates needed in future so shipowners should probably consider makers that have a long record rather than cheaper newcomers. That said, the market has now shrunk to some two to three thousand ships annually which may be a bar to new entrants to the market.

Accidents will happen

When the last rollout phase is completed, there will no doubt be a move to expand e-navigation projects – especially in Northern Europe where there is a strong desire by local and regional authorities to manage shipping movements. However, the fact that no cargo ship under 3,000gt is required to use ECDIS and only those above 3,000gt constructed since 2014 must carry it does mean that thousands of smaller ships will be outside of e-navigation regimes unless new rules are formulated.

Small ships are very common in all parts of the world but especially in the crowded waters in Europe and Asia where there are many ports and large populations. Ships of just under 3,000gt are large enough to create hazards for other ships and if grounded could even close major ports. They are equipped with AIS and traffic management systems will have some information from them because of this but not the comprehensive passage plan that is recorded in the ECDIS.

Many vessels under 3,000gt do carry ECDIS but since it is not mandated, the controls on using and maintaining it do not apply, neither are there restrictions on modifications. It was the latter that was cited by the UK’s MAIB as a main cause of the grounding of the 4,950dwt bulk carrier Muros in the North Sea in December 2016 (see https://shipinsight.com/ecdis-blamed-cause-marine-accident/). The Muros is a 2,998dwt ship so was not obliged to carry ECDIS.

The MAIB report also mentioned a study that had been undertaken at Lund University in Denmark that had identified several issues with ECDIS as reported by experienced users. It would appear that although many seafarers are perfectly happy with using ECDIS, some are more critical and raise serious concerns.

Many described the systems as unreliable, having a complex interface, cluttered displays and disturbing alarm functions among others. A not unexpected finding was that many experienced difficulties when transferring between systems.

Search for a common standard

The concerns identified will come as no surprise to many mariners as the Nautical Institute has been arguing for almost a decade now that there is an urgent need for a standardised display for navigational equipment and systems. The idea has been given the title S-Mode and the view of its supporters is that the standardisation would apply to most navigation systems.

The idea is that if all systems had an S-Mode that presented certain key information in identical ways, then seafarers moving between ships and different systems would not be faced with unfamiliar user interface of layouts, menus and displays when the S-Mode was activated. Equipment makers would still be free to develop their own unique features for systems if they wished to differentiate their products from the crowd.

The IMO has accepted the wisdom of the arguments in favour of S-Mode and has been progressing the concept; initially through the Navigation sub-committee and later its successor the Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR) sub-committee. NCSR has had a busy agenda over the past few years with the revision of GMDSS and e-navigation dominating its work load. In that period work on S-Mode has not been entirely dropped but has been put on the back burner.

In 2016 a correspondence group was established at NCSR3 to work on S-Mode and at the next meeting in February 2017 an information paper presented by Australia, South Korea, Nautical Institute and Intermanager was discussed at the meeting. It is planned that draft guidelines will be ready to discuss at NCSR5 in late February with a view to have a final version ready for adoption in late 2019.

If S-Mode is adopted and put into practice, its supporters believe that safety will be improved in emergencies and that could very well be true. But, the ability to revert to a standard display will not remove the errors that can occur through incorrect inputs, corrupted data or if the user decides not to make use of the S-Mode and misses some important information because of that.

 

California’s BWM regulations and fines

The London Club issued an alert informing that Californian legislation now applies maximum fines of USD27,500 per tank where no ballast exchange has been made and between USD5,000 and USD20,000 per tank where there was an exchange within the zones of 200nm and 50nm from land, depending upon how close to land it occurred. Falsification of records is also punishable by up to one year in jail.

As the US is not a party to the BWM Convention, it has introduced its own legislation, with California State developing even stricter requirements. Vessels arriving at ports in California from outside of the Pacific Coast Region intending to de-ballast in California waters are currently required to conduct any ballast exchanges in open seas.

The Pacific Coast Region (PCR) is defined in California legislation as east of 154 degrees West longtitude and north of 25 degrees North latitude. Open seas is defined as at least 200nm from the nearest land and in minimum 2,000m of water depth. Vessels whose voyages begin within the PCR and which intend to de-ballast in California waters must conduct a ballast water exchange at least 50nm from the nearest land and in minimum 200m of water depth.

The fines are imposed by the Californian State Lands Commission (CSLC), rather than the Coast Guard. Early experience of the activities of the CSLC points to very thorough investigations being made on board. The location where each ballast tank exchange took place is plotted precisely and substantial fines are imposed for any errors. As the fines are applied on a per tank basis, the sums can soon mount up.

The London Club informed of a recent incident involving a vessel on a great circle route across the Pacific carrying out a BW exchange mid-ocean and mid-voyage, but inadvertently within 200nm of the Aleutian Islands. While the authorities determined the ballast water after the exchange was free of invasive species which could be discharged within California waters, the mistake was innocent and a first time offence, the CSLC nevertheless sought to impose fines exceeding USD100,000. The fine was reduced by only 30% on appeal.

The Club advises:

1.     Operators whose vessels are scheduled to call at Californian ports should note the above and take care in planning where a ballast water exchange is to be conducted.

2.     Consideration should be given to the time needed to complete the exchange, the water depth, and weather, to ensure that such exchanges are completed well outside 200nm not just from California waters or the PCR but from any land, so as to avoid the risk of being having fines imposed and potentially being detained.

Due diligence: what is the standard expected of owners?

MT “Cape Bonny” Tankschiffarhts GmbH & Co KG v. Ping An Property and Casualty Insurance Company of China Limited, Beijing Branch (Cape Bonny) [2017] EWHC 3036 (Comm)

The Commercial Court has considered whether the Owners in this case had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy in circumstances where the vessel suffered an engine breakdown mid-voyage from uncertain causes.

The background facts

On 14 July 2011, on the course of a laden voyage from Argentina to China and while seeking to avoid tropical storm Ma-On, the Cape Bonny suffered an engine breakdown. The cause of the breakdown was discovered on inspection to be damage to main bearing no. 1, which was not repairable at sea and so towage assistance was required.

On 18 July 2011, the vessel was taken in tow by Koyo Maru. The vessel was not permitted to enter a Japanese port of refuge or to discharge her cargo in the Chinese port of discharge, and so proceeded to Yosu, South Korea where her cargo was transferred into another vessel on 2 and 3 August 2011. The port authorities then required the vessel to be taken back out to sea in view of the approach of another tropical storm (Muifa). The vessel returned to Yosu on 9 August 2011, following which Koyo Maru was released and the vessel was berthed for repairs.

General average (GA) was declared and, on 28 July 2011 cargo insurers provided a guarantee by which they promised to pay any contribution to GA “which may hereafter be ascertained to be properly due”. Cargo’s contribution to GA was assessed at about US$2.1 million in the average adjustment published on 13 March 2013.

Cargo underwriters denied any liability under the guarantee, alleging that no amount was ‘properly due’ from cargo. Alternatively, in the event that a contribution was properly due, cargo underwriters disputed the quantum of the claim.

The Commercial Court decision

Liability

Cargo’s basis for denying liability to contribute in GA was Rule D of the York-Antwerp Rules, which provides as follows:

“Rights to contribution in general average shall not be affected, though the event which gave rise to the sacrifice or expenditure may have been due to the fault of one of the parties to the adventure, but this shall not prejudice any remedies or defences which may be open against or to that party in respect of such fault”.

There was no dispute as to the true construction of Rule D and how it operates: both parties accepted the effect of Rule D is that a loss, which is in principle allowable in GA, will not be recoverable if it arises from the actionable fault of the party claiming contributions. In this case, the actionable fault alleged by cargo was a failure by the Owners to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.

Cargo’s case was that the damage to main bearing no.1 was caused by the presence of metal particles in the luboil system, which had been generated by spark erosion or by damage to the vessel’s chain drive gear or had been permitted to enter the engine by poor procedures when the crew were cleaning the filters. In addition, cargo argued that there was progressive wear to the no.1 bearing shells caused by damaged luboil filters failing to remove these particles from the luboil, and that crankshaft deflection readings taken by the ship’s crew about a month prior to the voyage indicated “abnormal wear” of the bearing which, in turn, should have resulted in the bearing being opened up such that the existing wear would have been detected prior to the commencement of the voyage.

The Owners accepted that the vessel was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage by reason of the metal particles present in the luboil system, but denied that there had been any failure to exercise due diligence because (on their case) the foreign particles were weld slag, which had been present in the luboil piping from the date of build and had broken off during the voyage in a period of bad weather.

The Court ruled that the bearing suffered from abnormal wear; that the luboil filters were damaged and that foreign particles were present in the luboil: the presence of all three rendered the vessel unseaworthy at the beginning of the voyage. The Court then went on to consider whether the Owners had nevertheless exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.

The Court was unable to reach any firm conclusions on the source of the metal particles in the luboil. Regarding the damaged luboil filters, the Court found that this could have been discovered by examination of the candles inside the filters, and that “a skilled and prudent chief engineer would have ensured that a proper visual check was made of at least a representative sample of the candles”. The Owners had not carried out such a check last time the candles were examined, and were, therefore, unable to prove that they exercised due diligence to make the filters seaworthy. However, as only a proportion of candles were found to be damaged, the damage would not necessarily have been detected by such an inspection, and the failure to exercise due diligence was not causative (it is possible that the representative sample of candles inspected may not have included any of the damaged candles).

In relation to the worn bearing, this should have been detectable from the crankweb deflection readings taken shortly before the voyage, which showed a -0.14mm increase from the readings taken six months earlier. A prudent engineer or superintendent would have decided, in the light of these readings, that bearing clearing measurements should be taken (which would likely have revealed abnormal wear to the bearings). The failure to do so was a failure to exercise due diligence and was causative of the engine breakdown.

Therefore, the GA expenditure was incurred by the Owners due to an actionable fault, and cargo were not liable to make a GA contribution.

Quantum

Cargo interests advanced arguments that various items of expenditure had not been reasonably incurred, including: the hire of the Koyo Maru (rather than a less expensive vessel); the diversion to Korea and transhipment of the cargo, and the continued hire of the Koyo Maru after arrival in Korea.

Although it was not necessary for the Court to make any ruling on quantum given its findings on liability, it nevertheless considered cargo’s arguments on this point, and found that the expenditure had been reasonably incurred in each case. The Court stressed that, while the burden of proving that expenditure was reasonably incurred lies upon owners, owners and managers when making such expenditure are also entitled to the benefit of the doubt if the circumstances are such that a prompt decision is required: there is no reason why hindsight should be taken into account in such circumstances.

Comment

This case emphasises the high standard that owners must meet in order to show that due diligence has been exercised to make a vessel seaworthy, especially in relation to incidents arising out of engine breakdowns/machinery malfunctions. Owners must not only carry out appropriate inspections on a regular basis, but must also ensure that the results of those inspections are subject to sufficient scrutiny to identify any problems that may be brewing. 

USCG’s Regulations on BWMC at a glance

Recently, the US Coast Guard completed a blog series regarding ballast water. In these series, USCG focuses extensively on compliance and enforcement of the US ballast water regulations.

The blog-series consisted of five articles, each dealing with a different issue.

In the first part, USCG noted that, so far, its approach to managing invasive species is similar to previous approaches to other environmental threats.

“Combating invasive species in ballast water is a complex challenge. At the core of this issue is a real threat to our environment and economy. According to the National Ballast Information Clearinghouse, so far in 2017, almost half of ballast water discharged into the U.S. has been from overseas sources. That’s more than 122 million cubic meters of foreign ballast water,” USCG commented on its blog.

The second part addressed the matter of the shift in focus from regulatory implementation to regulatory compliance. Specifically, USCG outlines where the industry stands with respect to Type Approval, informing that so far it has approved six BWMSs whereas many are currently under review. It also highlights that it is important to recognize that all ballast water discharged in U.S. waters must be managed and reported in compliance with federal regulations. 

Vessel owners and operators should be aware that the Coast Guard will fully enforce all requirements.

In the third article, the Coast Guard updated on BWMS type approval program. It said that since 2015, there has been a dramatic increase in the volume of ballast water being treated before being discharged into US waters and provided a list of type approved BWMSs.

Moving on to the fourth chapter, USCG emphasized the fact that BWMS should not be “plug and play”.

The selection, installation, operation, and maintenance of a BWMS requires analyses specific to the vessel and its operating profile. For this reason every BWMS installation is a customized installation, and every ballast water management plan (BWMP) is a customized plan. 

Furthermore, a BWMS will require analyses specific to the vessel and its operating profile, USCG noted, adding that for these reason a “plug and play” BWMS  is not possible.

Finishing the blog-series, the importance of Ballast Water Management Plan was mentioned. The BWMP should provide concise directions and alternate measures to be taken if a ballast water management system (BWMS) is inoperable or the vessel’s intended compliance method is unexpectedly unavailable.

USCG outlined its intention to enforce compliance with the ballast water discharge standards and expects all ballast water discharged to U.S. waters to be managed and reported in compliance with federal regulations.

Below you can find summarized the key point from the USCG’s blog series:

·         The US enforces BWM compliance as a normal part of a domestic vessel inspection or Port State Control examination. Between 2012 and 2017, the Coast Guard issued nearly 700 vessel deficiencies for ballast-related incidents of non-compliance.

·         Potential enforcement measures may include operational controls that restrict a vessel’s movement or cargo operations, monetary penalties, and a higher priority consideration for future examinations. There is also the possibility for prosecution if there is evidence of criminal intent.

·         Vessels operating in US waters should follow a ballast water management plan (BWMP) that is specific to the vessel and that identifies how it will comply with US ballast water regulations.

·         Ballast water exchange and compliance date extensions are being phased out as temporary compliance options as shipowners and operators are now able to select and install a USCG type approved BWMS.

·         Fitting a BWMS to a specific vessel will require an analysis of the vessel’s engineering systems, cargo operations, and trade routes. The complexity and extent of a BWMS’s impact on vessel operations means that a plug-and-play solution is not likely to succeed.

·         An inoperable BWMS will be treated like other pollution prevention equipment that fails or cannot perform its intended function. Inoperability is a compliance issue and is not a valid reason to discharge untreated ballast into US waters, nor is it grounds for granting an extension to a vessel’s compliance date.

·         Planning for compliance requires planning for contingencies. The BWMP should provide contingency measures that are specific to the vessel, its operational profile, and its intended ballast water management method. This includes a description of the alternative measures to be taken if a BWMS is inoperable or the vessel’s intended compliance method is unexpectedly unavailable.