The
UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (UK MAIB) issued an investigation
report on the grounding of the bulk carrier ‘Muros’, on Haisborough
Sand, in December 2016, providing a description of what happened and important
lessons learned to prevent similar accidents in the future.
The incident
The incident
In the early hours of 3 December 2016, the bulk carrier Muros
ran aground on Haisborough Sand, 8 miles off the Norfolk coast and the master’s
attempts to manoeuvre the vessel clear were unsuccessful due to a falling tide.
The vessel was re-floated 6 days later and was towed to Rotterdam for repair.
When Muros grounded, the vessel was following a passage plan shown on its
electronic chart and display information system (ECDIS). The plan had recently
been revised on the ECDIS by the OOW who then used the system to monitor the
vessel’s position.
Findings
1.
The
vessel was following a planned track across Haisborough Sand. The passage plan
in the ECDIS had been revised by the second officer less than 3 hours before
the grounding and it had not been seen or approved by the master.
2.
A
visual check of the track in the ECDIS using a small-scale chart did not
identify it to be unsafe, and warnings of the dangers over Haisborough Sand
that were automatically generated by the system’s ‘check route’ function were
ignored.
3.
The
second officer monitored the vessel’s position using the ECDIS but did not take
any action when the vessel crossed the 10m safety contour into shallow water.
4.
The
effectiveness of the second officer’s performance was impacted upon by the time
of day and a very low level of arousal and she might have fallen asleep
periodically.
5. The disablement of the ECDIS alarms removed
the system’s barriers that could have alerted the second officer to the danger
in time for successful avoiding action to be taken.
Safety Issues
·
The
intended track over Haisborough Sand was unsafe and grounding was inevitable
given the vessel’s draught and the depth of water available
·
ECDIS
safeguards were ignored, overlooked or disabled
·
The
track over Haisborough Sand was not planned or checked on an appropriate scale
chart
·
The
revision of the passage plan conficted with the 2/O’s watchkeeping duties
·
The
master directed the OOW to revise the route but he did not see or approve it
·
The
OOW’s performance was probably adversely affected by a low state of alertness
·
The
use of software to disable the audible alarm and the guard zone removed the
ECDIS barriers intended to alert bridge watchkeepers to imminent danger
·
The
use of the ‘standard’ chart view limited the information displayed and the
reliance of visual checks when passage planning was prone to error
·
ECDIS
use on board Muros was not as envisaged by regulators or equipment
manufacturers.
Actions taken
UK MAIB has commenced a safety study, in collaboration with the
Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board, to provide further research on
the reasons why seafarers are utilising ECDIS in ways that are often at
variance with the instructions and guidance provided by the system
manufacturers and regulators.
The overarching objective of the study is to provide
comprehensive data that can be used to improve the functionality of future
ECDIS systems by encouraging the greater use of operator experience and human
centred design principles.
Explore more by reading the full report:
Δεν υπάρχουν σχόλια:
Δημοσίευση σχολίου