Fuel samples Analysis - Last year saw a huge increase in bunker quality disputes

These disputes started around March/April with bunkers stemmed in Houston and gradually spreading to different regions and countries.

It is also thought that there may be issues regarding fuel quality, due to blending in order to provide IMO 2020 Sulfur Cap compliant fuel.

However, the purpose of this article is to bring into focus the need for a proper fuel testing and analysis regime to be in place.

Testing fuel samples on board is possible but there are limitations as to these findings, which generally are limited to density, viscosity, pour point, water content and compatibility. Whilst on board testing is useful to get early indications of problems, it is not sufficient to test for some of the issues seen recently, for example the presence of contaminants, such as phenolic compounds. However, Skuld understands that

owners routinely send bunker samples for laboratory testing for the presence of these compounds.

Correct sampling and which of the samples are to be tested and analyzed are just as important as the analysis itself. In most cases, the relevant contract between the parties specifies which samples are to be used for analysis (and be binding) and how those samples are to be collected.

For example, the BIMCO Bunker Terms 2018 stipulate at Clause 4 (a) that: -

“.... a primary sample shall be drawn at a point, to be mutually agreed between the Sellers and the Buyers.... closest to the Vessel’s bunker manifold and otherwise in accordance with the procedures set out in IMO Resolution MEPC.182(59) Guidelines for the Sampling of Fuel Oil for Determination of Compliance with

MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI or any subsequent amendments thereto...”

In terms of quality claims, at Clause 9(b)(ii): -

“In the event that a claim is raised.... the Parties hereto shall have the quality of the Marine Fuel analyzed by a mutually agreed, qualified and independent laboratory”

For time charters, the BIMCO Bunker Quality Control Clause for Time Chartering provides that: -

“(3)... during bunkering representative samples of the fuel(s) supplied shall be taken at the Vessel’s bunkering manifold and sealed in the presence of competent representatives of the Charterers and the Vessel...(4)...and any dispute as to whether the bunker fuels conform to the agreed specification (s) shall be settled by analysis of the sample(s)....whose findings shall be conclusive evidence as to the conformity or otherwise with the bunker fuel specification(s)”

The MEPC.182 (59) ‘Guidelines for the Sampling of Fuel Oils’ are benchmark guidelines to ensure the integrity of the sampling process and sets out details, such as sample location, handling and storage. In relation to the sampling method used to take samples from the manifold, as set out in the above clauses, the guideline recommends that the sample should “...be drawn continuously throughout the bunker delivery period”.

Various methods of tank sampling are possible, but some are more representative than others. Thus it is important to include on the sample bottle a label detailing the method used.

It is also important to seal and label the bottles correctly and to ensure that a sufficient sample volume is collected. It is usually recommended that five samples are collected; the MARPOL sample, supplier’s sample, vessel’s own retained sample, on board analysis sample and a sample for independent analysis.

Testing

A suitable testing laboratory should be agreed upon in advance and set out in the contract. If this has not been done then the parties should agree on a laboratory to test the agreed, binding, sample. Such a laboratory should be qualified, independent and accredited and capable of undertaking the specific tests and analysis required.

It should also be noted that not all laboratories allow the testing to be witnessed and the parties will need to make clear if this is acceptable. It should also be noted that where there are samples to be tested under both a charterparty  and a bunker supply contract then the same laboratory should be used for both samples in order to ensure the same methodology and processes are applied.

There should also be a testing protocol as agreed between the parties’ experts as this will avoid any later arguments as to the method used.

The results of the analysis will then be measured against the fuel specifications as stipulated under the relevant charter party or bunker supply contract, i.e. typically ISO 8217 (and whichever version is agreed e.g. 2012, or 2017). The results will show whether the fuel was on specification under the ISO 8217

‘Table 2’ requirements, which set out limits for, amongst other things, sulfur, water and aluminium. Further gas chromatography testing, combined with mass spectrometry (GC-MS) will provide analysis of the fuel for the purposes of the remainder of Clause 5, such as indicating whether the fuel is “free of any material that renders a fuel unacceptable for use in marine applications”.

For reference the circular MEPC.182 (59) may be downloaded at,

http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Marine-Environment-Protection-Committee-(MEPC)/Documents/MEPC.182(59).pdf

Prepare crews for PSC spot sampling of ships’ fuel

Marine Insurance P&I Club News 06/05/2019

“Prepare crews for PSC spot sampling of ships’ fuel”. This may seem like pretty minor advice at a time when ship owners are in the midst of preparing their fleets and crews for compliance with the 2020 global sulphur cap. Onboard spot sampling of ships’ fuel is nothing new. 

Since the 0.10% sulphur cap entered into force in EU ports and the designated ECAs, spot sampling and analysis of ships’ fuel have been common as a means for port state control (PSC) to verify the actual sulphur content of the fuel in use.

The ECAs are still relatively limited in terms of geographical scope whilst compliance with the global 0.50% sulphur cap involves much larger quantities and different types of fuels. Hence, it is anticipated that the frequency of PSC requests to take spot samples of ships’ fuel oil will increase significantly after 1 January 2020 and shipowners should prepare their ships and crew accordingly. The IMO’s adoption of a prohibition on the carriage of non-compliant fuel oil from 1 March 2020, the so called ‘carriage ban’, is also expected to drive the requirements for further sampling by PSC.

Even PSC inspectors make mistakes

There is no doubt that PSC will play an important role in the enforcement of the 2020 global 0.50% sulphur cap. However, while many PSC regimes are investing heavily in training and education of their inspectors ahead of the regulatory changes, others may not be equally well prepared for their new inspection tasks come 1 January 2020. The cases reported below demonstrate that even PSC inspectors make mistakes from time to time. And when such mistakes are the reason for ships being penalised – proper onboard procedures and a well prepared and attentive crew can make a big difference in changing the outcome of a case.

Case 1 – read the ‘small print’ before you sign

A ship entered with Gard was recently fined in an EU port for “using marine fuel with a content of sulphur higher than the restriction established by law (0.10%) in port”. A sample had been drawn from the fuel oil system while the ship was at berth and testing established that the sulphur content of the sampled fuel exceeded the 0.10% limit. The test results came as a complete surprise to the ship’s crew. According to the Chief Engineer, the ship’s auxiliary engines had been running on compliant marine gas oil (MGO) at the time of the inspection. This statement was supported by entries in the ship’s log-books, which showed that a successful change-over to MGO had been completed in line with the port’s requirements, as well as the bunker delivery note for the MGO, which showed that its sulphur content was well below the required 0.10% limit.

Further investigations revealed that the ship’s fuel oil supply unit for the main engines had also been running at the time of the PSC inspection, but only in re-circulation mode as part of the procedures for securing the main engines after stopping. The shipowner therefore concluded that it was very likely that the inspector had sampled fuel from the ‘wrong system’ and that the sample did not represent the fuel burned while the ship was at berth. Additional testing of the ship’s duplicate fuel sample supported this conclusion, the fuel in the bottle was HFO, not MGO. It appears in this instance that our Member may have been penalised because of a mistake made by the PSC inspector.

Following further investigations, the shipowner found that the PSC inspector’s sampling report was incomplete and could not be directly linked to the ship’s duplicate fuel sample that had been tested. The report did not specify the quality of the fuel sampled, the location where the sample was taken, nor did it list the seal number on the sample bottle. However, when it also turned out that the ship’s Master and Chief Engineer had signed the inspector’s report, with no notification of protest, it became very difficult for the shipowner to argue his case.

Case 2 – a picture is worth a thousand words

In another case, also in a port in the EU, a routine port state control inspection of a ship included the taking of a fuel sample. And, like the previous case, when the sample was tested, the sulphur content of the sampled oil was above 0.10%, and a fine was levied on the ship. In this case our Member was able to document that the ship had bunkered and burned only compliant ultra-low sulphur fuel oil (ULSFO) for the previous two years. From the shipowner’s perspective, it was therefore quite clear that the ship’s fuel oil could not possibly contain the stated sulphur levels.

Since the crew had taken pictures whilst the PSC inspection was ongoing, the correct seal number on the relevant sample bottle was easily identifiable and the duplicate sample that was kept onboard could quickly be located. It turned out that the duplicate sample bottle contained a thick brownish oil that did not resemble the ship’s ULSFO. When the duplicate sample was tested, and found to contain hydraulic oil, the fine was cancelled. Thanks to attentive crew and good routines on board, the shipowner was in this instance able to prove the PSC inspector had made a mistake.

Sulphur inspections – issues to be aware of

A ship may be targeted for a sulphur inspection for various reasons, e.g. the existence of a previous non-compliance or warning received concerning its fuel, the ship is scheduled to bunker at a specific port, or as part of a maritime safety administration’s enhanced verification programme – or just randomly in order to reach an overall percentage inspection rate set by the PSC.

Methods of verifying compliance

For the vast majority of ships that plan to meet the 2020 requirement by burning low sulphur fuel, PSC has essentially two methods of establishing whether a ship is compliant:

1) Verify the sulphur content of the ship’s fuel, e.g. by reviewing procedures, bunker delivery notes (BDN), log book recordings, analyse the MARPOL delivered sample, and taking additional samples at different locations of the fuel oil system.

2) Measure the sulphur content in the ship’s exhaust gas, e.g. by use of remote sensing equipment such as sulphur-sniffing drones or similar monitoring equipment placed at strategic locations on shore.

Document review

Much of the compliance with MARPOL Annex VI is documented by recordkeeping. It will therefore be important to ensure that that all MARPOL Annex VI documentation is complete and up-to-date prior to a port entry. Results from Tokyo MOUs concentrated inspection campaign in 2018 show that missing BDNs was one of the most notable deficiencies found during the campaign. Regulation 18.6 of MARPOL Annex VI requires BDNs to be retained onboard for a period of three years after the fuel has been delivered onboard.

In the shorter term, PSC may also consider ship implementations plans (SIP) when verifying compliance with the 0.50% sulphur limit requirement. A ship with a suitably developed SIP, and a clear record of the actions taken in order to be compliant, should be in a better position to demonstrate to PSC that the ship’s crew and managers have acted in good faith and done everything that could be reasonably expected to achieve full compliance. A SIP is, however, not mandatory and therefore, the absence of such or incorrect entries etc. should not form the basis for a PSC deficiency.

Initial check

The use of remote sensing equipment and portable handheld fuel analysers is likely to become increasingly common during initial inspections by PSC. As an example, the Danish Maritime Authorities recently announced that a sulphur-sniffing drone is already in use to check emissions from ships in Danish waters. When the drone enters a ship’s exhaust gas plume, it can register the amount of sulphur in the fuel and make the data immediately available to Danish authorities, who can follow up if a ship does not comply with the applicable requirements. http://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/27554374/prepare-crews-for-psc-spot-sampling-of-ships-fuel

The ship’s crew should, however, be aware that the results from such equipment may be of an indicative nature only and should not necessarily be accepted as the sole evidence of non-compliance. PSC inspectors are, however, likely to consider such results to be ‘clear grounds’ for further inspection.

More detailed inspection

Given ‘clear grounds’ to conduct a more detailed inspection, PSC may require samples of fuel oils to be analysed at a fuel testing laboratory. This could be either the representative samples provided with the BDN, or spot samples of fuel oil drawn from a ship’s fuel oil lines and/or tanks.

Where the MARPOL delivered sample required under Regulation 18.8.1 is taken from the ship, a receipt should be provided to the ship. Where spot samples are drawn from the ship’s fuel oil lines or tanks during the inspection, the Chief Engineer should be present at all times to verify that samples are drawn at the right location and in the correct way. The Chief Engineer should also inspect the immediate quality of the sample, verify that each sampling bottle is properly labelled and make sure the ship’s own samples are retained onboard. It is important that the PSC inspector reports information such as the sampling point location where the sample was drawn, date and port of sampling, name and IMO number of the ship, and details of seal identification.

Designated sampling points become mandatory under MARPOL Annex VI

A new retroactive requirement in MARPOL Annex VI to designate, or if necessary fit, sampling points to facilitate the taking of spot samples onboard ships was agreed during the sixth session of the IMO sub-committee on Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR 6) in February 2019. Subject to approval by the MEPC 74 in May 2019, ships will be required to designate, and clearly mark, sampling points no later than the first IAPP renewal survey that occurs 12 months or more after the entry into force of the amended regulation.

When designating the sampling points shipowners should consider the “2019 Guidelines for onboard sampling for the verification of the sulphur content of the fuel oil used on board ships”, also agreed at PPR 6. Although the guidelines are a recommendation only, they set out an acceptable sampling method for inspectors to determine the sulphur content of fuel oils, both with respect to location of sampling points and handling of the samples.

In order to distinguish between onboard spot samples and samples taken when fuel oil is delivered onboard, currently known as the ‘MARPOL sample’, the PPR 6 agreed to introduce two new terms in MARRPOL Annex VI: the ‘in-use sample’ to describe a sample drawn from a ship’s fuel oil system and the ‘onboard sample’ to describe a sample drawn from a ship’s bunker tank. The latter was introduced as a means of verifying compliance with the new ‘carriage ban’ and the PPR 6 further agreed that additional new guidelines are needed to support the safe taking of samples from ships’ bunker tanks.

Summary and recommendations

Despite ongoing preparatory work within the IMO and the publication of numerous guidances by classification societies and other industry stakeholders, shipowners still face a range of uncertainties and potential operational risks post-2020. Fuel prices in 2020 are a big unknown. Understandably, most shipowners worry about an increase in costs in an already difficult economic environment. Equally high on shipowners’ agenda are issues related to the availability of low sulphur fuels and the quality of new fuel blends. Compatibility between fuel batches is a serious safety concern, and so is the long-term stability of some of these new fuels. For those that have invested in exhaust gas cleaning systems (scrubbers), it will be particularly important to keep a close eye on the local regulation of wash water discharges from open-loop scrubbers.

Shipowners can, however, be fairly certain of one thing: PSC will start enforcing the cap from 1 January 2020, whether the industry is ready or not! Hence, when preparing fleets and crews for compliance with the 2020 global sulphur cap:

·       Do not forget to revisit ships’ procedures for fuel sampling.

·     Make sure the procedures describe acceptable and safe sampling methods for a ship’s fuel oil system, both with respect to location of sampling points, handling of the samples, and record keeping.

·     Train the relevant members of the engine crew and emphasise the importance of escorting the attending sulphur inspector at all times while onboard.

·   Consider if the recommendations contained in existing, as well as coming IMO sampling guidelines should be implemented in a ship’s procedures. The European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) “Sulphur Inspection Guidance” provides useful advice and information on the PSC’s approach to the inspection of ships and how they ascertain a vessel’s compliance with applicable sulphur in fuel requirements. Section 2.7 of the EMSA guidance addresses sample collection and analysis

Remember, without proper evidence, the chances of the shipowner losing the claim in a disputed case are high.

Source: http://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/27554374/prepare-crews-for-psc-spot-sampling-of-ships-fuel

Marshall Islands releases report on sinking of Stellar Daisy

More than two years after VLOC Stellar Daisy sank, the Marshall Islands flag has published its report into the tragedy, which killed 22 of the 24 crew on board. The ship's class society Korean Registry quickly issued a response to the report, agreeing with much, disagreeing with some points, and saying that it would act on others.

The Stellar Daisy, owned by South Korea-based Polaris Shipping, sank in the South Atlantic on March 31st 2017  while on a laden voyage from Ilha Guaíba, Brazil, to Qingdao, China. At the time of the sinking she was more than 1,700nm from the coast of Uruguay and 1,800nm from the west coast of South Africa. She sank to a depth of about 3.5km.

The marine safety investigation conducted by the Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator determined that the likely direct cause of Stellar Daisy foundering was a rapid list to port following a catastrophic structural failure of the ship’s hull. This caused a loss of buoyancy and uncontrolled flooding.

The structural failure and flooding were thought to have begun in the No. 2 port water ballast tank (WBT) and then progressed rapidly to include structural failure and flooding in multiple WBTs, voids, and cargo holds.

The report ascribed the structural damage to a combination of probable factors, including the strength of the ship’s structure being compromised over time due to material fatigue, corrosion, unidentified structural defects, multi-port loading, and the forces imposed on the hull as a result of the weather conditions encountered by the vessel between March 29th and 31st.

The Administrator’s marine safety investigation also concluded that the likely causal factors include:

1. the large port and starboard wing tanks increased the potential for a major structural failure and loss of buoyancy in the event that one or more of these tanks flooded while the ship was in a laden condition;
2. a gap in the additional safety measures for bulk carriers contained in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, Chapter XII, regulation 5. This does not require an assessment to ensure certain types of bulk carrier could withstand the flooding of any one wing tank in all loading and ballast conditions;
3. ineffective assessments of structural damage identified when the ship was in dry dock in 2011, 2012, and 2015 which failed to determine the cause of the structural damage, identify any potential defects with the conversion design, or require the development of appropriate repair plans.

The Stellar Daisy was formerly a very large crude carrier (VLCC), which completed its conversion to a VLOC in January 2009.

The investigation included interviews with the two surviving crew members, a detailed review of documents related to the ship’s conversion design, maintenance and inspection history, and cargo records, and a third party and Classification Society technical analysis. It also included a review of a video taken during a deep-sea search that was conducted by the Republic of Korea.

The Administrator thanked the marine safety investigation authorities from Korea, the Philippines and from Brazil for the assistance they provided as Substantially Interested States. The Administrator also thanked Polaris Shipping, the Korean Register (KR), and Vale SA for their cooperation.

KR said that in general it agreed with the majority of the content contained within the report and concurred that the most likely explanation for the loss of the vessel was due to a catastrophic structural failure of the ship’s hull which probably began in No 2 Port Water Ballast Tank (WBT).

KR also agreed with the report that the fatigue cracking was probably undetectable by visual inspection prior to the sinking.

KR said that, in its opinion, areas of the report that were "directed specifically at KR which require further explanation".

KR’s areas of concern were focused on page 71 of the report:

Material fatigue

The report stated that KR’s review and approval of the conversion design was based on the assumption that all of the scantlings, including those from when the ship was constructed as a VLCC in 1993, were as original and did not take into account material fatigue. KR responded that "the basis for this assumption was that the Finite Element Analysis (FEA), which was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the KR Rules for Steel Ships, took into consideration allowable stress, corrosion, and stresses due to local notch effect."
KR said that the report correctly stated that the FEA and fatigue strength assessment took into consideration allowable stress, corrosion, and stresses due to local notch effect. It said that this was "common practice for many IACS classification societies. An independent review conducted by Bruce S. Rosenblatt & Associates – the third-party hired by RMI to technically review the conversion process – confirmed that KR’s structural analysis was conducted properly".=

Failure analysis

The report stated that, although KR did conduct a failure analysis of the damage to the transverse bulkhead at frame No 65, it did not conduct a failure analysis after an extensive number of cracks were identified and repaired when the ship was in drydock in 2011, within two years after the conversion was completed. As a result, potential weaknesses with design details were not identified. This is an indication that KR’s monitoring and assessment of the ship’s structural integrity was not as effective as it might have been. KR said that "a failure analysis is carried out at the discretion of the attending surveyor when, in their assessment, a defect or damage is 'out of the ordinary' and further scrutiny is required. This is in accordance with KR procedures and in common with other IACS classification societies. The RMI report correctly states that a failure analysis of the damage to the transverse bulkhead at frame No. 65 was conducted as it was determined by the attending surveyor to be 'out of the ordinary' and similar damage was not found in other parts of the ship. However, the cracks/defects identified and repaired at the time of dry-docking in 2011 were determined to be those typically found on board ships of a similar age. Based on this observation, the attending surveyor determined that the cracks/defects were not 'out of the ordinary' and as long as proper repairs were performed, a failure analysis was not needed".

Reporting to Flag Administration

The report stated that KR was authorized to serve as an RO on behalf of the Administrator. The 2016 RO Agreement between the Administrator and KR required that KR immediately inform the Administrator of, among other things, “any dangerous occurrences, accidents, machinery or structural breakdowns, or failures that they are aware of on a Vessel.” KR did not inform the Administrator of the damage to frame No. 65 in 2016. KR responded that, as stated in the casualty investigation report, a failure analysis was carried out to assess the structural integrity of damage to the transverse bulkhead at frame No. 65, the result of which showed that there was no area of concern and proper repairs were undertaken to renew the damaged part to its original condition. KR also examined the surrounding bulkheads of Stellar Daisy as well as bulkheads on 29 other converted VLOCs (approximately 230 bulkheads in total) to determine if there were any similar defects. The result of this extensive investigation was that there were no areas of concern. As a thorough inspection and comprehensive repairs were undertaken, KR determined that there was no “dangerous” structural issue that warranted reporting to the Flag Administration".
However, mindful of the recommendations in the report, KR said that it intended to review its reporting procedures to avoid any future misunderstandings.

Full reports may be read at,

https://www.marinelog.com/news/marshall-islands-releases-report-on-stellar-daisy-sinking/

https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/RMI-Stellar-Daisy-Casualty-Investigation-Report-2019_04.pdf

The final countdown...the 2020 sulphur cap

The global sulphur cap, a MARPOL Annex VI requirement, enters into force on 1 January 2020, less than nine months away. In this short article we provide recommendations for managing the transition where the strategy is to use conventional compliant fuel, that is to transition from HSFO to a low sulphur fuel oil or distillate.

The cap means that the sulphur content of fuel oil used on board commercial ships trading globally must not exceed 0.50% m/m. This is a reduction from the current global limit of 3.50% m/m that applies outside of designated emission control areas (ECAs). However, the 0.10% sulphur limit shall continue to apply inside ECAs and for ships at berth in EU ports.

Ships can meet the 2020 sulphur cap requirement by using:

·         conventional compliant fuel such as sulphur controlled distillates or residual fuel oils;

·         alternative fuel types that meet the sulphur limits, such as LNG, methanol or hydrogen, some biofuels and synthetically manufactured fuel oils; or

·         an equivalent means to remove sulphur oxides from post-combustion exhaust emissions, such as an exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS), more often referred to as a “scrubber”.

To assist global implementation of the sulphur limits Regulation 14.1 of MARPOL Annex VI prohibits the carriage of non-compliant fuel oil from 1 March 2020 unless the vessel is fitted with a scrubber.   

The “compliance strategy”, which is primarily a choice between stemming compliant fuel or using a scrubber, is a commercial decision for shipowners and charterers. 

Ready, steady... 2020!

Owners and charterers should work with their counterparties to do some or all of the following to manage the transition to low sulphur fuels:

·         Use the BIMCO 2020 clauses. The 2020 Fuel Transition Clause for Time Charter Parties and the 2020 Marine Fuel Sulphur Content Clause for Time Charter Parties were published on 10 December 2018 and provide an objectively ‘fair’ approach to apportionment of liability for some of the key issues arising out of the change in regulation.

·         Prepare a Ship Implementation Plan (SIP) and carry it out. Maintain a record of its implementation onboard.  IMO guidance on the  use of SIPs was approved during MEPC73 in October 2018 and has been issued as MEPC.1/Circ.878.  As a minimum, the plan should provide guidance on

o    how to segregate different fuel grades,

o    how and when to carry out compatibility testing, and

o    how and when to carry out tank cleaning.

·         Work with your counterparty.  If your charterparty is going to straddle the 1 January 2020 deadline, begin a conversation now with your owner/charterer. Come to an agreement as to how you will handle the cleaning of tanks, and the purging of all pipework and the fuel oil service system, of all HSFO residues.

·         Decide how and when tank cleaning will take place. Will it be during dry dock or whilst the vessel is in service?  If you intend to dry dock, make sure that it is booked well in advance of the 1 January 2020 deadline.

·         Identify what type of compliant fuel you intend to use and begin to source reliable suppliers. Seek advice from engine manufacturers prior to ordering and using new/unfamiliar types of fuel.

·         Brief the Master and crew. Make sure they are prepared for the 1 January 2020 deadline change and the processes that will need to be put in place in advance of that date. Make sure they understand the importance of the entire ship’s system being purged of any HSFO residues. Have a plan in place for any unforeseen breaches and make sure your Master and crew know what to do and how to complete any necessary paperwork, including the IMO Draft Report on Compliant Fuel Non-Availability.

The MARPOL 0.50% sulphur regulation change will come into force on 1 January 2020. This deadline will not be put back. To make sure that you are properly prepared we would encourage you to adopt some of the suggestions set out above.  MEPC 74 is scheduled to take place between 13 – 17 May, to finalise the IMO’s response to some of the still unresolved 2020 issues. A further Gard update will follow publication of the report of that meeting. In the meantime, if you require further advice or guidance, please contact your Gard representative who will be able to assist you further.

http://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/27391956/the-final-countdownthe-2020-sulphur-cap

Liquid Cargo Sampling

A pro-active approach to cargo sampling on tankers can potentially save millions of dollars in claims and prevent delays to the vessel. In this Insight, insurance and P&I club Gard looks at some critical aspects of cargo sampling on tankers. Disputes relating to ‘off-spec’ or contaminated liquid cargoes are a recurring problem and ship owners may have no independent evidence as to the cause of an alleged cargo contamination.  

The source of the problem could be in the shore tank at the load port, in the shore pipeline during loading or on board the vessel itself. The cargo could even have been manufactured out of specification prior to delivery to the terminal for shipment.

However, if the cargo is found to be ‘off-spec’ when the vessel arrives at the discharge port and there is no evidence of contamination from the load port, the vessel could be faced with a claim, even if the vessel is not at fault. Samples drawn at the load port and retained on board showing that the condition of the cargo has not changed between loading and discharge provide the best defense against cargo claims. It is therefore important that ship owners and operators implement proper procedures for taking, and retaining, own (duplicate) samples of all cargoes loaded on the vessel and train their crew in how to perform the sampling process. For example, an experienced officer may be able to identify a poor-quality sample by visual inspection alone, and early intervention may prevent an expensive claim arising later.

Case Study

Although substantial resources are used on board vessels in the preparation and cleaning of tanks and lines prior to loading, we see that samples are frequently not taken by the vessel at the start of loading. Alternatively, where samples are taken, they are not taken following the proper procedure or are discarded for one reason or another before they can be analyzed.

In a recent Gard case, a chemical carrier arrived at a terminal with its cargo tanks and lines cleaned and ready for loading.

The vessel was inspected upon arrival and found to be suitable for the nominated cargo. No manifold samples were taken at the commencement of loading, but first foot samples were taken from the designated tanks that were being loaded.

Upon analysis of the first foot samples, the cargo was found to be ‘off-spec’ resulting in stoppages and delays on the vessel’s account for further tank cleaning. The vessel was held responsible for contaminating the cargo and the cargo in the vessel’s tank was pumped back ashore and the vessel was instructed to leave the terminal to clean her cargo tanks and lines.

She returned to the terminal following cleaning operations and loading was resumed. On this occasion, manifold samples were taken and analysed and everything found to be in order. However, upon detailed analysis of the sample of the contaminated cargo, the cause of the contamination was suspected to be from the remains of the previous cargo in the shore tanks and lines. Given that there were no manifold samples on the first occasion, there was no way for the vessel to prove that the cargo received on the first occasion may have been contaminated prior loading. Protecting interestsThe manifold - The transfer of custody of the cargo from another vessel or the terminal to the vessel, and vice versa, normally takes place when the cargo passes the vessel’s manifold. A manifold sample taken at the start of loading and discharge can, in principle, determine who is responsible for the contamination of a cargo. It should be noted that manifold samples should be taken outboard of the manifold valve. During this process, the loading rate should be very low, preferably by gravity.

In some Gard cases, even where a manifold sample had been taken at the start of loading, samples have been known to have been disposed of by the crew if they do not appear to be of the expected quality. A new sample is then drawn once the cargo quality appears as expected, and becomes the manifold sample ‘on record’, as having been taken by the ship at first loading.

Thus, the only evidence available in this instance indicates that sound cargo was loaded and the evidence showing that the cargo had been contaminated ashore is lost.

While this practice appears to be counterintuitive, it is nonetheless, prevalent. First foot samples - These should be taken to confirm that the vessel’s systems and pipes are clean. This is particularly important where sensitive and/or expensive cargoes are loaded to reduce the risks associated with contamination of the entire cargo parcel. Tank samples- Taking a final tank sample after completion of loading and prior to commencement of discharge will enable the vessel to determine the cause of any potential contamination on board. It can also be useful for the officer in charge to request specimens of samples taken by the terminal’s surveyor at the terminal’s manifold as well as samples from the shore tank and shore line.

If the quality of the cargo samples from the ship and shore appear to be different, loading should be ceased for further investigation.

Recommendations

To ensure the best possible defense of a cargo claim against the vessel, it is recommended that ship owners create awareness among the crew of the problems related to improper sampling and have in place written procedures describing the sampling process in detail. An improper sampling method can result in a poor-quality sample which is not necessarily representative of the cargo itself.

The procedures should include and emphasize the following points:

• Involvement of vessels’ crew. The crew should participate in the taking of cargo samples, both during loading and discharge, and should be competent in checking and verifying the quality of the samples taken. The Chief Officer should preferably be involved in all cargo sampling whether it is taking samples for the vessel or for the charterers.

• Independent cargo samples to be taken by the vessels’ crew. As a minimum, the crew should, for each grade of the cargo, take:

• Manifold samples, taken at a vessel’s manifold at the start of loading, preferably with the manifold valve in a closed position. Spot checks should be carried out at the manifold during loading whenever practicable, eg after shore stops and/or change of shore tanks.

• Pump stack samples, if taken by a surveyor the vessel should take own/duplicate samples.

• First foot samples, taken from the cargo tanks once cargo level reached the first foot in the tank(s).

• Final tank samples, taken from the cargo tanks after completion of loading.

• Cargo tank samples prior to commencement of discharge.

• The importance of the manifold sample often referred to as the ‘million-dollar sample’. Where a proper sample of the first products loaded has been drawn and retained on board, any uncertainty about the quality of the cargo at the time of loading can usually be clarified at relatively low cost. Vessel procedures should therefore be specifically formulated to avoid any misunderstandings when it comes to ensuring that this manifold sample is never disposed of, regardless of its apparent quality.

Handling of samples

• Always flush the sampling point prior to drawing a sample.

• Always use clean and appropriate sampling equipment and properly label, seal and store the samples in designated areas

• The labelling should always state where, what type and when the sample was drawn, eg ‘manifold at commencement of loading’ or ‘final tank sample drawn in the middle of cargo tank 4P’.

• Ensure there are sufficient sample amounts for retesting if necessary.

• For sample retention, we recommend members and clients have a clear policy taking into consideration the storage space, the vessel’s schedule and the number of grades loaded for each voyage. Samples should be retained for at least three months after the completion of discharge. If the vessel has received complaints during a voyage the samples should be retained for longer if possible, or ask your insurer if the samples can be disposed of.

• Recordings should be made in the cargo log-book to ensure traceability of samples taken.

• Sample bottles should, as far as possible, be suitable for the cargo in question. For example, use amber coloured glass bottles for UV sensitive cargo to prevent deterioration due to the effects of UV lights.

• For cargo that is oxygen sensitive the bottles should be purged with nitrogen prior to sampling.

• Sample report: On completion of sampling, a sample report should be produced by the vessel listing the unique identifier number of each sample retained on board and of the samples given to the charterers’ surveyor. The sample report should be jointly signed by the vessel’s Master, or his representative, and the charterers’ surveyor. Ship owners and operators should instruct their officers on board that whenever they are in doubt as to the apparent quality of a liquid bulk cargo, they should seek expert advice and have any samples analyzed at the loading port.