BIMCO issues CII clause for Time Charter Parties

New regulations on the carbon intensity of international shipping will come into force on 1 January 2023. The complex CII regulations are expected to significantly impact the future operation of ships. Shipowners and charterers must embrace new ways to co-operate, and new clauses for charter parties will be needed to help owners and charterers succeed.

The starting point for the new CII clause is that a time charterer should take responsibility for a ship’s emissions because the charterer makes the relevant decisions on the operation of the ship. When entering into the charter party, or incorporating the clause into an existing charter party, the parties are to agree on a specific CII to be achieved each year.

“The subcommittee comprised ship owners, charterers and legal and insurance experts. After more than eight months of deliberation and consultation, we have arrived at a clause which serves as an excellent starting point for negotiations for owners and charterers and which is workable in practice. The new clause will be reviewed as the underpinning regulatory regime develops,” says Nicholas Fell, Chairperson of BIMCO’s Documentary Committee.

As the industry faces more regulations from the IMO and the EU aimed at reducing shipping’s CO2 emissions, the need for new contracts and clauses increases. In December 2021, BIMCO published an EEXI Transition Clause and at the end of May 2022, BIMCO released a new Emissions Trading System Allowances (ETSA) Clause for Time Charter Parties in response to the European Union’s intention to include shipping emissions in the EU's emissions trading system, the ETS.

“The CII clause is the latest addition to BIMCO’s suite of carbon clauses for time charter parties. The subcommittee will now continue its work to develop further clauses (such as a CII clause for voyage charter parties) to assist charterers and owners responding to new regulatory requirements, regardless of whether they come from the IMO, EU, or elsewhere,” says Stinne Taiger Ivø, Director, Contracts & Support at BIMCO.

The clause can be downloaded at:

https://maritimecyprus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/BIMCO-CII-clause-for-Time-Chartr-Parties.pdf

Maritime Law: Cabotage Laws from Around the World

The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) released a multi-year study showing 91 nations have cabotage laws on their books. The report – called Cabotage Laws of the World – comes from the Seafarers’ Rights International (SRI). It provides the first comprehensive, independent analysis of worldwide maritime cabotage laws since the early 1990s. (SRI Executive Director Deirdre Fitzpatrick addressed the MTD Executive Board in March on this research).

Cabotage refers to the movement of cargo or goods within the boundaries of one nation. The Jones Act has stood as the United States’ freight cabotage law since 1920. It states goods moved from one domestic port to another must be carried aboard U.S.-flag, U.S.-built, U.S.-crewed and U.S.-owned vessels.

Within its 100 pages is a review of applicable maritime cabotage laws for the 91 of the 140 nations analyzed. These 91 countries represent 80% of the world’s coastal United Nations maritime states. The report is careful to point out these various maritime laws are not identical, and refers to the Jones Act as the model for others. It also demonstrates that cabotage laws exist across all political, economic and legal systems.

According to the report, cabotage laws are found around the world and geared toward protecting local shipping industries, ensuring the retention of skilled maritime workers and preservation of maritime knowledge and technology, which promote safety and bolster national security.

“Without strong cabotage rules, local workers often have to compete with cheap, exploited foreign labor on flag of convenience vessels, the owners of which usually pay substandard wages and flout safety laws,” added Given, who is the president of the Seafarers International Union of Canada and serves as chair of the ITF Cabotage Task Force.

Ms Fitzpatrick called the Jones Act “a model cabotage law: protecting jobs, the workforce, and the country. But to protect the Jones Act, and to protect other cabotage laws around the world, it can only be helpful to know which countries have cabotage protections so that, in fact, the situation might be that the protection of cabotage laws is the norm, and it’s not the exception.”

Prior to Fitzpatrick’s remarks, the most readily accepted number of nations with maritime cabotage laws was 40. That came from a 1991 study conducted by the U.S Maritime Administration.

Cabotage is not a new phenomenon. According to the report, cabotage laws can be traced to fourteenth-century England. The first U.S. Congress in 1789 enacted a cabotage law.

The ITF, to which several MTD affiliates belong, has campaigned for decades to underline the importance of national cabotage laws and the value of having domestic jobs in national waters, as well as domestic employment conditions for foreign seafarers in cases where domestic seafarers are not available. Members of the London-based ITF come from around 650 transportation-related unions from 150 nations.

The SRI conducts independent legal research on maritime-related subjects under the guidance of an advisory board composed of judges, professors, lawyers and maritime industry representatives from around the world.

To see the full report, click below:

https://maritimecyprus.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/cabotage-laws-of-the-world-ss-1.pdf

IAPH: Checklists for Ship-to-Ship and Truck-to-Ship bunkering of liquefied gasses

IAPH announced the publication of a total of six new checklists created and developed by the IAPH Clean Marine Fuels Working Group, which cater for both Ship-to-Ship and Truck-to-Ship bunkering operations of liquefied gasses as a marine fuel at ports.

One of the main objectives of the working group was to create harmonized bunker checklists for known bunkering scenarios. These checklists reflect the extra requirements of ports with regard to bunker operations of alternative marine fuels in or near their port environment.

These new bunkering checklists, which are applicable to LNG, but also to Liquid Hydrogen,will contribute in a very concrete way towards the energy transition of shipping

IAPH Managing Director Patrick Verhoeven, commented.

Ship to Ship checklist

The checklist is available in two alternative versions. Ports or other competent authorities may choose either version A or B to be applicable for their port.

• Version A has been developed specific for project-based bunkering of vessels alongside a quay where the site operator is fully engaged in, and has a shared responsibility for, the safety of the STS bunkering.
• Version B has been developed specific for the bunkering of vessels alongside a “Bunker Ready Terminal”.

IAPH recommends that terminals should be involved in the process to enable and ensure safe bunker operations at their berths. The choice as to which checklist is to be used in a port should be based on the formal responsibilities of the terminal, which may depend on national or regional legislation.

If the formal role of the terminal includes certain responsibilities with respect to the STS bunker operation, STS bunker checklist ‘A’ would be the checklist of choice.

In case the terminal only is to be informed on which operational risk mitigation measures are to be taken during STS bunker operations, version ‘B’ would be checklist of choice. 

https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/IAPH-Liquefied-Gas-Bunker-Checklist-STS-A-2022_11.pdf

https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/IAPH-Liquefied-Gas-Bunker-Checklist-STS-B-2022_11.pdf

NTSB reports on $1 million LPG tanker strike on tugs and loading dock

The National Transportation Safety Board has released its report on a November 25, 2021 incident involving a 754-foot-long, 106-foot-wide LPG carrier, the Gas Ares, that led to more than $1 million in damages. The vessel was transiting upbound on the Neches River in Port Neches, Texas, when it struck the outermost of two harbor tugs moored alongside the no. 1 loading dock at the Motiva Port Neches Terminal. The tug Sabine was outboard on the channel side with the tug Florida moored inboard and alongside the dock, both facing up river.

The Sabine’s mooring broke, and the tug was pushed into the adjacent tug Florida and moved up river. The Florida, which had four crewmembers on board, was driven against the dock but remained moored. The Gas Ares’s port bow sustained minor damage consisting of an indentation and scratch in the shell plating above the waterline. No postcasualty survey was conducted.

• The Sabine sustained damage to its starboard main engine/generator stack plating, anchor handling boom, onboard image recording system, and about 11 feet of its starboard bulwarks and starboard rubber fendering. The cost of repairs was about $34,000.

• The Florida sustained damage to its no. 2 port wing fuel tank and starboard-side shell plating near the engine room. The cost of repairs was about $56,000.

• The Motiva no. 1 dock sustained damage to its pilings, steel beams that supported the concrete deck, the concrete surface, and mooring dolphins.2 The cost of repairs was estimated to be $967,000.

At the time of the incident, the Gas Ares was under the navigational control of a state licensed pilot from the Sabine Pilots.

ANALYSIS

Following is the NTSB report’s analysis of the incident:

“As the 106-foot-wide Gas Ares was transiting through the Neches River at half ahead at 8.1 knots, at 2208, the pilot of the Gas Ares hailed the outbound 688-foot-long tow Chad Douglas and proposed a starboard-to-starboard passing. Setting the vessel up to meet the tow, the pilot of the Gas Ares favored the left (south) part of the 400-foot-wide navigation channel—the same side where vessels were moored at the Huntsman and Motiva docks. At 2212, about 4 minutes after arranging the passing, the pilot ordered the Gas Ares to dead slow ahead to avoid making a wake as the LPG carrier passed a pipeline removal project (to starboard outside of the navigation channel), and about 6 minutes later, the vessel was only making about 3.8 knots. The pilot’s decision to order the vessel’s speed reduced in anticipation of passing the pipeline removal project was what initiated the eventual collision with the Sabine at the Motiva no. 1 dock.

“As the Gas Ares approached the Huntsman dock (where an ATB was moored), Motiva dock no. 2 (where the 144-foot-wide tanker Wonder Polaris was moored), and the Chad Douglas tow, the pilot faced a close-quarters passing with the vessels moored at each dock. The pilot had the tug Hayley Moran—which had been made fast to the stern of the Gas Ares—pull the Gas Ares’s stern to starboard to keep it from falling onto the Wonder Polaris. At the same time, she issued rudder and engine orders intended to keep the LPG carrier from falling farther south and point its bow back into the channel. North-northwesterly winds at 18–27 knots exerted pressure on the exposed (in-ballast) starboard-side hull above the waterline (the 0.4-knot current likely had little impact on the immersed portion of the hull). Thus, the vessel—which was already on the left side of the narrow channel for the passing arrangement with the Chad Douglas tow—was set farther toward the left and the Huntsman and Motiva docks. With the pilot’s ordered reduction of the ship’s speed, the Gas Ares’s rudder became less effective, and the pilot was not able to move the vessel to starboard and away from the nearby moored vessels by rudder and engine alone. The pilot’s efforts to use the stern tug to pull the Gas Ares’s stern back to starboard and the center of the channel caused the LPG carrier’s bow to point more toward the left side of the channel and moored vessels. Without enough headway, the pilot was unable to steer the vessel back to the center of the channel and avoid striking the moored Sabine at the Motiva no. 1 dock.”

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision between the liquefied petroleum gas carrier Gas Ares and the tug Sabine, moored alongside the tug Florida at the Motiva Port Neches Terminal no. 1 loading dock, was the pilot’s decision to reduce the vessel’s speed in order to create less wake when passing a pipeline removal project, causing a loss of rudder effectiveness in strong crosswinds that set the carrier toward moored vessels.

• As always, there’s very much more in the full NTSB report.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MIR2227.pdf

Do you know the safe passages through the Bohai Strait in China?

The Bohai Strait in China is the only entrance and exit for vessels to the Bohai Sea. In recent years, there have been frequent reports of ships being fined by the authorities for crossing the areas with restricted navigation in the Bohai Strait. 

Moreover, vessels often also come into contact with fishery farms or fishing nets when navigating in those areas. Members and masters of vessels calling at ports in the Bohai Sea are advised to familiarize themselves with the safe passages through Bohai Strait to avoid penalties and fishery related claims.

Case study

In March 2022, a Gard Member’s cargo vessel was on an outbound passage in the Bohai Sea having departed from Tianjin. Before arriving at the Laotieshan Channel, the OOW received a VHF call from Dalian VTS stating that due to a military exercise in the area, the Laotieshan TSS was temporarily closed. The Master on the bridge considered the options available and decided to pass between the islands of Daqin Dao and Tuoji Dao. The vessel adjusted her course and passed through the Beituoji Waterway as shown in the below map. The next day the vessel received a message from the China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) stating that the vessel had passed through the area with restricted navigation and was therefore in breach of China’s Marine Traffic Safety Law.

Fines

The local MSA imposed fines for the breach of the provisions for passing through the restricted area:

l   The owner was fined CNY 40,000 (USD 6,000).

l   The Master was fined CNY 8,000 (USD 1,200).

l   The OOW was fined CNY 6,000 (USD 900).

The MSA also warned the vessel of potential claims against it as a result of contact with fishery farms and nets in the area. Fortunately, no such claims have been received to date.  

Transit data

The Bohai Strait is the only entrance and exit for vessels to the Bohai Sea. The Miaodao Archipelago, located in the middle and south of the strait, divides the strait into a dozen waterways. From north to south, there are the Laotieshan Channel, Daqin Waterway, Xiaoqin Waterway, Beituoji Waterway, Nantuoji Waterway, Changshan Waterway, Dengzhou Waterway, etc. According to information obtained from the Yantai MSA, most breaches are in the Beituoji Waterway of the Miaodao Archipelago, as also experienced by our Member’s vessel in the above case study. According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence, there are 125 transits by vessels of various types and larger than 3,000 Gross Tonnage (GT) of Beituoji waterway alone, during the period 2017 to 2021. Among them:

• Foreign vessels account for 94% of the total transits.  
• 58% vessels are bulk carriers and 27% are tankers of various types.
• 45% ships are more than 199 metres in Length overall (LOA). In 2017, a fully cellular containership of 400-metre LOA transited the Beituoji Waterway.
• 12% are vessels entered with Gard.

Passing through Bohai Strait safely

Information available in nautical publications

• Paper charts: A cautionary note can be found on British Admiralty (BA) Charts (such as BA1206), stating that Laotieshan Shuidao, Changshan Shuidao and Miaodao Haixia (Dengzhou Shuidao) are the only navigable channels through the Bohai Strait. It is worth noting that only vessels of 200GT or less are permitted to transit Miaodao Haixia (Dengzhou Shuidao).
• ECDIS: The following snapshot indicates how typical cautionary notes are displayed on the ECDIS: Navigating is prohibited in the fairways of Miaodao Qundao except Changshan Shuidao and Miaodao Haixia (Dengzhou Shuidao). Only vessels of less than 200GT can go through Miaodao Haixia.

 Admiralty Sailing Directions (ASD)： NP32B states that foreign vessels are only permitted to use three of the channels, namely Laotieshan channel, Changshan channel and Miaodao Haixia (Dengzhou Shuidao) (for vessels of 200GT or less only).

Other maritime safety information

Shandong MSA has published several navigational warnings (NWs) and notices to mariners (NTMs) to address the frequent breaches by merchant vessels, such as the NW SD0434 and NTM No. 068 in 2017, NTM No. 0519 in 2020, NW SD0088 in 2022. The recent warning published on 14 March 2022 includes the following information:

Frequent breaches

1. Mariners on foreign ships are not familiar with the areas with restricted navigation in the waters of the Miaodao Archipelago. The statistics indicate that foreign ships account for 94% of the total transits of the Beituoji Waterway between 2017 and 2021 and Chinese ships account for 6%. The actual number of breaches by Chinese ships may be even less because the statistics also include approved transits by Chinese rescue ships and training ships.  
2. Electronic charts do not display cautionary notes as clearly as paper charts. Many merchant vessels have been equipped with two sets of ECDIS to replace paper charts. However, ECDIS users have to query an object on the screen to find out more about it. Safety information such as the cautionary notes may not as readily available as on paper charts and it may take a few clicks to bring up a submenu to find the information.  
3. The names of the various waterways as listed on nautical publications are not easily understood by some mariners. Out of respect for local culture or for consistency with information in Chinese publications, many geographical names used in maritime safety information is in Chinese Pinyin instead of a proper translation. These may not be easily understood by foreign mariners. For example, in nautical publications, quite often Haixia is used for Strait as in Bohai Haixia, Shuidao for Channel or Waterway as in Laotieshan Shuidao, Qundao for Archipelago as in Miaodao Qundao, etc.
4. Vessels may choose alternative passages to avoid any area with military activities in the Bohai and North Yellow Seas. In our case study, the vessel decided to adjust her route because of the information received from Dalian VTS. There are frequent military drills and exercises in the Bohai and North Yellow Sea. Normally MSA will issue notices to mariners warning merchant vessels against entering the area. In order to avoid such area and possible congestion or delays, vessels may seek to use alternative routes that they normally would not take. Since Laotieshan TSS is within the coverage of Dalian VTS, the waters of the Miaodao Archipelago are under the administration of Yantai MSA. Vessels may find it difficult to obtain effective support or verification of any route adjustment or selection from the relevant VTS.
5. Vessels may also adjust their routes to avoid high concentrations of fishing boats in the Laotieshan Channel or Changshan Waterway. During the fishing season, there are a large number of fishing boats in Bohai Strait and North Yellow Sea. There have been some collisions between merchant vessels and the fishing boats in Laotieshan Channel and Changshan Waterway in the past. For example, a collision between a merchant vessel and a fishing boat in the Laotieshan Channel in 2020 led to the sinking of the fishing boat with the loss of all 10 crew. Mariners may seek “alternative” routes if they expect increasing fishing traffic along their planned routes through the Laotieshan Channel or Changshan Waterway.
6. Relevant maritime safety information (MSI) may not be readily available to mariners. The NWs published by China MSA are in English and Chinese, but NTMs are only in Chinese. And not all NWs or NTMs are picked up by the China Navy Hydrographic Office (CNHO). Since United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) uses CNHO products, including Notice to Mariners to keep UKHO products up to date. If relevant MSI published by China MSA is not picked up by CNHO, mariners who relying on British Admiralty publications may not receive such navigationally significant information from UKHO.

Consequences of breaches

Penalties for non-compliance

According to the Maritime Traffic Safety Law of China, any breaches of the legislation will be dealt with by the MSA. Article 44 of the law requires that a vessel shall not enter or pass through the restricted navigation zone in violation of provisions. Article 103(7) sets out the penalties imposed on vessels entering or passing through restricted navigation zones in violation of the provisions. Accordingly, vessels shall follow the instructions received from the MSA to take corrective action and:

• The owner, operator or manager of the vessel in violation of the law shall be fined not less than CNY 20,000 (USD 3,000) but not more than CNY 200,000 Yuan (USD 30,000),
• The Master and any liable crew members shall be subject to a fine of not less than CNY 2,000 (USD 300) per person but not more than CNY 20,000 (USD 3,000) and suspension of their certificates of competency (COC) for three to twelve months, and
• In more serious instances, the Master and any liable crew shall be subject to revocationof their certificates of competency.

The measure involving the suspension or revocation of certificates is only applicable to COC or COE issued by China MSA.                                                                               

Risk of navigation incidents

Contact incidents

Fishing and aquaculture are traditionally important livelihoods of local people living on the islands in the Miaodao Archipelago. Fishing nets or marine farms can be found in the waterways prohibited to navigation. Any vessels transiting the area are prone to coming into contact with marine farms or fishing nets.

Grounding

Merchant ships have been prohibited from navigating the waterways of the Miaodao Archipelago for decades due to militarily activities. The hydrography data for the area shown on nautical publications may not be accurate and reliable. For example, as highlighted in MSA’s information, there are reefs in the Beituoji Waterway making it unsafe for vessels, especially large vessels, to transit.

Recommendations

• Masters of vessels calling northern Chinese ports in Bohai Sea are recommended to:
• familiarize themselves with the safe passages through the Bohai Strait which are the Laotieshan Channel and the Changshan Waterway for vessels over 200GT. Both the Laotieshan Channel and the Changshan Waterway are properly surveyed and are under the supervision of respective VTS，
• plan for potential congestion and delay, and consider using the other channel as an alternative route if one channel is temporarily not available for transit，and
• refer to up to date nautical publications onboard, paper/ENC charts, ASDs, etc., and NWs/NTMs published by the MSA when preparing a passage plan, include notes in the plan on the safe passages through Bohai Strait, and make user areas on ECDIS to warn OOW of areas with restricted navigation.

• Members with vessels trading to ports in the Bohai Sea are advised to:
• share fleetwide circulars about the safe passages through Bohai Strait and the consequences for breaches to raise awareness among crew, and
• exercise due diligence and remind crew to collect all relevant information on safe transit from nautical publications, ships’ agents and China MSA so as to make appropriate passage plans keeping away from areas with restricted navigation.

 Read full article at

https://gard.no//web/articles?documentId=33907977

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) marine investigation report - Fire on M/V BBC Rhonetal

In the early hours of 25 March 2021, a fire broke out in the lower cargo hold of the general cargo ship BBC Rhonetal while it was alongside Port Hedland number two berth. The fire started during hot work to remove sea fastenings from the tween deck in preparation for cargo discharge operations.

Immediate efforts by the crew to extinguish the fire with deck hoses were unsuccessful and all persons safely evacuated the area before the hatch covers were closed and carbon dioxide using the ship’s fixed fire extinguishing system was released into the cargo hold. Shoreside fire authorities responded to the emergency and monitored the situation until the fire was declared extinguished on the morning of 28 March.

What the ATSB found

The ATSB found that the risk of fire had not been adequately assessed by the crew prior to
the commencement of the hot work. As a result, a continuous fire watch was not maintained and proper precautions were not taken to sufficiently protect vulnerable cargo from catching alight.

The ATSB also found that BBC Rhonetal’s managers had not effectively implemented the shipboard safety management system procedures to prevent the fire, which was the tenth such fire on a ship managed under the same parent company in the past 14 years, and the fourth investigated by the ATSB, identifying similar contributing factors.

What has been done as a result

BBC Rhonetal’s managers advised the ATSB that shipboard procedures for hot work will be amended to better describe the fire watch role, emphasising its importance in fire prevention. Fire watch requirements will be integrated into the hot work permit procedure and additional equipment for the fire watch is to be distributed across the fleet. The company also intends to educate ship crews on the amended procedures and the additional equipment through a training video with shore-based staff further reiterating safe hot work practices during shipboard inspections.

The ATSB considers that the proposed safety action has the potential to address the safety issue concerning the hot work procedures. However, as no timeline for implementation was provided, the ATSB issued formal recommendations to BBC Rhonetal’s managers, and the parent company, that the proposed safety action be implemented across their fleets.

Safety message

The continuing incidence of fires in the cargo holds of ships while performing hot work highlights the importance of adhering to shipboard procedures and recognised safe work guidelines for hot work.

Ship operators and managers must ensure that their safety management system protocols for hot work are suitable and properly implemented on board their ships. This requires regular verification that ships’ crew understand and follow prescribed safe work practices for hot work.

For more details, click on the below image to download full report. 

https://maritimecyprus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ATSB-Fire-onboard-BBC-Rhonetal-2022_09.pdf

Maritime innovation: ABS whitepaper on Biofuels as Marine Fuel

ABS continues its series of industry-leading alternative fuels guidance with the publication of its latest whitepaper examining the potential of biofuels in shipping. The Sustainability Whitepaper: Biofuels as Marine Fuel gives an overview of the various types of marine liquid biofuels that are “drop-in” fuel options for replacing conventional fuels in both the near and long term and their potential to contribute to industry decarbonization goals. Other aspects considered include safety, vessel design implications and regulatory challenges.

“Biofuels have been identified as a highly promising carbon-neutral fuels that can enter the global market relatively quickly and help approach the IMO GHG reduction targets for 2030 and beyond. Being produced from renewable biomass, biofuels have the potential to offset the carbon emissions of a vessel due to the CO2 absorption of the feedstock, which can help counterbalance the combustion emissions. However, the total carbon reduction potential of different biofuels clearly depends on a range of factors related to their value chain. ABS is committed to ensuring owners, operators, shipbuilders and original equipment manufacturers are fully informed about its potential as they develop their decarbonization strategies,” said Georgios Plevrakis, ABS Director, Global Sustainability.
Determining the best fuel option to achieve the maritime industry’s current decarbonization targets can prove challenging. Through the ABS series of sustainability whitepapers focused on fuels, we break down the available options including their challenges, advantages, as well as other factors to take into consideration during the decision-making process.

The latest installment in this series, this Whitepaper focuses specifically on drop-in biofuels and answers questions such as:

·        What are the types of drop-in biofuels that are currently available? What might be available in the future?

·        What role do drop-in biofuels play in the short-term and long-term transition to decarbonization?

·        What will the infrastructure need to look like in order to make this a viable fuel option?

 A copy of the Whitepaper Biofuels as Marine Fuel is available for download below:

https://maritimecyprus.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ABS-Biofuels-as-Marine-fuels.pdf