Παρασκευή 28 Φεβρουαρίου 2020

Carrier liability for contaminated liquid bulk cargo – Contributory negligence of shipper


Facts
The claimant commissioned the first defendant with the inland transport of de-icing fluid for an airport. In addition, the claimant commissioned the second defendant to inspect the cargo upon loading. The actual transport was carried out by a sub-contractor (the intervening party) commissioned by the first defendant.
Prior to loading, the second defendant took samples from each of the vessel's four tanks (despite its contractual obligations extending to only the inspection of the cargo). No abnormalities were found and the second defendant issued a cleanliness report. However, subsequent to the loading, the second defendant found brown particles on the product surface, which were identified as remnants of the last product carried in the tanks (Hamino, a wheat-based natural product). On discharge, another type of particle was found in the de-icing fluid. This was identified as detached coating from the vessel's tanks. The claimant held the first and second defendant liable for the damage caused by the contamination.
The key issue to be decided by the Hamburg Higher Regional Court was whether the claimant had a control and inspection duty under Section 425(2) of the Commercial Code and if so, to what extent the damage should be reduced for reasons of contributory negligence.
Decision
The first-instance court ruled that the intervening party's failure to provide a vessel with clean tanks amounted to a qualified fault, depriving the first defendant of the right to limit liability. On the other hand, the first defendant was liable for only two-thirds of the damage, as the claimant had contributed to one-third of the damage by failing to adhere to its duty to inspect and control the tanks prior to loading. The court considered that the claimant was subject to such duty as it had failed to inform the first defendant that the product required a minimum degree of cleanliness. The first defendant and the intervening party appealed. The second defendant was not found liable, as its contractual obligations had not extended to inspection of the tanks. This part of the decision was not appealed.
The Hamburg Higher Regional Court upheld the operative part of the first-instance decision, but with a different reasoning.
First, it overruled the first-instance court's conclusion that the first defendant was liable without a right to limit liability. Neither the facts established by the first-instance court nor the content of the claim submissions led to the conclusion that the actual carrier had caused the damage through qualified fault. Among other things, it was neither argued nor proven that the actual carrier had had any knowledge of the flaking coating or remnants from the last cargo.
Second, the Hamburg Higher Regional Court rejected the appealing parties' argument that the first defendant was exonerated from liability under Section 427(1)(4) of the Commercial Code as the damage had been caused by the natural condition of the goods. The court concluded that it was obvious that contamination from the detached coating in the vessel's tank had nothing to do with the natural condition of the goods. This was regardless of whether there were other types of goods that would not suffer damage from such contamination, as argued by the appealing parties. As the defence had already been rejected for this reason, there was no need for the court to examine whether the natural condition of the de-icing fluid could be affirmed in relation to the remnants from the previous cargo (the appealing parties argued that this was the case due to how the fluid was misted with fine nozzles on the wings of aircraft and was as such sensitive to contamination).
Third, the Hamburg Higher Regional Court overruled the first-instance decision that the claimant had contributed to one-third of the damage by failing to adhere to its control and inspection duties. The court stated that it is primarily the obligation of carriers to ensure that goods are duly transported. Just as shippers can rely on carriers to provide a clean vehicle, they also rely on the fact that goods are transported in sound tanks and will not become contaminated by flaking coating. Shippers do not have to examine vehicles, except in cases of known or obvious defects. In the present case, it had not been demonstrated that the tanks' defects were evident at first sight. Further, even if the second defendant's negligence could be attributed to the claimant, in view of the carrier's obligation to know its vehicles used for transport, the negligence would not exceed 10% to 20%. For procedural reasons, the court did not have to make a final decision on this issue.
Comment
The decision clarifies that shippers can rely on carriers to provide a sound transport vehicle. In particular, shippers have no duty to inspect their cargo holds for cleanliness or flaky coating that may contaminate goods. An exception applies only if a defect is known to the shipper or evident at first sight. However, even then, in apportioning negligence between carriers and shippers, considerable weight should be attached to the fact that carriers must know their vehicles and as a result their contributory negligence is unlikely to exceed 10% to 20%.

Reconstructing the concept of seaworthiness under the maritime labour convention 2006

The concept of seaworthiness has evolved over many years, and in common with similar concepts (for instance, the definition and application of “prudent seamanship”), its precise meaning has varied considerably. 
In this context, the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) can be regarded as focusing the concept in a manner that is not found elsewhere (whether in treaties or in case law). The implementation of the Convention will change shipowners' obligations to ensure ship safety and constitute an essential element of the standard of seaworthiness. Moreover, it is submitted that the MLC 2006 shifts the centre of emphasis in a manner that is both focussed and necessary. These changes are tracked and critically examined in this paper and conclusions are submitted based on the relevant analysis.

Read the full document at,






Samples and sampling in the carriage of liquid bulk cargoes - 2020

As there is a wide variety of liquid cargoes carried and many different types of ships involved, the subject of sampling is very wide. 
This article deals with the general principles of how to ascertain the apparent order and condition of liquid goods when they are shipped and, just as importantly, how to preserve the evidence.
The period of the carrier’s responsibility for liquid bulk cargoes, under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, extends from the time when the cargo is loaded until the time it is discharged, including the loading and discharging operations. Under the Hamburg Rules, the carrier, his servants and agents are responsible for the cargo from the time the cargo is received by them at the load port until the time it has been delivered at the discharge port.
Download the full publication at,

Lloyd’s Review of LOF

Steamship Mutual’s Ian Freeman, Syndicate Manager Claims, Americas Syndicate has reported that, continuing from the publication of the revised SCOPIC 2018 form, Lloyd’s of London had now concluded its review of the Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement, more commonly known as the Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF).
He noted that LOF 2020, and its associated Lloyd’s Salvage Arbitration Clauses named LSAC 2020, contained significant changes. The first was the consolidation into one document of the previously separate arbitration clauses and procedural rules of LOF 2011. Lloyd’s has included in the same document the Fixed Cost Arbitration Procedure (FCAP), with the aim of encouraging its use.
There are two amendments to the main LOF 2020 form.
The first is a re-write of Clause H ‘Deemed performance’ on the reverse of the form. This clause addresses the circumstances in which a contractor may re-deliver the casualty, that is the casualty is to be in a safe place and safe condition. The qualifying definition of what is a safe condition has been simplified to remove some slightly antiquated language, although the meaning remains unchanged, that being that the casualty may be redelivered in a damaged state provided it is not in need of skilled salvage services or the contractor is being prevented from demobilizing through the intervention of a local authority.
In more recent years Lloyd’s has tried to identify the frequency by which the terms of a standard LOF have been amended by a side-agreement or other variation of its terms. As a continuation of this initiative, an additional provision has been inserted into ‘Important Notices No. 4’ obliging a contractor to disclose any agreement that seeks to amend or vary the standard LOF terms.
Another notable amendment found in the LSAC 2020 is that of the Special Cargo Provisions, now clause 143. Previously limited to container cargoes, these provisions provide an arbitrator the power to take into account the terms on which a contractor may have settled with a majority (by salved value) of cargo interests when considering the award to apply to the remainder unrepresented cargo interests. The provisions also permit small salved value cargo interests to be omitted from contributing to the overall salved fund.
The change in LOF 2020 is that LSAC 2020 has removed the restriction to container cargoes and widened the application to any cargoes where the provisions may be appropriate.
An entirely new clause appears as clause 19: ‘Contractor’s Special Right to Terminate’. This clause seeks to address an anomaly between the termination provisions of SCOPIC and LOF. The difficulty arises where an owner may terminate SCOPIC, but the contractor has no similar rights of termination under LOF. This may leave the contractor in the invidious position of having to attend a casualty with a potentially low salved value without the reassurance of SCOPIC remuneration or an Article 14 award.
SCOPIC is a substitute method of calculating Special Compensation under Article 14 of the salvage convention. Once incorporated into LOF a contractor has no recourse to special compensation other than though SCOPIC itself.
There are however two exceptions to this rule.
The first entitles the contractor to withdraw from SCOPIC and rely on an Article 14 award if the owner fails to provide initial SCOPIC security.
The second permits the contractor to terminate the services under both SCOPIC and, crucially, to terminate the main agreement (LOF) if, under SCOPIC, the owner fails to provide increased security.
However, if the owner has complied with their SCOPIC security obligations, the exceptions will not apply and on termination of SCOPIC the contractor is no longer earning SCOPIC remuneration, nor does the contractor have any automatic right to terminate the main agreement.
In this position the contractor can only look to the slightly subjective termination provisions of LOF of whether there is any reasonable prospect of a useful result or that the casualty is in ‘safe place’ and ‘safe condition’ for re-delivery to the owner. Termination of SCOPIC part way through a salvage operation would be unlikely to trigger any of these criteria, leaving the contractor bound to perform the operation under their LOF obligations, with potentially limited prospects of a financial reward to reflect those efforts.
Freeman said that the remedy to this imbalance in the termination provisions would be to provide the contractor an opportunity to apply to the salvage arbitrator to bring the main agreement to an end.
Finally, in an attempt to reduce the cost of salvage arbitrations, particularly in low salved value or straightforward cases, Lloyd’s has supported the Fixed Costs Arbitration Procedure (FCAP). The initiative has existed since 2005, but usage has proved disappointing and, in an attempt to improve visibility of the procedure, it has now been fully incorporated within LSAC 2020. FCAP has also seen some changes, with the nominal threshold increased to $2m salved value and wider powers given to the arbitrator to order FCAP for straightforward cases excess of the threshold value, or to order full arbitration in complicated cases below the threshold value.
Two documents (LOF and LSAC) are available on Lloyd’s Salvage and Arbitration Branch website:


Impact of Laytime and Demurrage clauses


Laytime disputes and demurrage claims under charterparties are the stable diet of shipping and maritime lawyers globally.
The payments and receipts of money as demurrage, or post fixture claims being recognized well both by tanker owners and charterers not only as devices encouraging efficient usage of time in loading and discharging operations but also as hedges against fluctuating freight markets.
The Maritime law reports and the literature are replete with decisions and guidance on the application and construction of the Laytime and Demurrage (L&D) clauses in charterparties.
These have attracted much attention and analysis in their original base contracts, ie charterparties. They also exist in International Sales Contracts where two issues are raised.
1.   First, what is the link between an L&D clause in a sales contract and its relevant charterparty.
2.   Second, when the interpretation of the clauses is applied, are we guided by charterparties or court decisions?
A new approach is been taken towards the drafting of such clauses separately in the contracts, keeping the verbiage, precise and accurate. Charterparties are concluded in most cases in order to perform obligations under sale contracts and charterers find themselves liable under charterparties for delays caused by their counterparties under their sales contracts.
This brings us to the two points of discussion, both of which related to the link between L&D clauses in sales contracts and charterparties.
Tanker owners have a vested interested in ensuring that their voyage charterer do not delay their asset - the tanker. Time delays caused have a direct impact of prolonging the duration of the voyage beyond the profit margins allowed by the tanker owner in settling of the final freight. Tanker owners enforce this interest by stipulating for L&D in the agreed charterparty.
Where the charterer is also a CIF or CFR seller of the commodity, demurrage might be paid on account of a delay caused by the buyer during the discharge operation. This is co-relation of capital cash flow in the oil trading market. The reverse my occur where the charterer is the FOB buyer.
The very purpose of the L&D clause in the sales contract is the ability to pass on to the counterparty, the cost of demurrage paid to the shipowner by the charterer, which has been in the first place, caused by the counter party.
Financial link
The financial link between the two clauses,
1.     is the L&D clause in the sales contract intended simply to indemnify the party to the sales contract against losses suffered under the counterpart clause in the charter party or,
2.     does the clause in the sales contract stand quite independently of the liability under the charterparty?
What is the legal link between these clauses: when applying and construing the L&D clause in a sales contract, do we need to transplant in the sales contract all the law surrounding similar clauses created in the context of charterparties?
The L&D clause in a sales contract stands free and independent from their counterparties’ charterparty. L&D clauses in sales contracts should be construed and applied as clauses in sales contracts, not as adjuncts to charterparties. Their interpretation should therefore be colored not by direction of the charterparties but by their relationship to the contractual duties of being an FOB or a CIF buyer or seller.
Of specific interest here is the start of laytime. A valid Notice of Readiness (NOR) may not necessarily be the same of what the charterers have been charged by the tanker owners, compared to what can be onward charged to the counterparty.
The commencement of laytime in the charterparty or a valid NOR may depend on various factors, which the charterers can use to accept as a valid NOR.
A valid NOR from tanker owners to charterers may not necessarily be the same valid NOR from charterers to their buyers.
Also worth a mention is the commencement of laytime is relevant at the first discharge port but not at the second and third port, where the laytime is to start at arrival immediately at arrival at the port.
FOB loading duties
While we are aware that the CIF buyer is under no obligation to discharge the cargo, it is impossible to suggest that an FOB seller is under no implied obligations to lead – and, if the FOB seller is obliged to
load, he must be under the obligation to do so within a specific time.
It is of the essence in the FOB sales contract that the seller performs his obligation to deliver by loading the goods free on board. The obligation is also of the essence in the sense that the seller must deliver the goods within the shipment period stipulated in the sales contract subject to of course the buyer making the arrangements for the engagement of shipping space allowing the seller to ship within the shipping period where the sales contract leave such arrangements to the buyer.
However, to say that the FOB seller is under an implied duty to place the cargo free on board the vessel within the period stipulated in the sales contract does not mean so necessarily that the FOB seller is bound to load within the stipulated time to avoid the buyer’s potential liability to the tanker owner for demurrage.
Laytime starts
Where the charterparty names a port as the terminal for loading or discharging operation, then subject to any term in the charterparty stipulating for the giving of an NOR, laytime starts as soon as the vessel reaches the named terminal. i.e. once the tanker has ‘arrived’ at the port. The precise ambit of the port consequently becomes an issue between owner and charterer i.e. any time spent idle between ‘arrival’ and berthing for the benefit of the charterers eats into the laytime agreed in the charterparty and brings closer the moment at which the owner starts earning demurrage.
It is interesting to identify who bears the risk of congestion between the arrival and berthing of the vessel.
Who bears this risk?
Is it between tanker owner and charterer or between buyer and seller in the sales contract?
To undertake a liability for demurrage while the vessel is in port but waiting for berth would be an open-ended commitment in a contract for the purchase of what must probably be a part cargo. In fixing the start of laytime in a sales contract, overriding regard should be had to the nature of the sales contract rather than to the charter party origins of laytime.
Valid NOR
In the case where there is ambiguity towards start of laytime, this runs from the moment the seller places the cargo at the disposal of the buyer. Even when the contract provides for an NOR to be provided, laytime still runs from the moment when a valid NOR has been provided, such that the risk of congestion remains with the CIF seller or charterer.
In conclusion, although the points of reference discussed above are all interlinked and related, the ultimate interest is the ability to dissect and clarify the risk to which any particular party is exposed because all of this translates into a dollar value which makes the L&D industry worth billions of dollars annually.
Traders and execution officers responsible for carrying out the trade deal are to be familiar with the interstices of the law of L&D in the charterparty, as it has been evolving and developing in the commercial courts and beyond.

Σάββατο 28 Δεκεμβρίου 2019

ABS New LNG Bunkering Guide

Classification society ABS has released a guide for liquefied natural gas (LNG) bunkering, which outlines requirements for the design, construction, and survey of carriers and barges fitted with dedicated LNG transfer arrangements and intended for regular LNG bunkering service. In parallel ABS has also released its GUIDE FOR LNG BUNKERING. Both documents are available to download further below.

The guide also addresses bunkering station safety, lifting and hose handling equipment, control, monitoring and Emergency Shutdown (ESD) and release safety systems.
While application of the guide is optional, the guide must be followed in order to obtain ABS’ optional LNG Bunkering notation.
“Most LNG-fuelled vessels in operation at the time of issuance of this Guide receive LNG bunkers on a relatively small scale, typically through a shore-to-ship basis by road tankers or dedicated shore side LNG tanks,” notes ABS. “ It is envisaged that greater LNG transfer rates than those typically used for refueling the current gas fueled ship fleet will be required. In order to support the further growth and development of LNG fueled vessels for short sea and international trade, ABS says more dedicated LNG infrastructure is needed, particularly in terms of small scale LNG storage and distribution centres together and dedicated LNG bunkering vessels for ship to ship LNG transfer operations.
The guide may be downloaded at,

Πέμπτη 26 Δεκεμβρίου 2019

Bunkers and bunkering - It's nothing to do with your golf swing


Introduction
Everybody who owns or drives a car has experience of bunkering. We all fill up with petrol from time to time. We do so almost without thinking about it. Fortunately, we rarely, if ever, have a problem with the quality of the fuel. And if we spill some petrol, it is not a "pollution incident".
The procedures which take place during bunkering vessels are, or should be, very different from the procedure of putting petrol into your car. Given the problems and liabilities which bunkers and bunkering can lead to, it is essential that the entire bunkering operation, from start to finish, is closely monitored by the receiving vessel. It is also vital that the quality of the (new) bunkers is checked and the bunkers are tested before they are used or mixed with other bunkers already on board.
Apart from nuclear-powered ships, all vessels have to take on bunkers from time to time. Large bulk carriers and container vessels can carry as much as 10,000 MT of fuel oil at any one time. Even the "workhorses" of the bulk trades, the Handymax and Panamax vessels, may have up to 1,000 MT of fuel oil on board after bunkering. Fuel oil is very viscous and persistent.
The problems which (good or bad) bunkers can cause
Bunkers do not need to be "bad", or, more correctly, off-specification, to cause serious claims and liabilities. A spill of bunkers from any vessel is likely to lead to a difficult and expensive clean-up operation and - depending to some extent on where the spill has occurred - to claims for damage to the environment and for losses suffered by individuals or organisations allegedly affected by the spill.
Bunker experts generally consider that overall bunker quality has deteriorated over the years, although the quality also tends to follow the price and vice-versa. However, it is often the case that, because of increased demand for high quality products such as kerosene and jet fuel, the "raw material" left behind after the crude oil has been processed is likely to lead to bunkers of a lower quality being produced. If the bunkers contain additives such as used car oil, this may well add to the problem.
Off-specification bunkers (bad bunkers) can cause many problems. At best, they may result in the main engine not performing effectively or efficiently. This may result in reduced speed and over-consumption of bunkers. In turn, either or both of these is likely to lead to a claim by charterers - a speed and consumption claim.
More importantly, the consumption of bunkers which are off-specification could well cause damage to the main engine. Relatively speaking, the age and condition of the engine is not relevant, although it is perhaps true to say that an engine in first-class condition may have a greater tolerance for bad bunkers than an engine in poor condition. Nevertheless, damage to the main engine caused by bad bunkers is likely to be a serious problem. Your hull insurers are likely to be worried.
Such main engine damage can lead to even more serious problems. If a loss of main engine power occurs at sea, there is likely to be a significant delay to the vessel while the engineers work hard to put right the problem. They may not be able to do so. Salvage assistance, or possibly a straightforward tow, may be needed. Even more seriously, a vessel with little or no main engine power could, particularly in confined waters, result in the vessel grounding or colliding with another vessel or fixed or floating object such as a jetty or dolphin. If this happens, both your hull and your P&I insurers will be very worried people. The potential claims and liabilities arising in such circumstances are very large.
Bunker spills
The International Tanker Owners' Pollution Federation (ITOPF) publishes oil pollution statistics every year. In a speech made at an oil pollution conference in London in May 2019, the managing director of ITOPF said that "about 28 per cent of the oil spills attended on site by ITOPF staff over the past fifteen years have involved bunker fuel spilled from non-tankers. In the last two years, this percentage has risen to about 50 per cent."
It is likely that for bulk carriers, the number/percentage of oil spills caused by casualties of some sort (i.e., grounding or collision) is substantially less than for tankers (which is only 14 per cent anyway) and the number/percentage of spills happening during routine operations is substantially higher.
Most bunker spills will be in the range of between 7 and 700 MT. Some will involve smaller quantities. Unless the vessel concerned is a large vessel, with a large quantity of bunkers on board, and is involved in a major casualty, such as a grounding in which more than one bunker tank is holed, few bunker spills will be more than 700 MT.
Many such spills are the result of carelessness or negligence, either on the part of those supplying the bunkers, or those on board the vessel receiving them. Even a technical problem, such as the failure of an alarm to go off, may well be the result of human error. More often, our experience is that one or more of the following are present:
     Ø  failure to agree a loading rate with the bunker barge or shore loading facility;  
     Ø  failure on the part of the bunker barge or shore facility to stick to the agreed loading rate;
    Ø  failure on the part of the vessel's crew to check that the bunkers are being loaded at the agreed rate and if they are not, failure to request the loading barge to slow down;
    Ø  failure to monitor the tank(s) into which the bunkers are being loaded; 
    Ø  failure to respond to an alarm indicating that the tank is nearly full.
    Out of all of these, Gard's experience is that most bunker spills result from an overflow of bunkers. The cause is usually one or both of the last two failures. A former deck officer once suggested that the best way of avoiding bunker spills would to be connect all the bunker tank airvents and overflow pipes to the chief engineer's cabin!
Example
A small tanker was discharging mineral oil at a berth upriver in London. Owners' safety officer was on board to assist with a vetting inspection by one of the major oil companies. During discharge from four of the vessel's tanks, the high level alarms went off. The master and chief officer were taking part in the vetting inspection and the second officer was on duty. He assumed that the alarms had been activated in the course of the vetting inspection - perhaps to show to the inspectors from the oil company that they worked properly - and took no action. In fact, they had been activated in exactly the intended way - to warn that cargo was close to overflowing from a cargo tank. A couple of minutes later, the cargo overflowed from one of the tanks. Fortunately, the crew then responded very quickly and took all the required steps to stop discharge and clean up the spill. As a result, only a very small quantity - estimated at 100 litres - went over the side. Later investigation showed that the device showing the position of the cargo valves (i.e., open or closed) was not working on almost all valves. Both the chief officer and the second officer wrongly thought that a particular valve was closed, when in fact it was open. Neither of them checked the position of the valve before starting discharge. The quantity spilled was very small. It was not spilled into the water, but on to "Thames mud", which becomes visible at times as a result of the large rise and fall of the river. Despite this, the Port of London Authority (PLA) investigated the incident, with a view to possible criminal prosecution. Ultimately, they decided not to prosecute. Instead, they issued the master with a letter of warning, which will be taken into account in a future similar incident. The potential maximum fine in such cases is GBP 250,000 in the Magistrates Court or an unlimited fine in the Crown Court.
The time and cost involved in cleaning-up spills of heavy fuel oil is usually considerable. The oil is thick and does not evaporate or disperse. Manual cleaning is often the only option. Disposal of the oil which has been collected is also a problem and can be just as difficult and expensive as the clean-up operation. If the spill has occurred in or close to an area where other ships or private boats are moored, their hulls may be oiled and require cleaning. Even more importantly, if the spill affects, or is alleged to have affected, mariculture, often fish-farming, the claims can be very significant. The local and sometimes the national, media may well take an interest in the incident. Even worse, local or national politicians may either take an interest themselves, or find themselves called upon to do so by their voters, whose pleasure boats have been oiled, or whose beach has been closed while the clean-up is carried out.
Even a small quantity of fuel oil can, if spilt, result in very large liabilities. Perhaps the best - or worst - example concerns a non-tanker - a woodchip carrier, which spilled approximately 17.5 MT of heavy fuel oil in a port in Southern California. The spill occurred during loading and was caused by the vessel making contact with a dolphin on the jetty. A bunker tank was holed and heavy fuel oil was spilt. For the first five days, the clean-up cost, per day, was approximately USD 1 million. After five days, it was possible to reduce the cost per day to about USD 500,000. By the end of 1999, the Club in question had paid approximately USD 14.3 million, mainly in respect of clean-up costs and third party claims. They were estimating a further USD 10.7 million to cover the claim for alleged natural resource damage and further legal and expert's costs. A round sum of USD 25 million!
This is the worst-case scenario - the P&I man's nightmare. Most bunker spills do not cost anything like this amount, but they are difficult and expensive to deal with. If you spill a little petrol when you are filling up your car, it is nobody's problem but yours, since you have to pay for the petrol you have lost. You do not have to clean it up. Nor do you have to pay compensation to the garage owner for "damaging" his property. Nor do you have to deal with claims from third parties - for example, people living near to the garage who may claim that they have been affected by the smell of the petrol which has been spilt. Nor are you likely to face civil and criminal proceedings, with every chance of being deemed to be guilty, which brings with it the potential for large fines and even imprisonment. In the example mentioned, criminal prosecution did not happen. However, Gard has had many cases, in various countries, where the master, usually together with the ship owner, is criminally prosecuted. Regrettably, this trend is continuing. Remember that criminal prosecution and any liability arising as a result is not covered by P&I insurance. The legal costs involved and any liability incurred may well remain with the person or company in question.
All these problems can and often do arise in a bunker spill.
Even if there is no initial bunker spill, it is very likely that, if the vessel has suffered a casualty of some kind, the first "request" (i.e., instruction) from the authorities will be: "remove the bunkers". The nature of the casualty and the quantity and location of the bunkers are often ignored. The focus - sometimes to the exclusion of almost everything else - is on the potential pollution which the bunkers could cause.
This may be good for the environment. It is certainly good business for the salvors. However, someone has to pay for it and it is likely that a ship owner will look for his P&I Club to do so, on the basis that the removal of the bunkers is mainly a measure to avoid or minimize pollution.
Over the last 20 years or so, there has been worldwide growth of environmental awareness and concern about the damage which we are all, in some way, said to be doing to the environment. These days, the publicity given by the media to an oil spill of any significance is extensive and almost always unfavorable to the ship owner, or indeed, almost anyone involved in the operation of the ship. Remember the very negative publicity which Total, the charterers of the ERIKA, received.
International conventions
With the exception of the US, a large proportion of the world's coastal states have ratified one or both of the Civil Liability Conventions (CLCs) and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention). These conventions essentially deal with compensation for loss and damage caused by oil pollution from tankers and are widely recognized and accepted.
The text of a new convention, specifically covering bunker spills, was agreed in March 2001 at an IMO Diplomatic Conference in London. It is unlikely to come into force for at least a couple of years, but the intention is for this latest Convention to fill the gaps left by the earlier CLCs, which effectively date back to 1969 and 1992.1

Neither the CLC 1969, nor the Protocols to the CLC of 1992, will apply to a spill of bunkers from a non-tanker, such as a bulk carrier. However, in general terms, if the bunker barge supplying the oil could be classed as a "tanker" and the spill occurred from the bunker barge, the CLC in one of its two forms would probably apply.
The fact that many countries are now focusing more closely on bunker spills can be seen from the new compulsory insurance requirements which have come into force in Australia.
As from 6th April 2001, all ships larger than 400 GT which are visiting an Australian port and are carrying oil as cargo or bunkers must have a "relevant insurance certificate". This rule does not cover oil tankers which are already required to have such insurance under the 1992 CLC. Clearly, therefore, the rule is aimed at non-tankers and by implication, at bunker pollution. Amongst other things, the "relevant insurance certificate" must state the amount of insurance cover, or other financial security, which "must be no less than the limit of any liability applicable under relevant international law". The good news is that, in most cases, the requirements should be met by carrying on board the original P&I Club certificate of entry, or a certified copy. The certificate must be produced on request.
Other problems with "good" bunkers
As can be seen from the above, bunkers do not have to be "bad" to cause serious problems. Apart from the pollution aspect, even on-specification bunkers can cause problems and damage, as can be seen from the example described below.
A purpose-built car carrier, laden with cargo for Japan and entered with Gard, was bunkering heavy fuel oil in the Far East just before Christmas 2016. The vessel was receiving bunkers into the No. 1 port and starboard bunker tanks. Because an inlet valve had been left open, bunkers leaked into the No. 4 centre heavy fuel oil tank. This tank was nearly full. Not surprisingly, it filled up and the excess oil overflowed up the ventilation pipe. Unfortunately, this pipe had a small hole, later found to have been caused by corrosion, through which fuel oil leaked out. Where did it go? Approximately 3 MT leaked out on to a car deck in No. 2 hold. Some of this ran down through lashing openings on to a further three car decks. As if this was not bad enough, a further, fortunately small, quantity of fuel oil leaked from a previously repaired part of the ventilation pipe from No. 4 centre F.O. tank. The cargo was BMW cars! Some 41 cars were badly damaged. A further 209 were slightly damaged. The estimated liability on the Club is USD 250,000. In addition, some areas of the vessel were heavily oiled and had to be cleaned. The time and expense involved in cleaning the vessel is unlikely to be covered by the P&I insurance. It is owners' responsibility to properly clean and prepare the vessel for loading and carrying cargo.
Bunker shortages
Engineers reading this article will know the difficulties involved in accurately measuring and perhaps more importantly, agreeing with the bunker supplier, the quantity of bunkers supplied. Inevitably, with a bulk liquid, there will be some minor measurement variations. Equally, however, there are examples where the difference between the bunker supplier's figures and the vessel's figures are substantial. It always seems to be the case that the supplier's figures are higher than the vessel's figures.
In a case mentioned in a recent warning issued by DNV and Intertanko, a vessel bunkered diesel and fuel oil. The responsible engineer on board the vessel recorded substantial shortages for both products. In the case of the diesel, the bunker barge's figure was 119.69 cbm , whereas the vessel's figure was 93.0 cbm, a shortage of 26.69 cbm. At the request of the vessel, the bunker barge resumed pumping diesel. Problems were also noted in relation to the fuel oil. The flow from the barge to the vessel was very slow. When the engineer commented on this, the crew of the bunker barge were seen to adjust a valve on board the barge, which resulted in the flow speeding up. Even so, on completion of bunkering, the vessel still recorded shortages of some 3 MT in relation to the fuel oil and some 19 MT in relation to the diesel.
"Bad" bunkers
We have seen how perfectly good (i.e., within specification) bunkers can cause serious problems and liabilities. Bad bunkers - bunkers which are off-specification - can cause equally difficult and expensive problems and liabilities.
Gard News issue No. 156 contains an article dealing with procedures for bunkering.2 It includes comments and suggestions in relation to sampling and testing the bunkers received, as well as practical advice, especially regarding the sampling and testing of bunkers before use. A little prevention at an early stage can avoid the need for a lot of (expensive) cure at a later date!
Speed and consumption claims
Unfortunately for ship owners and charterers and their insurers, proper sampling and testing is not always carried out. As a result, fuel which is off-specification in some way may well be supplied to the vessel. This does not mean that serious problems will automatically follow. The vessel's engine may be capable of using the fuel, albeit with a reduced power output and/or a greater consumption of fuel to produce the same power. Such circumstances are, however, likely to lead to a claim by charterers either because the vessel has burned a larger quantity of bunkers than she should have, or because she has taken longer to complete the voyage (because of the reduced power output). Often, the claim is a combination of the two aspects - what is called a speed and consumption claim.
Claims for delay
A speed and consumption claim by itself is not necessarily particularly difficult or expensive, but a long delay in the voyage will mean a delay in the delivery of the cargo. Often, this may not matter. Sometimes, however, it may be extremely important to both the seller and the buyer, especially if the price of the cargo has gone up or down during the period of delay. In such circumstances, the party who may have lost money because of the delay may well bring a claim against the vessel. Depending on the cargo and the variation(s) in price, the amount may be large. Further, the cargo itself may have suffered damage. Many fruit and vegetable cargoes have a limited shelf life and the conditions under which they are carried are calculated as precisely as they can be for the expected length of the voyage. A delay of only a few days can upset these calculations. The result can often be a claim for damage to the cargo, often the entire cargo if the vessel is carrying foodstuffs with a limited shelf life.
Conclusion
Being human, all of us will make mistakes from time to time. Fortunately, these mistakes rarely have important consequences, but from time to time, a person involved in the bunkering operation, or in the preparation and use of the bunkers on board the vessel, will make a mistake which results in a spill of bunkers, or in damage to the main engine or other machinery on board.
Clearly, it is impossible to do away with human error completely. One must accept that accidents will happen from time to time - that is what P&I insurance is for. However, by properly following well prepared and clearly explained procedures, the problems and incidents mentioned above can be avoided.