Σάββατο 30 Οκτωβρίου 2021

Draft surveys – a critical tool to defend dry bulk cargo shortage claims

Draft surveys of bulk cargoes are a means of checking that the shipper's figures inserted in the bill of lading are correct. The receiver has paid for the quantity stated in the bill and that figure is prima facie or even conclusive evidence that the amount stated was loaded aboard. A draft survey may be the best evidence to refute claims for shortage, so we recommend that members routinely order draft surveys for dry bulk cargo.

It is generally accepted that performing a draft survey is not an exact science. Much depends on the weather conditions at the time, the swell, the accuracy of the draft marks and the care which is taken in carrying out the required calculations. Nevertheless, the accuracy of a draft survey which has been properly performed is generally regarded as being up to more or less 0.5 per cent of the final figure for dry bulk cargoes. Therefore, barring exceptional circumstances, such as a high swell during the survey, if the difference between the shore figure and the draft survey figure is greater than 0.5 per cent, it may well represent a physical gain or loss, rather than being simply a “paper” difference. The latter is of course just that – a difference on paper only. Such a difference is usually the result of the inaccuracies inherent in the different measurement methods which are used.

If the shore figure is less than the draft survey figure, any such difference is likely to be relatively unimportant. As we discuss below, the shipowner may be legally bound to deliver the weight or quantity stated in the bill of lading, regardless of the actual quantity received on board and available for discharge. If the vessel’s figure for cargo actually received on board (such figure being ascertained by a draft survey after loading) is greater than the bill of lading figure, the shipowner can be reasonably confident that the vessel has received on board at least the same weight or quantity of cargo as the weight or quantity stated in the bill of lading. As mentioned, this is the weight or quantity which he may well be contractually obliged to deliver. Therefore, barring an accident during the voyage resulting in the physical loss of cargo, the shipowner should be able to deliver at the port of discharge a weight or quantity approximately the same as that stated in the bill of lading, taking into account inevitable measurement variations and any loss inherent in the nature of the cargo, for example, weight loss due to drying of cargo during transit.

However, if the figure which the shippers wish to have inserted into the bill of lading is greater than the draft survey figure by more than 0.5 per cent the alarm bells should ring, both on board and in the shipowner’s office. The reason is that the quantity stated in the bill of lading will often be legally binding as against the shipowner, whether or not it is in itself accurate, and the shipowner may be prevented (the legal term is “estopped”) from arguing that the bill of lading figure was wrong and that the “excess” cargo was in fact never loaded. According to the Hague-Visby Rules the carrier is obliged, upon the demand of the shipper, to issue a bill of lading stating, inter alia, the quantity or the weight of the goods. Once issued, the bill of lading is, subject to any valid qualifying statements on the bill of lading itself, prima facie evidence of the quantity or weight recorded on the bill, but once negotiated, i.e. endorsed, by the shipper in favour of some other third party, it will in most cases amount to conclusive evidence in the hands of a third party acting in good faith. It follows that the carrier must inspect the goods diligently upon receiving them for shipment by conducting draft measurements for bulk cargoes. Following such inspection, any discrepancies or deficiencies should be appropriately recorded in the mate’s receipts and, subsequently, on the bills of lading. The proviso to Article III Rule 2 of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules emphasizes that neither the carrier nor his agent nor the Master is obliged to issue a bill of lading recording a quantity of the goods which they had reasonable grounds for suspecting not accurately to reflect the quantity actually received or which they had no reasonable means of checking.

Bulk cargoes are commonly shipped under bills of lading which include wording such as “said to weigh” or “said to be” or “weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value unknown”. In some jurisdictions such clauses, even if printed rather than typed on the face of the bill of lading, will mean that the bill of lading is not even prima facie evidence of the quantity stated to have been shipped. The burden of proof will therefore be on the cargo claimant to prove the quantity which he says was shipped. Such a clause will normally be upheld by the English courts. Unfortunately, the courts of many other countries will not recognize such a printed clause, on the ground that it merely forms part of the standard wording of that form of bill of lading and has not been added solely in connection with that particular shipment. It is therefore essential that such wording is typed or handwritten on the front of the bill of lading, whether or not the bill of lading form includes such printed words. However, it should be noted that some jurisdictions will not uphold such clauses at all, whether printed, typed or handwritten on the bill of lading. Therefore, clausing with “number, quantity and weight unknown” In circumstances where the difference is not normal or customary, it is insufficient to clause the bill of lading with the words “number, quantity and weight unknown”. If the Master has been able to determine the number, quantity or weight loaded, such clausing is clearly not true. Such clausing should, however, still be used in circumstances where the difference is normal or customary.

This brings us back to the importance of a draft survey, which is the only means those on board have of checking the shipper’s figure. The latter will usually be based on measurements carried out ashore. The Master will have had no means of checking these measurements. For various reasons, the shipper’s figure may not be accurate and if the draft survey gives a figure which is more than 0.5 per cent below the shipper’s figure, the Mate’s receipt and bill of lading should be claused to reflect the fact that there is probably a physical shortage of cargo. The clausing should clearly state the draft survey figures and should be as accurate as possible. In order to avoid the clausing charterers may offer a LOI holding the shipowner harmless if they agree not to do so. However, Members should be aware that such LOI may be unenforceable if a court or tribunal comes to the conclusion that they were given in order to try to persuade the shipowner to help the charterer or shipper to mislead an innocent third party, such as the buyer of the cargo, acting in good faith.

There are of course a number of practical problems which can arise. It may have been agreed that the bills of lading will be issued and signed by the local agent, who will often be acting on behalf of the charterer. The charterer may also be the shipper himself or connected to the shipper in one way or another. The shipper will almost certainly be invoicing the consignee on the basis of the weight or quantity stated in the bill of lading. Nevertheless, the bill of lading is likely to be signed and worded in such a way that it evidences a contract of carriage with the shipowner, not the charterer. In these circumstances, it can be difficult for a Master to ensure that the bill of lading is issued and signed in the form and wording he considers appropriate (i.e., in strict compliance with the Mate’s receipts). What he can do is:

(1) to make sure that his Letter of Authority to the agents specifically states that the bills of lading are to be signed strictly in accordance with the Mate’s receipts and

(2) to ensure that the Mate’s receipts are properly worded and where appropriate, contain the ship’s figures as calculated by draft survey.

It is important to stress that both steps outlined above should be taken. One by itself is not sufficient. These steps will not guarantee that the charterer or his agents do in fact issue bills of lading as authorized by the Master. Nor will they guarantee that the shipowner will have a defense to any claim for alleged cargo shortage which may be made by the consignee. However, they should mean that, if the shipowner incurs liability to the consignee because of the failure by the charterer or his agent to issue and/or sign a bill of lading on the authorized form, the shipowner has a good chance of succeeding with a claim for indemnity against the charterer under the charterparty.

A further point to be made is that, under the Association’s Rules, no cover is available for “liabilities, costs and expenses arising out of the issue of a bill of lading, waybill or other document evidencing the contract of carriage, known by the Member or the master to contain an incorrect description of the cargo or its quantity or its condition” (Rule 34 (1)(ix)). Therefore, cover would be denied under this Rule if the Member or the Master knew that the quantity shown in the bill of lading was wrong but nevertheless failed to clause the bill and incurred “liabilities, costs and expenses” as a result of such failure.

It is sometimes the case that the bulk cargo is divided in a number of relatively small parcels – say five separate parcels, each of 1,500 MT. Assuming there is no separation on board between these parcels, the only time at which a draft survey can usefully be carried out is on completion of loading the entire cargo at the specific port. The charterers and shippers will almost certainly want the vessel to leave as quickly as possible but provided the relevant tables have been checked beforehand, a draft survey should not take more than a couple of hours at the most. In the Association’s view, the investment in this short period of time, both after loading and before the start of discharge, is worthwhile.

The Association has handled a large number of claims for the alleged loss of agricultural products in particular. Typically, these claims will be for the alleged loss of anywhere between 0.5 per cent and five per cent of the bill of lading figure. There is little doubt that virtually all such claims are “paper losses” and that the vessel delivered all the cargo received on board. Sometimes, however, such an argument is not sufficient to defeat a claim. This is where the draft survey reports show their value, as they serve as an independent record by the vessel of the quantity received on board at the port(s) of loading and the quantity on board before the start of discharge. If the hatch covers have been sealed after loading and these seals are intact before the start of discharge (and the fact that they are intact is witnessed by the consignee), this is an additional indication that no loss of cargo could possibly have occurred during the voyage.

Hard, factual evidence is a vital factor in the defense of any claim and the shortage claims we have mentioned are no exception. The absence of draft survey reports will mean that there is no independent evidence which the shipowner can use to try to show that the weight or quantity stated in the bill of lading was wrong and that, by comparing the figures shown in the draft survey reports, the vessel delivered approximately the same weight or quantity as was received on board at the port(s) of loading. Without this evidence, the shipowner can sometimes do little more than argue that the weight or quantity stated in the bill of lading is not even prima facie evidence of the weight or quantity actually shipped on board, but as we have said, this argument depends heavily on the wording of the bill of lading and a complete rejection of the claim is often difficult to achieve.

As mentioned above, the carrier’s obligation to state accurate figures on the face of the bill of lading derives from the provisions of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. Shipowners are therefore recommended to arrange for draft surveys, both after loading and before discharge, whenever a bulk cargo is being carried. The Association will arrange for such surveys through its local correspondents. The cost involved is normally for the Member’s account in the first instance, but if the report is used in defense of a claim, the cost may be recovered from the Association. Furthermore, if the report results in a claim being rejected and withdrawn, this will reflect favorably on the Member’s loss record.

Σάββατο 25 Σεπτεμβρίου 2021

Why the Golden Ray capsized

The National Transportation Safety Board has determined that an error in entering ballast water quantities into a stability program is the probable cause of the September 8, 2019 capsizing of the car carrier Golden Ray as it transited outbound through St. Simons Sound near Brunswick, Ga.

Less than 40 minutes after leaving port, the 656-foot-long vessel began to heel rapidly to port during a 68 degree turn to starboard. Despite attempts by the pilot and crew to counter the heel, the rate of turn to starboard increased, and the vessel reached a heel of 60 degrees to port in under a minute before it grounded outside of the channel.

The NTSB determined the probable cause of the capsizing was the chief officer’s error entering ballast quantities into the stability calculation program, which led to his incorrect determination of the vessel’s stability and resulted in the Golden Ray having an insufficient righting arm to counteract the forces developed during a turn while transiting outbound from the Port of Brunswick through St. Simons Sound.

Contributing to the accident was vessel operator G-Marine Service Co. Ltd.’s lack of effective procedures in its safety management system for verifying stability calculations.

The NTSB concluded the Golden Ray did not meet international stability standards at departure and possessed less stability than the chief officer calculated.

According to the NTSB, after the vessel capsized, open watertight doors allowed flooding into the vessel, which blocked the primary egress from the engine room, where four crewmembers were trapped. Two watertight doors had been left open for almost two hours before the accident. No one on the bridge ensured that the doors were closed before departing the port.

“The circumstances of this accident show that even when transiting in protected waters, watertight integrity is critical to the safety of the vessel and its crew,” the report said. “It is essential that the operator ensure that crews verify that all watertight doors are closed in accordance with safety management system procedures.”

As a result of its investigation, the NTSB issued two safety recommendations to G-Marine Service Co. Ltd.:

  • Revise its safety management system to establish procedures for verifying stability calculations and implement audit procedures to ensure their vessels meet stability requirements before leaving the port; and
  • Revise its safety management system audit process to verify crew adherence to the Arrival/Departure Checklist regarding the closure of watertight doors.

The public docket for the investigation contains more than 1,700 pages of factual information, including interview transcripts, photographs and other investigative materials and is available online .

All 23 crewmembers and one pilot on board were rescued, including four engineering crew who were trapped in the vessel for nearly 40 hours. Two crewmembers sustained serious injuries. The Golden Ray sustained significant damage due to fire, flooding and saltwater corrosion and was declared a total loss estimated at $62.5 million. An estimated $142 million worth of cargo, including more than 4,100 vehicles, was also lost.

Download the NTSB report at

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR2103.pdf


Κυριακή 5 Σεπτεμβρίου 2021

NTSB reports on expensive collision between two anchored ships

The National Transportation Safety Board has issued its report on a May 8, 2020, incident in which, at about 4.55 p.m. local time, the anchored general cargo vessel Nomadic Milde collided with the anchored bulk carrier Atlantic Venus on the Lower Mississippi River near New Orleans, La.

After the Nomadic Milde began to swing and drag its anchors in the current, it collided with the Atlantic Venus, which had been anchored directly behind it, and then struck a nearby chemical dock and grounded on the bank. No injuries were reported. The Nomadic Milde released an estimated 13 gallons of lube oil into the river. Damage to both vessels and the dock was estimated at $16.9 million.

ANALYSIS

In its analysis the NTSB says that the Nomadic Milde’s positions and headings suggested that the ship did not initially settle at its original anchor position.

“After the starboard anchor was let go, the ship moved about 730 feet away from the original starboard anchor drop position towards the right descending bank, a distance double the amount of chain that was set on the anchor, indicating that the starboard anchor likely dragged. The initial 6-minute anchor drag began within 10 minutes of when the pilot had informed the master that the anchoring was finished,” says the report. “The pilot departed the bridge while the vessel was still moving, although he said he had no concerns about the Nomadic Milde holding anchor. Had he noticed the initial drag of the Nomadic Milde, he may have remained with the vessel. Additionally, had the bridge team detected the initial drag before the pilot departed the vessel, or if the master had voiced any concern, they may have been able to request that the pilot remain with the ship to attend to the issue.

“The second officer and chief officer both stated that the ECDIS was their means to monitor the Nomadic Milde’s position at anchor. Monitoring a ship at anchor, especially in an area where the risks of nearby hazards and weather and current are present, requires a continuous state of vigilance and the use of all available means to determine whether a vessel is dragging or not. The second officer had set an ECDIS anchor watch alarm, which would have sounded had the vessel moved beyond the set radius. Neither the second officer nor chief officer recalled hearing the anchor alarm activate, and, given that the initial estimated distance from the stern of the Nomadic Milde to the bow of the Atlantic Venus was 490 feet, the anchor watch alarm radius setting of 590 feet was too large to provide for a timely alarm of the ship dragging. From 1551 to 1557, just before the change of the watch between the second officer and chief officer at 1602, the ship began to swing to starboard and dragged anchor, moving about 800 feet over about 6 minutes. Although the chief officer noticed that the vessel was not in the center of the anchor watch circle when he relieved the watch, he did not question if the ship had dragged or check whether the ship was remaining securely at anchor.

“The officers on anchor watch on the Nomadic Milde had adequate time and means to check whether the ship was remaining securely at anchor. At the watch relief, the chief officer did not cross-check the ship’s position after he noticed that the Nomadic Milde was not in the middle of the ECDIS anchor watch circle. Even after the initial alert by the Atlantic Venus to monitor their holding position, the chief officer did not take any follow-up action to address the concern, only communicating that their engines were ready on short notice. There was no evidence of either watch officer checking the ship’s position at frequent intervals or by means other than the ECDIS watch alarm to determine if the ship was secure at anchor or not. Although ECDIS is a useful tool in determining a ship’s position at anchor, the ship’s radars would have provided information for the crew to determine or crosscheck if the range to a vessel or object had decreased, or if the ship had moved while at anchor. There was sufficient evidence to alert the bridge team that the Nomadic Milde was not holding well, and, had this been detected, the master could have been alerted earlier, and, in turn, there would have been sufficient time to undertake necessary measures to address the problem.

“By the time the Nomadic Milde’s master was called to the bridge, he had lost about half the original distance between his vessel and the Atlantic Venus in which to react to and mitigate the situation. Knowing that a pilot was required to get under way in the Lower Mississippi River, he contacted New Orleans VTS and the ship’s agent to request a pilot but was informed he would have to wait hours. Seven minutes before the collision, the main engine was ready for use on the bridge—but VTS had told the Nomadic Milde not to heave anchor and to maneuver only with their engine until a pilot arrived. The master followed the instructions from VTS, keeping the anchors out. However, this severely limited the bridge team’s ability to control the vessel in the strong current, even while using the main engine up to full ahead, the bow thruster, and rudder.”

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision between the Nomadic Milde and Atlantic Venus was the bridge team on the Nomadic Milde not effectively monitoring the vessel’s position and therefore not detecting that the vessel was dragging anchor and had moved from its original position during high-water conditions in proximity to other vessels. 

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAB2115.pdf


Παρασκευή 23 Ιουλίου 2021

MAIB investigation report 9-2021: Stolt Groenland

Summary

On 28 September 2019, a cargo tank containing styrene monomer on board the Cayman Islands registered chemical tanker Stolt Groenland ruptured due to runaway polymerisation. The catastrophic rupture released a large quantity of vapour to the atmosphere, and it subsequently ignited. 



Fire-fighting efforts by the emergency services took over six hours and involved more than 700 personnel and 117 units of fire trucks, pumps and fire tugs.

 Safety Issues

·         the styrene monomer was affected by other heated cargo tanks

·         heat transfer from other cargoes was not fully appreciated

·         the styrene monomer temperature was not monitored




Recommendations

A recommendation (2021/122) has been made to Stolt Tankers B.V. aimed at ensuring the wider marine chemical sector benefits from the lessons learned from the Stolt Focus incident and research initiatives that were carried out as a result of this accident.

The Internantional Chamber of Shipping and INTERTANKO have been recommended (2021/118 and 2021/119) to promulgate our report to their members.

Recommendations (2021/117, 2021/120 and 2021/121) have also been made to the Cayman Island Shipping Registry , the Chemical Distribution Institute and Plastics Europe (Styrene Producers Association). These are intended to assist in ensuring that the guidance provided in certificates of inhibitor and styrene monomer handling guides is consistent and achievable given the limitations of equipment and testing facilities on board ships.

Full report at,

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60f93e2cd3bf7f044c51590b/2021-09-StoltGroenland-Report.pdf


Σάββατο 3 Ιουλίου 2021

Grounding of ro-ro freight ferry Arrow

At 0727 on 25 June 2020, the Isle of Man registered ro-ro freight ferry Arrow grounded in thick fog while entering Aberdeen Harbour. During its port approach, a pilot exemption certificate (PEC) holder provided by the vessel’s charterer was navigating by radar and steering the vessel.

The vessel encountered the thick fog a few minutes before it entered Aberdeen’s 70m wide Navigation Channel, and with limited support from the bridge team, the PEC holder became overloaded. Consequently, while attempting to correct a deviation to the north of the planned track, he over corrected to the south. The over-correction was not noticed by the bridge team in time to avoid the grounding.

After grounding, the vessel began to list significantly in the falling tide. After confirming no water ingress into the hull, with the assistance of a tug, the master used Arrow’s engines and bow thruster to refloat the vessel. There were no injuries or pollution but there was significant damage to the hull.

Safety issues

·   Arrow’s bridge team was not fully prepared for pilotage in restricted visibility. There was no effective shared mental model of the pilotage plan and the vessel’s progress along it.

·   The level of support provided to the PEC holder by the bridge team was poor.

·   Navigation techniques used did not provide Arrow’s bridge team with an accurate view of the available safe water in the Aberdeen approach channel.

·   Poor bridge ergonomics and limited electronic chart system capabilities meant that the PEC holder was navigating by use of radar alone.

 Full report may be read at

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60dc6b66e90e077176c20127/2021-08-Arrow-Report.pdf

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60dc6ba0d3bf7f7c389ab2c0/2021-08-Arrow-Annexes.pdf


Δευτέρα 28 Ιουνίου 2021

Bahamas Maritime Authority: Guidance on CIC for Pilot Transfer Arrangements

The Bahamas Maritime Authority (BMA) announced that a Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Pilot Transfer Arrangements will take place onboard all Bahamian ships from 01 July 2021 to 31 December 2021. The decision came as a number of accident reports published by various organizations across the maritime industry reveal a growing number of serious accidents, incidents, and near misses related to incorrect pilot transfer arrangements or significant defects in associated equipment. Last year, USCG published MSIB 21-20 Change 1 “Recommendation for Pilot Transfer Arrangements”, in light of recent deaths of maritime pilots while embarking commercial vessels, while earlier in 2021, several countries and port authorities have shared instructions regarding pilot boarding arrangements.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

The root causes identified in these cases were mainly due to the use of substandard and/or modified pilot and combination ladders, unauthorized modifications to deck access, defective winches and reels, and incorrect pilot ladder securing.

All of these issues can be attributed to non-compliant designs, inadequate procedures, unsafe rigging, poor maintenance and/or insufficient crew training in relation to pilot transfer operations, All ships to which the SOLAS 1974, as amended applies are expected to meet the pilot transfer arrangement requirements laid out in Regulation 23 of Chapter V of SOLAS and IMO Resolution A.1045 (27) Pilot Transfer Arrangements.

 Instructions to Masters and companies on the Campaign Procedure

§  Companies operating Bahamian ships are requested to circulate this Technical Alert among their fleet.

§  Masters of Bahamian ships are requested to address the issues raised in BMA Safety Alert 21-01 and Information Notice 018 at an onboard safety committee meeting.

§  It is also requested to conduct at least one training session to increase crew awareness of the correct procedure for arranging pilot transfer, and inspection requirements for transfer equipment onboard. The Master may decide, at his or her discretion, to conduct follow-up training sessions as necessary in order to ensure adequate understanding by the crew.

§  Training records with signatures of the attendees are to be available for inspection at the annual flag inspection.

§  The checklist included in Annex 1 of this document should be completed by the attending inspector at the inspection and reported directly to tech@bahamasmaritime.com. Masters, if they wish, may complete and submit the checklist at any time.

 Instructions to Flag Approved Nautical Inspectors (ANI)

§  The ANI should complete the same checklist at every flag inspection during the CIC, where practicable. The completed checklist shall be reported directly to the BMA via email soonest possible following to completion of the inspection onboard. The company may be put in copy to this communication. Any deficiencies identified are to be reported with other findings of the inspection through BORIS.

§  The ANI should interview responsible crew members to make sure they have been properly trained on the correct procedure of arranging pilot transfer and inspection of transfer arrangements and equipment involved. This can be confirmed through a “Pilot Transfer Arrangement Rigging” drill, which can be recorded as a drill for the flag inspection.

§  The ANI should check training and safety committee meeting records and note this in the narrative section of the inspection report under “General Comments”. 

https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/BMA-Concentrated-Inspection-Campaign-CIC-for-Pilot-Transfer-Arrangements-2021_06.pdf

Δευτέρα 21 Ιουνίου 2021

Tank cleaning as per MARPOL ANNEX II Amendments

Tank cleaning is one of the key operations on board tanker carriers as it removes any hydrocarbon vapours, liquids or residues from tanks. Tank cleaning is required for many reasons, such as to carry clean ballast, remove sediments from tank top plating, prepare the tankers for internal inspections or prior to entering dry dock.

For ships certified of Noxious Liquid Substances in bulk, the Procedures & Arrangements Manual (P&A) is a requirement as outcome of MARPOL Annex II, which includes the details of tank washing.

Recently IMO has adopted MARPOL Annex II and IBC & BCH codes amendments to address the issues of tank washing with high viscosity (but not harmful) oil which were washed ashore in the English Channel. In this regard a new special area has been incorporated under the title “North Western European Waters”.

Following the amendments, MEPC. 315 (74) requires the revision of P&A manuals in order to include the new requirements. As these requirements are going to come into force on 1st January 2021, the P&A Manual amendments shall be required to be actioned by all ships subject to MARPOL Annex II surveys, by the date of entry into force.

MEPC. 315 (74) may be read at

https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/IMO-ANNEX-4-RESOLUTION-MEPC.31574-adopted-on-17-May-2019-Amendments-to-MARPOL-Annex-II-Cargo-residues-and-tank-washings-of-persistent-floating-products-2019_05.pdf