USCG raleases El Faro final report

The US Coast Guard issued an official investigation report on cargo vessel El Faro, which sank along with its 33 member crew, in October 2015, becoming one of the worst maritime disasters in US history. The investigation report on El Faro cargo vessel found that the captain underestimated the strength of a hurricane and overestimated the ship’s strength on a trip between Florida and Puerto Rico. Also, ship’s owner, Tote Maritime Inc., had not replaced a safety officer and had violated regulations regarding crew rest periods and working hours.

The incident

At the time of the sinking, EL FARO was on a U.S. domestic voyage with a full load of containers and roll-on roll-off cargo bound from Jacksonville, Florida to San Juan, Puerto Rico.

As EL FARO departed port on September 29, 2015, a tropical weather system that had formed east of the Bahamas Islands was rapidly intensifying in strength. The storm system evolved into Hurricane Joaquin and defied weather forecasts and standard Atlantic Basin hurricane tracking by traveling southwest. As various weather updates were received onboard EL FARO, the Master directed the ship southward of the direct course to San Juan, which was the normal route.

The Master’s southern deviation ultimately steered EL FARO almost directly towards the strengthening hurricane. As EL FARO began to encounter heavy seas and winds associated with the outer bands of Hurricane Joaquin, the vessel sustained a prolonged starboard list and began intermittently taking water into the interior of the ship. Shortly after 5:30 AM on the morning of October 1, 2015, flooding was identified in one of the vessel’s large cargo holds. At the same time, EL FARO engineers were struggling to maintain propulsion as the list and motion of the vessel increased. After making a turn to shift the vessel’s list to port, in order to close an open scuttle, EL FARO lost propulsion and began drifting beam to the hurricane force winds and seas.

At approximately 7:00 AM, without propulsion and with uncontrolled flooding, the Master notified his company and signaled distress using EL FARO’s satellite distress communication system. Shortly after signaling distress, the Master ordered abandon ship. The vessel, at the time, was near the eye of Hurricane Joaquin, which had strengthened to a Category 3 storm. Rescue assets began search operations, and included a U.S. Air National Guard hurricane tracking aircraft overflight of the vessel’s last known position. After hurricane conditions subsided, the Coast Guard commenced additional search operations, with assistance from commercial assets contracted by the vessel’s owner. The search located EL FARO debris and one deceased crewmember. No survivors were located during these search and rescue operations.

Conclusions – Probable Causes

·         TOTE did not provide the tools and protocols for accurate weather observations. The Master and navigation crew did not adequately or accurately assess and report observed weather conditions.

·         EL FARO Incurred a Severe Port List and Lost Propulsion : At 5:54 AM on October 1, the Master altered course to intentionally put the wind on the vessel’s starboard side to induce a port list and enable the C/M to access and close the Hold 3 starboard scuttle. This port list was exacerbated by his previous order to transfer ramp tank ballast to port, and resulted in a port list that was greater than the previous starboard list and a dynamic shifting of cargo and flood water.

·         The loss of propulsion resulted in the vessel drifting and aligning with the trough of the sea, exposing the beam of the vessel to the full force of the sea and wind.

·         The EL FARO crew did not have adequate knowledge of the ship or ship’s systems to identify the sources of the flooding, nor did they have equipment or training to properly respond to the flooding.

·         A lack of effective training and drills by crew members, and inadequate oversight by TOTE, Coast Guard and ABS, resulted in the crew and riding crew members being unprepared to undertake the proper actions required for surviving in an abandon ship scenario.

·         After 5:43 AM on October 1, the Master failed to recognize the magnitude of the threat presented by the flooding into the hold combined with the heavy weather conditions. The Master did not take appropriate action commensurate with the emergent nature of the situation onboard EL FARO, including alerting the crew and making preparations for abandoning ship.

·         When the Master made the decision to abandon ship, approximately 10 minutes before the vessel sank, he did not make a final distress notification to shore to update his earlier report to TOTE’s Designated Person Ashore that they were not abandoning ship. This delayed the Coast Guard’s awareness that EL FARO was sinking and the crew was abandoning ship, and impacted the Coast Guard’s search and rescue operation.

·         The cumulative effects of anxiety, fatigue, and vessel motion from heavy weather degraded the crew’s decision making and physical performance of duties during the accident voyage.

·         EL FARO’s conversion in 2005-2006, which converted outboard ballast tanks to fixed ballast, also severely limited the vessel’s ability to improve stability at sea in the event of heavy weather or flooding.

·         Although EL FARO’s open lifeboats met applicable standards (SOLAS 60), they were completely inadequate to be considered as an option for the crew to abandon ship in the prevailing conditions.

Recommendations

Among others, it is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative:

·         to review U.S. regulations, international conventions, and technical policy to initiate revisions to ensure that all ventilators or other hull openings, which cannot be closed watertight or are required to remain normally open due to operational reasons such as continuous positive pressure ventilation, should be considered as down-flooding points for intact and damage stability.

·         to eliminate open top gravity launched lifeboats for all oceangoing ships in the U.S.commercial fleet.

·         to require that a company maintain an onboard and shore side record of all incremental vessel weight changes, to track weight changes over time so that the aggregate total may be readily determined.

·         to require review and approval of software that is used to perform cargo loading and securing calculations.

·         to require that all Personal Flotation Devices on oceangoing commercial vessels be outfitted with a Personal Locator Beacon.

·         to develop a shipboard emergency alert system that would provide an anonymous reporting mechanism for crew members to communicate directly with the Designated Person Ashore or the Coast Guard while the ship is at sea.

·         to request that NOAA evaluate the effectiveness and responsiveness of current National Weather Service (NWS) tropical cyclone forecast products, specifically in relation to storms that may not make landfall but that may impact maritime interests.

·         to require that all cargo ships have a plan and booklets outlining damage control information. 

·         to update 46 CFR to establish damage control training and drill requirements for commercial, inspected vessels.

·         to require electronic records and periodic electronic transmission of records and data to shore from oceangoing commercial ships.

·         to explore adding an OCMI segment to Training Center Yorktown’s Sector Commander Indoctrination Course for prospective officers who do not have the Prevention Ashore Officer Specialty Code, OAP-10. 

·         to update NVIC 2-95 and Marine Safety Manual Volume II to require increased frequency of ACS and Third Party Organizations (TPOs) direct oversight by attendance of Coast Guard during Safety Management Certificate and Document of Compliance audits.

·         to establish and publish an annual report of domestic vessel compliance.

·         to implement a policy requiring that individual ACS surveyors complete an assessment process, approved by the cognizant OCMI, for each type of delegated activity being conducted on behalf of the Coast Guard. 

·         to explore adding a Steam Plant Inspection course to the Training Center Yorktown curriculum.

·         to require that all existing cargo vessels meet the most current intact and damage stability standards.

Explore more by reading the full report at,

https://www.safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/UCSG-Steamship-El-Faro-sinking-and-loss-of-the-vessel-with-33-persons-missing-northeast-of-Acklins-and-Crooked-island-2017_10.pdf

 

 

 

Carefully to Carry 2017 now available!

While safety is the primary objective and loss prevention continues to be an ongoing concern for shipping, this book also touches upon a variety of issues, as vessels, cargoes and regulations become increasingly complex. In this context, the UK P&I Club has updated its Carefully to Carry publication to highlight the most current thinking in the industry.

Best practices, checklists, key points and considerations, and clear messages supported by photos and illustrations are some of the features of this manual that not only educate but also enhance the reader's existing knowledge. For example, it supplements insightfully the IMSBC Code, the IGC Code and the BLU Code, among others.

Carefully to Carry is of course not limited to dry bulk cargoes, but also covers liquid bulk cargoes, gases, packaged cargoes and a long list of other cargoes. It encapsulates the full range of potential issues around transporting bulk cargoes, from the characteristics and risks inherent in specific goods, hold preparation and hatch covers, to best practice when loading and unloading and the regulations that shippers must abide by.

By encouraging best practice around the handling and storage of potentially dangerous cargo, this book will hopefully assist in reducing the number of tragic injuries and incidents that unfortunately continue to occur. Crew members who familiarize themselves with this guide and its recommendations can significantly reduce the possibility of cargo incurring any damage, with all the resulting costs that this can bring.

Established in 1961, the C2C committee has produced many articles on cargoes that have caused many claims, and other cargo related issues such as hold washing, cargo securing, and ventilation.

All articles published by the committee are available to Members for download using the menu below, and are also available on disk and a paper volume. Member's also receive the latest reports from the committee by email, every other month through the departments email newsletter Loss Prevention News.

The quality of advice given has established Carefully to Carry as a key source of guidance for ship owners and ships' officers. In addition, the articles have frequently been the source of expertise in negotiations over the settlement of claims and have also been relied on in court hearings.

https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/C_to_C_flashpoint_contaminations.pdf

https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/Carefully_to_Carry/BulkOil.pdf


https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/Carefully_to_Carry/Samples%20and%20Sampling.pdf


https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/Carefully_to_Carry/Biofuels.pdf


https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/Carefully_to_Carry/Liquid%20Natural%20Oils.pdf
 

Lessons Learnt: Enclosed Space Fatality

Incident description

As discharge of a cargo of coal progressed, the level in one of the cargo holds had lowered to the point where stevedores needed to enter for cargo trimming operations using bulldozers. The cargo hold ladders were completely enclosed within a trunk, with openings at the main deck and at the lower part of the hold only. In accordance with shipboard SMS procedures, it was necessary for the crew to arrange ventilation and testing of the trunk space atmosphere prior to permitting entry of personnel. The third officer instructed two crew members to open the cargo hold access hatch and install a ventilation fan at the entrance, a task which should not normally have required the crew to enter the hold. When the third officer arrived with the portable gas instrument, he saw the hatch open but the fan was not running. He then noticed that both crew members were lying unconscious on the hold ladder platforms within the trunk. The alarm was raised and rescue of the crew members was performed using self-contained breathing apparatus. Unfortunately, one crew member died and the other, although resuscitated, suffered the debilitating health effects of gas poisoning and oxygen starvation.

 

Analysis

 

It is not known why the crew found it necessary to enter the hold as the surviving crew member had no recollection of the incident. However, this tragedy highlights the dangers associated with unplanned entry into cargo holds which should always be treated as enclosed spaces, particularly when loaded with cargoes which may deplete oxygen and/or emit flammable gasses and/or toxic gasses. Coal is a cargo which can present all of these hazards. Although the hold access trunk serves the purpose of protecting the ladders from stevedore damage, the very restricted space created with only limited openings increases the hazard to personnel, particularly when considering that the lower opening may be obstructed with cargo.

Lessons Learnt

Ø  All crew should be properly trained to recognise the hazards presented by the enclosed spaces on board and in safe entry procedures as per SOLAS requirements and IMO recommendations

Ø  Ship managers, Masters and crew must have a zero tolerance attitude to unplanned entry into enclosed spaces or breach of SMS procedures.

Ø  Cargo holds are some of the most dangerous spaces on board vessels and should always be assumed to be dangerous until proven otherwise.

Ø  Enclosed space openings need to be rigorously controlled. Cargo hold access hatches should be clearly labelled with warning notices prohibiting entry without an enclosed space permit.

The UK Club’s Loss Prevention team combines practical solutions that address Members’ needs and claims experience with research into the wider issues that impact directly on P&I insurance and the Club’s exposure to claims. Every year, the UK P&I Club deals with thousands of claims using the expertise and experience of its professional claims handlers, ex-seafarers and lawyers. With five decades of research into loss prevention issues the Club has developed a formidable body of technical material on maritime risks. Each month the Loss Prevention team aim to share some of the Club’s claims experience, by looking at real case examples and identifying lessons learnt to help Members avoid similar incidents – you can find past lessons learnt here:

 https://www.ukpandi.com/loss-prevention/training-advice/lessons-learnt/

Supreme Court provides guidance on damages and mitigation in New Flamenco

The Supreme Court recently handed down its judgment in New Flamenco (Globalia Business Travel SAU of Spain v Fulton Shipping Inc). In this long-awaited decision, the court considered whether a benefit obtained by the owners relating to the sale of the vessel following the charterers' repudiatory breach of a charter should be taken into account in assessing the damages that the owners were entitled to recover.

Facts

The New Flamenco was a small cruise ship that was time chartered from February 2004 to October 2007. The charter period was extended by two years, but the charterers denied that they had agreed to any extension and redelivered the vessel at the end of the original period. The charterers were found to be wrong and in breach of the charter. Following redelivery, the owners terminated the charter on the basis that the charterers' conduct amounted to an anticipatory repudiation of the charter. Having terminated the contract, the owners sold the ship for a price that was significantly higher than the price that they would have achieved had they sold the vessel at the time when the vessel should have been redelivered.

The owners then claimed damages from the charterers for loss of profit during the extension period. The charterers argued that the owners were required to give credit for the difference in the price between that which they sold the vessel for after the early redelivery and the price for which the vessel could have been sold at the contractual redelivery date in November 2009. If allowed, this credit would have reduced the owners' claim for damages to a nominal amount.

Arbitration and Commercial Court

The matter originated in an arbitration where the arbitrator held for the charterers and found that the owners' sale of the vessel shortly after the early redelivery was an act of mitigation that was caused by the charterers' repudiatory breach of the charter. Consequently, the arbitrator held that the benefit gained from selling the vessel should be taken into account when considering the net loss suffered by the owners.

The arbitrator's decision was appealed to the Commercial Court, which disagreed and decided in favor of the owners. Justice Popplewell found that the owners were not required to give credit to the charterers for the benefit they had obtained by selling the vessel in October 2007 as it "was not a benefit which was legally caused by the breach". He also found that the owners' decision to sell the vessel was driven by commercial factors which were independent of the repudiation of the charter. Indeed, the owners could have sold the vessel at any time. For this reason, Popplewell concluded that the capital benefit gained by the owners was of a different kind to the income loss as a result of the breach.

Appeal

The Court of Appeal disagreed with Popplewell and reinstated the arbitrator's award. The view of the court was that as long as long as the act of mitigation "arises out of the consequences of the breach and is in the ordinary course of business and benefits the claimant", any benefit should be taken into account in assessing the amount of loss. The court highlighted that an important question in this context is whether there is an available market. If there is no available market, the prima facie measures of loss for an owner would be the "difference between contractual hire and the cost of earning that hire (crew, wages, cost of fuel, etc)". If an owner makes an additional profit by trading the vessel, that additional profit should also be taken into account in assessing damages. Further, if an owner decides to sell the vessel, the court was of the opinion that there was no sound reason why the benefit gained by selling the vessel at a high price should not be taken into account, as this a step taken in mitigation which had brought about a benefit to the owner.

Supreme Court

The owners appealed to the Supreme Court, and in a unanimous judgment it overturned the Court of Appeal's judgment and restored Popplewell's ruling. In arriving at its decision, the court explained that the reason why the benefit did not need to be taken into account in assessing damages was because the benefit was not of the same nature as the loss caused by the charterers. The court found that the "the essential question is whether there is a sufficiently close link between the two". In this case, the premature redelivery of the vessel had not necessitated the sale of the vessel and it was not the legal cause of it. In Lord Clarke's words "there was nothing about the premature termination of the charterparty which made it necessary to sell the vessel either at all or at any particular time". The decision to sell the vessel had nothing to do with the charterers and had arisen solely as a result a commercial decision made by the owners.

Further, in dealing with the argument that the sale of the vessel should be considered as a mitigating act by the owners, the court held that realizing the capital value of the vessel through a sale could not and did not mitigate the loss of the income stream for the two-year extension period of the charter. Even though the owners were able to sell the vessel at what was considered to be the peak of the market, it did not reduce or prevent the loss of the charter hire income stream that would have been earned during the extension period.

Comment

New Flamenco is an important decision and highlights the issues that can arise in relation to the measure of damages and mitigation in the context of a breach of contract. The Supreme Court's judgment provides interesting guidance on this area of law and sets out – at least to a certain extent – the boundaries of the law relating to mitigation and what types of acts by an innocent party can reduce the amount of damages recoverable arising from a breach of contract.

New Emission Control Norms from 2019 in Hong Kong

Hong Kong will introduce their own regulation to require vessels plying Hong Kong waters to use cleaner fuel from January 2019 to complement the efforts under the PRC’s Ministry of Transport’s action plan for the Hong Kong, Macau and PRD (Pearl River Delta).

“A Clean Air Plan for Hong Kong” published in March 2013, was the first document issued by the Environment Bureau (ENB) which set out an emission control plan to improve the air quality in Hong Kong, Macau and PRD. The plan looked into emission level and set out the emission reduction targets for various sectors, such as Road, Marine, Power Plants and Non-Road Mobile Machinery for the future.

The ENB and the Environmental Protection Department (EPD) of Hong Kong updated their publication on “Clean Air Plan for Hong Kong 2013-2017 Progress Report” (Page 25 – 30 related to the marine trade) in June 2017. This updates the 2013 publication and reveals stricter controls measure for Hong Kong’s air quality and its future plans.

From 1 January 2019 onwards, vessels trading within the PRD Domestic Emission Control Areas (DECA) are required to run on low-sulphur fuel with the sulphur content not exceeding 0.5%, according to the plan set out by the PRC’s Ministry of Transport. However, the penalty violating the 0.5% requirement remains unknown at present.

The figures below are the extracts from the June 2017 report on the designated PRD DECA zone and the timetable plan to reduce sulphur content within its region.

Source of Information

https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/LP_Bulletins/2017/Bulletin_1134_-_0717_-_New_Emission_Control_Norms_from_2019_in_Hong_Kong.pdf

Supreme Court defines parameters of safe port undertakings

Introduction

On May 10 2017 the Supreme Court handed down a judgment addressing three issues of importance to ship owners, charterers and insurers alike, defining:

·         the parameters of the safe port undertakings;

      ·         the rights of subrogation of insurers where vessels are operated under bareboat charter; and

     ·         the right of charterers to limit their liability under the 1976 Convention on the Limitation of Liability of Ship owners.

The principal issue in the insurers' appeal was the safety of the port. The insurers brought their claim as assignees of the ship owners' and demise charterers' rights; this led to the court considering the extent of the insurers' rights to pursue subrogated claims where a bareboat charter was in place. The Court of Appeal had found that the sub-charterers had not breached the safe port undertaking in their charter by ordering the vessel to the port of Kashima, Japan in October 2006. The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the famous phrase 'abnormal occurrence' from the leading case on unsafe ports, Eastern City [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep 217. This decision sets out the test for safety of a port and provides that a "port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the particular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship".

Despite closely examining the features of the port, the lower courts disagreed with each other as to whether the events which led to the loss of the Ocean Victory constituted an abnormal occurrence. In this decision the Supreme Court confirmed the Court of Appeal's finding in favor of the sub-charterers, which was to apply an ordinary interpretation to the phrase 'abnormal occurrence' − that is, "something well removed from the normal", being exceptional in nature.

 

Facts

The Capesize bulk carrier Ocean Victory was in the process of discharging a cargo of iron ore at the port of Kashima, Japan on October 24 2006 when an incoming storm led to a decision to leave the berth and sail to open waters. In the event, the vessel sailed up the port's fairway and collided with the breakwater, eventually grounding nearby. Despite attempts by salvors to save the vessel, it later broke in two and was declared a total loss.

Legal issues

Safe port undertakings

The principal argument throughout the litigation was the safety of the port in question − in particular, the notion that the phenomena experienced that particular day could be described as so unusual as to amount to an abnormal occurrence. The owners also put forward various submissions that the port was unsafe due to its safety systems, but this part of the claim was not central to the appeal.

In relation to the conditions at the port, the first-instance judge examined the features separately (i.e., long waves and strong northerly gales) to decide whether they were individually foreseeable. Following this logic, since each event was known to have occurred previously at the port, these constituted ordinary characteristics of that port, and the fact that they could occur (whether individually or concurrently) was sufficient to render the port unsafe. He did not consider whether the combination of the two events at the same time was unusual. Under this interpretation, the port of Kashima was found to be unsafe despite the fact that no significant casualties had occurred in its 35-year history. This created a great deal of uncertainty for charterers, as it considerably widened their assumption of responsibility under the safe port undertaking.

In overturning the High Court decision, the Court of Appeal looked at the history of the port and found that the simultaneous occurrence of the specific winds and wave patterns was so highly unusual as to be considered an abnormal occurrence. The Supreme Court confirmed the approach taken by the Court of Appeal, agreeing that the storm was sufficiently exceptional that the port was ordinarily safe and accordingly dismissing the appeal.

Given that there was no breach of safe port warranty, the court was not bound to address the other issues in the litigation:

·         insurance arrangements between the hull insurers and the ship owners/demise charterers; and

·         Limitation funds under the 1976 convention.

However, the judges considered these questions to be of general importance and provided useful guidance − albeit obiter (i.e., in passing) − in response.

Insurance provisions – third-party claims

The Court of Appeal accepted the sub-charterers' submission that the allocation of risk between the demise charterers and the ship owners was regulated as a complete code under Clause 12 of the Barecon 89 charter. Under this clause, the demise charterers were responsible for insuring the vessel against marine losses and the ship owners were named as co-insureds. In the event of a total loss, the ship owners would look to the hull insurers for recovery regardless of whether the loss resulted from the negligence or fault of the demise charterers. This effectively precluded the right of subrogation by the insurers, which could not look to the charterers (or sub-charterers) for indemnification.

By a three-to-two majority, the Supreme Court accepted the Court of Appeal's interpretation of Clause 12 and found that there was no loss which could be passed down to the sub-charterers. The minority were not persuaded by this argument, as rights of subrogation are a generally accepted feature in insurance claims.

Scope of limitation fund

The Supreme Court considered whether a charterer can rely on the 1976 convention to limit its liability against a ship owner for loss of the vessel. Under Article 2(1)(a) of the convention, charterers may limit their liability in relation to events "occurring on board or in direct connection with the operation of the ship". It was unanimously found that, had the charterers been found to have breached the safe port undertaking, they would not have been entitled to limit their liability against the ship owners under the 1976 convention. This affirms the earlier Court of Appeal decision in The CMA Djakarta [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 460 (which settled before reaching the then House of Lords).

Comment

If any doubt remained as to the correct construction of the phrase 'abnormal occurrence', the comprehensive review of safe port authorities by both appeal courts has laid this to rest. There is therefore no departure from the accepted understanding of safe port obligations. Charterers will be reassured by this decision, which balances the ordinary trading risks that they take in the course of their business with unusual phenomena occurring in their ports of call.

Arguably, the more interesting issue arising out of this decision is the potential curtailment of the rights of insurers to recover against third parties. Insurers of bareboat chartered vessels will be especially mindful of this decision which − although issued obiter − could leave them significantly out of pocket in the event of total loss.

 

Additional input in regards to the safe port may be found at,

https://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/Articles/Safe_Port.asp

 

 

USCG: Acceptable US ballast methods vs BWMC requirements

USCG issued a Safety Information Bulletin as a reminder to operators that ships discharging ballast water into the waters of the US must comply with the country’s requirements

Recently, the National Ballast Information Clearinghouse has received a number of reports indicating that untreated ballast water exchanges had been undertaken by vessels beyond their compliance date and without a valid Coast Guard extension. An investigation into these circumstances has found that “Statement(s) of Compliance for Ballast Water Management” endorsed for “sequential exchange method” [Regulation D-1 of the BWM Convention] have been misinterpreted as applying to the U.S. BW regulations. USCG reminds that these Statements of Compliance are issued under the provisions of the BWM Convention, which the United States is not signatory to.

Vessels beyond their compliance date are reminded to employ one of the following BWM methods, when operating in the waters of the United States:

·         Use a Coast Guard-approved ballast water management system (BWMS);

·         Use only water from a U.S. public water system (PWS);

·         Use an alternate management system (AMS) [NOTE: Only valid for 5-years from compliance date];

·         Do not discharge BW into waters of the United States (includes the territorial sea as extended to 12 nautical miles from the baseline); or

·         Discharge to a facility onshore or to another vessel for purposes of treatment.

Masters, owners/operators, agents and persons-in-charge are further reminded to maintain an up-to-date vessel specific BWM plan, as detailed in 33 CFR 151.2050(g) and to provide training on the application of ballast water and sediment management and treatment procedures as required by 33 CFR 151.2050(h).

These plans should include options for the Master to consider if the BWMS stops operating or becomes unexpectedly unavailable during a voyage, and the need to contact the cognizant COTP or District Commander as soon as possible to discuss options not addressed above.

USCG reminds that violations of the U.S. ballast water regulations may result in costly delays, environmental deficiencies, civil enforcement action, and ineligibility for the QUALSHIP 21/E-Zero designation.

Explore more at the official policy letter:

http://www.green4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/USCG-Acceptable-U.S.-Ballast-Water-Management-Methods-vs.-BWMC-methods-2017_06.pdf

https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/ECFR?page=browse