Παρασκευή 28 Φεβρουαρίου 2020

Carrier liability for contaminated liquid bulk cargo – Contributory negligence of shipper


Facts
The claimant commissioned the first defendant with the inland transport of de-icing fluid for an airport. In addition, the claimant commissioned the second defendant to inspect the cargo upon loading. The actual transport was carried out by a sub-contractor (the intervening party) commissioned by the first defendant.
Prior to loading, the second defendant took samples from each of the vessel's four tanks (despite its contractual obligations extending to only the inspection of the cargo). No abnormalities were found and the second defendant issued a cleanliness report. However, subsequent to the loading, the second defendant found brown particles on the product surface, which were identified as remnants of the last product carried in the tanks (Hamino, a wheat-based natural product). On discharge, another type of particle was found in the de-icing fluid. This was identified as detached coating from the vessel's tanks. The claimant held the first and second defendant liable for the damage caused by the contamination.
The key issue to be decided by the Hamburg Higher Regional Court was whether the claimant had a control and inspection duty under Section 425(2) of the Commercial Code and if so, to what extent the damage should be reduced for reasons of contributory negligence.
Decision
The first-instance court ruled that the intervening party's failure to provide a vessel with clean tanks amounted to a qualified fault, depriving the first defendant of the right to limit liability. On the other hand, the first defendant was liable for only two-thirds of the damage, as the claimant had contributed to one-third of the damage by failing to adhere to its duty to inspect and control the tanks prior to loading. The court considered that the claimant was subject to such duty as it had failed to inform the first defendant that the product required a minimum degree of cleanliness. The first defendant and the intervening party appealed. The second defendant was not found liable, as its contractual obligations had not extended to inspection of the tanks. This part of the decision was not appealed.
The Hamburg Higher Regional Court upheld the operative part of the first-instance decision, but with a different reasoning.
First, it overruled the first-instance court's conclusion that the first defendant was liable without a right to limit liability. Neither the facts established by the first-instance court nor the content of the claim submissions led to the conclusion that the actual carrier had caused the damage through qualified fault. Among other things, it was neither argued nor proven that the actual carrier had had any knowledge of the flaking coating or remnants from the last cargo.
Second, the Hamburg Higher Regional Court rejected the appealing parties' argument that the first defendant was exonerated from liability under Section 427(1)(4) of the Commercial Code as the damage had been caused by the natural condition of the goods. The court concluded that it was obvious that contamination from the detached coating in the vessel's tank had nothing to do with the natural condition of the goods. This was regardless of whether there were other types of goods that would not suffer damage from such contamination, as argued by the appealing parties. As the defence had already been rejected for this reason, there was no need for the court to examine whether the natural condition of the de-icing fluid could be affirmed in relation to the remnants from the previous cargo (the appealing parties argued that this was the case due to how the fluid was misted with fine nozzles on the wings of aircraft and was as such sensitive to contamination).
Third, the Hamburg Higher Regional Court overruled the first-instance decision that the claimant had contributed to one-third of the damage by failing to adhere to its control and inspection duties. The court stated that it is primarily the obligation of carriers to ensure that goods are duly transported. Just as shippers can rely on carriers to provide a clean vehicle, they also rely on the fact that goods are transported in sound tanks and will not become contaminated by flaking coating. Shippers do not have to examine vehicles, except in cases of known or obvious defects. In the present case, it had not been demonstrated that the tanks' defects were evident at first sight. Further, even if the second defendant's negligence could be attributed to the claimant, in view of the carrier's obligation to know its vehicles used for transport, the negligence would not exceed 10% to 20%. For procedural reasons, the court did not have to make a final decision on this issue.
Comment
The decision clarifies that shippers can rely on carriers to provide a sound transport vehicle. In particular, shippers have no duty to inspect their cargo holds for cleanliness or flaky coating that may contaminate goods. An exception applies only if a defect is known to the shipper or evident at first sight. However, even then, in apportioning negligence between carriers and shippers, considerable weight should be attached to the fact that carriers must know their vehicles and as a result their contributory negligence is unlikely to exceed 10% to 20%.

Reconstructing the concept of seaworthiness under the maritime labour convention 2006

The concept of seaworthiness has evolved over many years, and in common with similar concepts (for instance, the definition and application of “prudent seamanship”), its precise meaning has varied considerably. 
In this context, the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) can be regarded as focusing the concept in a manner that is not found elsewhere (whether in treaties or in case law). The implementation of the Convention will change shipowners' obligations to ensure ship safety and constitute an essential element of the standard of seaworthiness. Moreover, it is submitted that the MLC 2006 shifts the centre of emphasis in a manner that is both focussed and necessary. These changes are tracked and critically examined in this paper and conclusions are submitted based on the relevant analysis.

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Samples and sampling in the carriage of liquid bulk cargoes - 2020

As there is a wide variety of liquid cargoes carried and many different types of ships involved, the subject of sampling is very wide. 
This article deals with the general principles of how to ascertain the apparent order and condition of liquid goods when they are shipped and, just as importantly, how to preserve the evidence.
The period of the carrier’s responsibility for liquid bulk cargoes, under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, extends from the time when the cargo is loaded until the time it is discharged, including the loading and discharging operations. Under the Hamburg Rules, the carrier, his servants and agents are responsible for the cargo from the time the cargo is received by them at the load port until the time it has been delivered at the discharge port.
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Lloyd’s Review of LOF

Steamship Mutual’s Ian Freeman, Syndicate Manager Claims, Americas Syndicate has reported that, continuing from the publication of the revised SCOPIC 2018 form, Lloyd’s of London had now concluded its review of the Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement, more commonly known as the Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF).
He noted that LOF 2020, and its associated Lloyd’s Salvage Arbitration Clauses named LSAC 2020, contained significant changes. The first was the consolidation into one document of the previously separate arbitration clauses and procedural rules of LOF 2011. Lloyd’s has included in the same document the Fixed Cost Arbitration Procedure (FCAP), with the aim of encouraging its use.
There are two amendments to the main LOF 2020 form.
The first is a re-write of Clause H ‘Deemed performance’ on the reverse of the form. This clause addresses the circumstances in which a contractor may re-deliver the casualty, that is the casualty is to be in a safe place and safe condition. The qualifying definition of what is a safe condition has been simplified to remove some slightly antiquated language, although the meaning remains unchanged, that being that the casualty may be redelivered in a damaged state provided it is not in need of skilled salvage services or the contractor is being prevented from demobilizing through the intervention of a local authority.
In more recent years Lloyd’s has tried to identify the frequency by which the terms of a standard LOF have been amended by a side-agreement or other variation of its terms. As a continuation of this initiative, an additional provision has been inserted into ‘Important Notices No. 4’ obliging a contractor to disclose any agreement that seeks to amend or vary the standard LOF terms.
Another notable amendment found in the LSAC 2020 is that of the Special Cargo Provisions, now clause 143. Previously limited to container cargoes, these provisions provide an arbitrator the power to take into account the terms on which a contractor may have settled with a majority (by salved value) of cargo interests when considering the award to apply to the remainder unrepresented cargo interests. The provisions also permit small salved value cargo interests to be omitted from contributing to the overall salved fund.
The change in LOF 2020 is that LSAC 2020 has removed the restriction to container cargoes and widened the application to any cargoes where the provisions may be appropriate.
An entirely new clause appears as clause 19: ‘Contractor’s Special Right to Terminate’. This clause seeks to address an anomaly between the termination provisions of SCOPIC and LOF. The difficulty arises where an owner may terminate SCOPIC, but the contractor has no similar rights of termination under LOF. This may leave the contractor in the invidious position of having to attend a casualty with a potentially low salved value without the reassurance of SCOPIC remuneration or an Article 14 award.
SCOPIC is a substitute method of calculating Special Compensation under Article 14 of the salvage convention. Once incorporated into LOF a contractor has no recourse to special compensation other than though SCOPIC itself.
There are however two exceptions to this rule.
The first entitles the contractor to withdraw from SCOPIC and rely on an Article 14 award if the owner fails to provide initial SCOPIC security.
The second permits the contractor to terminate the services under both SCOPIC and, crucially, to terminate the main agreement (LOF) if, under SCOPIC, the owner fails to provide increased security.
However, if the owner has complied with their SCOPIC security obligations, the exceptions will not apply and on termination of SCOPIC the contractor is no longer earning SCOPIC remuneration, nor does the contractor have any automatic right to terminate the main agreement.
In this position the contractor can only look to the slightly subjective termination provisions of LOF of whether there is any reasonable prospect of a useful result or that the casualty is in ‘safe place’ and ‘safe condition’ for re-delivery to the owner. Termination of SCOPIC part way through a salvage operation would be unlikely to trigger any of these criteria, leaving the contractor bound to perform the operation under their LOF obligations, with potentially limited prospects of a financial reward to reflect those efforts.
Freeman said that the remedy to this imbalance in the termination provisions would be to provide the contractor an opportunity to apply to the salvage arbitrator to bring the main agreement to an end.
Finally, in an attempt to reduce the cost of salvage arbitrations, particularly in low salved value or straightforward cases, Lloyd’s has supported the Fixed Costs Arbitration Procedure (FCAP). The initiative has existed since 2005, but usage has proved disappointing and, in an attempt to improve visibility of the procedure, it has now been fully incorporated within LSAC 2020. FCAP has also seen some changes, with the nominal threshold increased to $2m salved value and wider powers given to the arbitrator to order FCAP for straightforward cases excess of the threshold value, or to order full arbitration in complicated cases below the threshold value.
Two documents (LOF and LSAC) are available on Lloyd’s Salvage and Arbitration Branch website:


Impact of Laytime and Demurrage clauses


Laytime disputes and demurrage claims under charterparties are the stable diet of shipping and maritime lawyers globally.
The payments and receipts of money as demurrage, or post fixture claims being recognized well both by tanker owners and charterers not only as devices encouraging efficient usage of time in loading and discharging operations but also as hedges against fluctuating freight markets.
The Maritime law reports and the literature are replete with decisions and guidance on the application and construction of the Laytime and Demurrage (L&D) clauses in charterparties.
These have attracted much attention and analysis in their original base contracts, ie charterparties. They also exist in International Sales Contracts where two issues are raised.
1.   First, what is the link between an L&D clause in a sales contract and its relevant charterparty.
2.   Second, when the interpretation of the clauses is applied, are we guided by charterparties or court decisions?
A new approach is been taken towards the drafting of such clauses separately in the contracts, keeping the verbiage, precise and accurate. Charterparties are concluded in most cases in order to perform obligations under sale contracts and charterers find themselves liable under charterparties for delays caused by their counterparties under their sales contracts.
This brings us to the two points of discussion, both of which related to the link between L&D clauses in sales contracts and charterparties.
Tanker owners have a vested interested in ensuring that their voyage charterer do not delay their asset - the tanker. Time delays caused have a direct impact of prolonging the duration of the voyage beyond the profit margins allowed by the tanker owner in settling of the final freight. Tanker owners enforce this interest by stipulating for L&D in the agreed charterparty.
Where the charterer is also a CIF or CFR seller of the commodity, demurrage might be paid on account of a delay caused by the buyer during the discharge operation. This is co-relation of capital cash flow in the oil trading market. The reverse my occur where the charterer is the FOB buyer.
The very purpose of the L&D clause in the sales contract is the ability to pass on to the counterparty, the cost of demurrage paid to the shipowner by the charterer, which has been in the first place, caused by the counter party.
Financial link
The financial link between the two clauses,
1.     is the L&D clause in the sales contract intended simply to indemnify the party to the sales contract against losses suffered under the counterpart clause in the charter party or,
2.     does the clause in the sales contract stand quite independently of the liability under the charterparty?
What is the legal link between these clauses: when applying and construing the L&D clause in a sales contract, do we need to transplant in the sales contract all the law surrounding similar clauses created in the context of charterparties?
The L&D clause in a sales contract stands free and independent from their counterparties’ charterparty. L&D clauses in sales contracts should be construed and applied as clauses in sales contracts, not as adjuncts to charterparties. Their interpretation should therefore be colored not by direction of the charterparties but by their relationship to the contractual duties of being an FOB or a CIF buyer or seller.
Of specific interest here is the start of laytime. A valid Notice of Readiness (NOR) may not necessarily be the same of what the charterers have been charged by the tanker owners, compared to what can be onward charged to the counterparty.
The commencement of laytime in the charterparty or a valid NOR may depend on various factors, which the charterers can use to accept as a valid NOR.
A valid NOR from tanker owners to charterers may not necessarily be the same valid NOR from charterers to their buyers.
Also worth a mention is the commencement of laytime is relevant at the first discharge port but not at the second and third port, where the laytime is to start at arrival immediately at arrival at the port.
FOB loading duties
While we are aware that the CIF buyer is under no obligation to discharge the cargo, it is impossible to suggest that an FOB seller is under no implied obligations to lead – and, if the FOB seller is obliged to
load, he must be under the obligation to do so within a specific time.
It is of the essence in the FOB sales contract that the seller performs his obligation to deliver by loading the goods free on board. The obligation is also of the essence in the sense that the seller must deliver the goods within the shipment period stipulated in the sales contract subject to of course the buyer making the arrangements for the engagement of shipping space allowing the seller to ship within the shipping period where the sales contract leave such arrangements to the buyer.
However, to say that the FOB seller is under an implied duty to place the cargo free on board the vessel within the period stipulated in the sales contract does not mean so necessarily that the FOB seller is bound to load within the stipulated time to avoid the buyer’s potential liability to the tanker owner for demurrage.
Laytime starts
Where the charterparty names a port as the terminal for loading or discharging operation, then subject to any term in the charterparty stipulating for the giving of an NOR, laytime starts as soon as the vessel reaches the named terminal. i.e. once the tanker has ‘arrived’ at the port. The precise ambit of the port consequently becomes an issue between owner and charterer i.e. any time spent idle between ‘arrival’ and berthing for the benefit of the charterers eats into the laytime agreed in the charterparty and brings closer the moment at which the owner starts earning demurrage.
It is interesting to identify who bears the risk of congestion between the arrival and berthing of the vessel.
Who bears this risk?
Is it between tanker owner and charterer or between buyer and seller in the sales contract?
To undertake a liability for demurrage while the vessel is in port but waiting for berth would be an open-ended commitment in a contract for the purchase of what must probably be a part cargo. In fixing the start of laytime in a sales contract, overriding regard should be had to the nature of the sales contract rather than to the charter party origins of laytime.
Valid NOR
In the case where there is ambiguity towards start of laytime, this runs from the moment the seller places the cargo at the disposal of the buyer. Even when the contract provides for an NOR to be provided, laytime still runs from the moment when a valid NOR has been provided, such that the risk of congestion remains with the CIF seller or charterer.
In conclusion, although the points of reference discussed above are all interlinked and related, the ultimate interest is the ability to dissect and clarify the risk to which any particular party is exposed because all of this translates into a dollar value which makes the L&D industry worth billions of dollars annually.
Traders and execution officers responsible for carrying out the trade deal are to be familiar with the interstices of the law of L&D in the charterparty, as it has been evolving and developing in the commercial courts and beyond.