Παρασκευή 22 Νοεμβρίου 2019

Re-Appraising the Concept of Laytime


Charterparty is an agreement between a shipowner and a charterer, wherein a ship or part of a vessel is hired or lease, for the carriage of goods by sea for a specific period. One of the most
frequent challenges in the contract of carriage by sea is the issue of bearer of liability for delay in loading or unloading of the goods from the chartered ship. Despite the introduction of several uniform forms to address the challenge of accurately construing time, the problem remain unabated as the sailing of vessels on sea are  delayed or impeded by various unprecedented and often times uncontrollable factors. Faced with unanticipated delay either in the loading or unloading of the cargo, the crisis of who as between the shipowner or charterer bears the liability thereof becomes inevitable. It is the position of this paper that the introduction of an extension of time clause, good knowledge of the ports concerned and an elegance drafting of the agreement would reduce the friction of liability for delay in carriage at sea.

INTRODUCTION

Layday otherwise called, Laytime is the period agreed between the parties to a charterparty for the loading and unloading of a cargo without penalty to the parties chartering the vessel. If more time than agreed is used to load or unload the vessel, the vessel’s owner (shipowner) is generally entitled to compensation for the delay. The compensation is called Demurrage. Laydays have also been described as the time allowed to the cargo-owner to remove the goods after arrival of the ship at the port of destination, after which, if he does not do so, he would have to pay rent called “demurrage” for the space his goods occupied on the ship during the extra days.

In charterparties agreements, laydays may be calculated by days, time and or tonnage. Laytimes are described in different ways and may also be stipulated and variously calculated. Laydays may also be called working days and what is a working day is determines by the port of destination and the country in question. But one of the duties of the charterer is to nominate within a reasonable time, a port or berth, where appropriate, for loading or discharge of his goods from the chartered vessel. The charterer also has a duty to load and discharge the cargo at that berth or port within a reasonable time, on completion of the approached or the carrying voyage. If the charterer fails to perform either obligation, he would be liable to the shipowner in damages for detention. What is known and called Laytime is thus the agreeable time for the discharge of the vessel that is now stipulated by a set period of timing.

Generally, if loading or discharge takes longer than the permitted laytime, the charterer would be made liable for “demurrage”. Demurrage is a pre-agreed daily rate liquidated damages which replaces the common law liability for detention, assessed at the market rate. The laytime and demurrage calculations will cease with the completion of loading or discharge as the case may be. This is however a general rule with rooms for exceptions. A charterparty agreement will usually contain an exception clause, which provides for the suspension of laytime on the occurrence of various unanticipated incidence interfering with loading or discharging. Such events may be sudden war, bad weather, etc.

Lay days may use such expressions as “running days”, “weather working days” and “working days”. Such expressions answer such questions as to what is the normal number of days required for a ship for instance to sail from Apapa port in Lagos Nigeria to Leiden in Netherland? Is it inclusive of night or only day? Is it 24 hours per day? Is it every day including Sundays and public holidays?

In the case of a “weather working days”, the correct definition is a day on which the weather permits the relevant work to be done, whether or not any person avails himself of that ‘permission’. The status of a day as being a weather working day, wholly or in part or not at all, is determined solely by its own weather, and not by extraneous factors. In Reardon Smith Line Ltd. Vs Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, the court held that where the weather is bad only for a fraction of the day, the whole day would not be written off, but only that fraction. This is understandable because the whole essence of a laytime is to ensure speedy completion of the charter for commercial expediency. It is equally for the same reason that many charterparty agreements contain a “dispatch clause” under which charterers become entitled to payment by the shipowner in the event that they finish those operations before the expiration of their allotted laytime. 
The difference between charters in which a specific time is allowed, whether for loading and unloading, and those in which laydays are wholly unidentified, is of great importance[8]. It is therefore pivotal to identify the type of voyage for the purposes of calculating time. A voyage may be port charter or berth charter. The laytime provision of the charter is also expected to determine the point at which the approach and carrying voyages end. If it is when the vessel reaches the port, then the charter will be a “port charter”. But if at the point the vessel reaches a berth within the port, then it is called a “berth6 charter”. Thus the character of the charter is determined by the laytime clause in the charterparty agreement.

Having identified the general nature of the concept of laytime, it is pivotal to this discourse to know the appropriate ways of calculating loading and unloading times in charterparty agreements.

HOW TO CALCULATE LAYTIME

Subject to the agreement of the parties, Laytimes may be calculated by a fixed number of days or by daily rate or exact quantity of loading and unloading.

Fixed Number of Days.

One way to calculate the duration of laytime is by reference to a fixed number of days. The presumption is that days mean “calendar days”. Thus where only part of a day is worked, that is counted as a whole day in laytime. This rebuttable presumption has however now given way to the more normal conventional day of 24 hours running from the start of laytime. For instance, if time starts at 0500hrs on a Tuesday and loading is completed at 11.00hrs on a Friday, under a “Calendar” day, four laydays is deemed to have been used. But under a “conventional day” only three and a quarter laydays would be used.
Some learned authors are of the view that Laytime could also be calculated according to running working days. Normally, a charterparty specifies the number of “laydays”, i.e. the number of days allowed for loading and discharging the cargo. Where they are referred to as “running working days”, it means days on which work is usually done in the particular port in question. Unless there are exemption clauses in the charter, the charterer is liable to load and unload within the agreed time.

Daily rate or quantity of Loading or offloading:

Laytime may also be calculated by reference to a daily rate of loading and or discharge. For example, 500 tons daily. In the case of General Capinpin, the House of Lords held that a variant of the clause which read “at the average rate of 1,000 metric tons basis five or more available workable hatches pro rata, if less number of hatches fixed an overall discharge rate of 1,000 tons per day.
Sometimes the rate will be expressed as one being “per working/available hatch”. In most cases, the hatch which is to take the largest quantity of cargo will be the “critical hatch” and the laydays will be the result of dividing the cargo for that hatch by the average rate specified by the charter. Therefore if the average rate is 500 tons per day and the charterer loads 1,000 tons into hatch one and 800 into hatch two and 200 into hatch three, the charterer will have available a total of two laydays, calculated by dividing cargo loaded into hatch one by the daily rate.

COMPLETION OF LOADING / UNLOADING BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF LAYTIME

A charterer will usually wish to complete loading before the expiration of laytime so as to avoid liability for demurrage. Where loading is completed before the expiration of laydays, the charterer is obligated to present bill of lading immediately and enable the ship to proceed. The charterer need not delay the departure of the ship only to complete laytime, otherwise he would be liable. But the charterer is entitled to delay the ship up to the expiration of laydays. He cannot be held liable for using the whole time only by showing that he could have conveniently completed the loading earlier. In return however, the charterer may subject to the charterparty be entitled to a rebate called “dispatch money” if he loads or unloads the ship earlier than the time to which he is entitled under the charterparty.

It should be noted however that the completion of loading before expiration of the laydays may sometimes cause problems to the charterer if it means that bills of lading are dated earlier than the date specified on their sale contract. What the charterer cannot do is to delay the presentation of the bills for signature. Bills of lading must be presented within a reasonable time of completion of loading. Any delay caused by charterer’s failure to comply with this obligation will be compensated by damages for detention, and not at the demurrage rate.

In Nolisement vs Bunge, a vessel completed loading 19 days prior to the expiration of laydays. Bills of lading were not presented until three days after completion of loading, whereas on the facts a reasonable time for presenting bills of lading for signature would have been not more than one day. The charterer was held liable. However, it is quite legitimate to spin out the loading operation so that the bill of lading eventually issued bears the date that is in accordance with the charter’s sale contract. In the case of Margaronis Navigation Agency London Ltd. v. Henry W. Reabody and Co. of London Ltd. (The Vrontados), the charterer delayed the loading of the final 1% of the cargo so that a January bill of lading could be issued in respect of the whole cargo. It was held that the charterer was entitled to have the fixed time to load and was under no duty to accelerate the rate of loading to shorten the time to which it was otherwise entitled.

It must be stressed that the charterer’s duty is to load within the laytime allowed. The charterer owes no further duty to load or discharge with reasonable dispatch. But the shipowner will bear liability where he is responsible for the delay in the loading or discharge.

WHEN LAYDAYS BEGINS TO RUN

Subject to the terms of the charterparty agreement laytime will begin to run upon the arrival and readiness of the vessel couple with notice of the arrival of the ship to the charterer.

Upon Arrival of the Vessel.

Laydays generally begins to run after the arrival of the ship and its availability for loading or unloading. The charterparty agreement determines when a ship would be deemed to be available for the purpose of laytime. The question as to whether or not a ship is an “arrived ship” depends on whether a charterparty is a berth charter or a port charter. In a berth charter, the ship does not become an arrived ship unless it is at the particular berth, and therefore laytime begins to run once she is ready to load. 

In Sociedad Financiera De Bienes Raices S.A vs. Agrimpex Hungarian Trading Co (The Aello),the vessel under a port charterparty, was held not to be an “arrived ship” until she was within the commercial area of the port. The ship was anchored at a point and not allowed to go further unless there was a certificate that a cargo had been allocated to her. The House of Lords held that the charterers were in breach in failing to provide cargo in time to enable the ship to perform its obligation of becoming an arrived ship.

The readiness of the vessel also means the actual readiness of the ship and not anticipated readiness. By readiness, the cargo gear, cranes, cleanliness, cargo space accessibility, fumigation etcetera must be intact requiring no further work or checking. Legally, it also means the vessel has fulfilled all port formalities for loading and or unloading before laytime can start running. The implication of this assertion is that under a berth charter party any time lost before the vessel can get to the berth where loading or discharging can be done falls upon the owner of the ship or on the charterer if he fails to provide cargo except it is expressly provided otherwise. Conversely, in a port charterparty, the moment a ship arrives at the port, any subsequent delay in berthing would normally be at the risk of the charterer.

TENDERING OF VALID NOTICE OF READINESS

If the vessel has arrived and is ready to load or unload, the shipowner is required to serve a valid Notice of Readiness (NOR) of the vessel on the charterer before laytime could commence. The tendering of the Notice of Readiness (NOR) on the charter must be subsequent to the arrival and readiness of the vessel for it to be valid. Anything short of this, the notice would be invalid except, otherwise expressly agreed.

Laytime start running after a valid Notice of Readiness (NOR) has been given to the charterer. In The Mexico 1, a failure to give a valid Notice of Readiness was held to prevent laytime from running until the actual start of discharge. But notice for the purpose of discharge is not necessary. What is paramount is that the notice tendered is not defective. It is generally immaterial if the notice though valid does not fully conform to the requirements of the charterparty agreement. If loading in fact starts before the earliest time specified for giving of Notice of Readiness, laytime will not commence until that time has passed.

Laytime may not run in the absence of notice. In the case of Fairbridge V Pace[26], the ship entered at the custom house but no notice of readiness was given to the charterer, it was held that the charterer was not liable for failure to provide a cargo for the purposes of loading because they were not aware of the arrival of the ship.

LEGAL READINESS OF THE SHIP. 
      
Apart from being physically available to the charterer, the ship must be legally available. This means that all the necessary permits have been obtained and no laws or regulations prevent his having access to the ship for his work. She must have free pratique, be free from any quarantine (disease) restrictions and be fully documented. The documentation may be stipulated by national or local laws, or established at the discretion of the authorities. The documents include in the case of most ports, the certificate of registry, bills of lading, charter-party, manifest, official log-book, ship's articles, lists of dutiable stores, trade line and wireless installation inspection certificates and in some ports a bill of health. In Nigeria, the ship before proceeding to the sea for loading must have obtained a LoadLine Certificate. In the Nigerian case of ISC Services Ltd. V. G. C Ltd, the appellate court held that the Pre-Shipment Inspection of goods is a pre-requisite for the commencement of carriage by sea. Conversely, the ship will be deemed not ready if the failure to meet these requirements results in her not being available to the charterer to whatever extent he requires her.

THE PHYSICAL READINESS OF A SHIP

The cargo charterer must be allowed physical control of the ship including access to the holds, so far as that is necessary for them to perform their part of the joint operation of loading or discharging. This is known as the physical readiness of the ship to load. Such control could include stopping the shipowner from loading the cargo.

Practically speaking, the readiness of the ship at the loading port will usually be within the peculiar knowledge of the shipowner, who must give notice of her arrival to the charterer. A statement as to the position (location) of the ship will generally be construed as a condition precedent, the falsity of which entitles the charterer to rescind the contract.

It is also submitted that the master of a ship when in doubt as to the place where notice should be given to just issue the notice to avoid demurrage. This advice is predicated on the need to act on the part of caution and surplusage than to pay high cost of demurrage.

If the charterparty provides that notice shall be given in a particular form, then mere notice or awareness of readiness is not enough. The master of the ship must adhere to the method prescribed. For example, where the charterparty agreed that notice should be given in office hours, failure to adopt the prescribed method will prevent time from running. In Gordon V. Powis, the charterparty provided that "captains or owners to telegraph advising probable arrival, and at least eight clear days notice shall be given previous to requiring cargo". The court held that it did not amount to a notice requiring cargo where the Master telegraphed that he had left Philadelphia, the last port on the previous voyage, for Quebec. According to Day J, that is something entirely distinct from the telegraphic notice as to probable arrival and that is not a notice requiring cargo as agreed by the parties. It is a provision precedent that such notice should be given.

NOTICE REQUIRES AT FIRST LOADING PORT ONLY

In a charterparty agreement where the cargo are in more than one ports or the vessel is passing through multiple ports, notice of readiness is mandatorily requires at a sole loading port, even in the absence of an express stipulation to that effect in the charterparty. Conversely notice of readiness is not needed at the second and subsequent ports unless otherwise expressly agreed. This rule is predicated on the ground that where there has already been a call at the loading port, the charterer is aware that the ship has already begun to fulfill its obligation. The presumption then is that the charterer is following its course and making loading preparations accordingly. This position was affirmed in the case of Burnett S.S. Co. Ltd. V. Oliver & Co. Ltd.
It submitted however that notice can be required at each loading port where it was so agreed. In such cases, the charter- party should contain such clauses as "...laydays at each loading port to commence on the day following notice of readiness to load..."

Under English law, there is generally no requirements for issuance of notice at the port of discharge. Notice of the readiness of a ship to discharge is to be given to the receiver where the bill of loading or charterparty expressly provides or where it is customary to the country in question[33]. Such notice would also be given where there is custom to that effect. In the absence of these the shipowner is not obliged to give notice of readiness.

The presumption of the law is that the consignee (charterer) must always be on the watch out for the arriving ship while the shipowner must not make it difficult or impossible for the charterer to locate the ship.

In modern charterparties agreements however, the circumstances in which notice of readiness has to be given, and the mode of giving the notice is often spelt out in more details.

Notice of readiness of a ship for the purposes of loading and or unloading is a notice to the charterer of certain facts, in whatever form it may have been prescribed. These facts include the arrival of the ship at her contractual destination or so near thereto as she can safely get and her readiness to load.

If all the requirements of readiness, subject to minimal and insignificant qualifications are not satisfied when the notice is given, the notice wholly is ineffective. In this circumstance, notice would have to be given again upon the readiness requirements being out. Similarly if there is an express "provision for a further waiting period to elapse after notice and before laytime can begin” then that further waiting period will have also to elapse after the requirements of readiness have been satisfied. It should be noted however that this latter provision may be dispensed with so that laytime begins when the readiness requirements are satisfied. This is a rare possibility but has been acknowledged where some reciprocal concession had been made by ship-owners delaying the beginning of the "time lost in waiting" period and the charterer did not need the notice period.

Where a bill of lading is silent as to the time within which the consignee is to discharge ship's cargo, the charterer is obligated to discharge within a reasonable time. That obligation is performed if he discharges the cargo within a time which is reasonable under the existing circumstances, assuming that those circumstances, in so far as they involve delay, are not caused or contributed to by him. Thus in the case of Hick V. Raymond and Reid, a cargo was shipped for the port of London under bills of lading which did not specify the time within which the consignees were to take discharge of it. Upon arrival of the ship, the consignees began to unload, but it was interrupted for several days by a strike of the dock labourers. The consignees were held not liable to the shipowner for the delay.

SOME CLAUSES THAT MAY MODIFY THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ON COMMENCEMENT OF LAYTIME

There are certain express terms/clauses which when included in a charterparty agreement may modify the usual conditions for the commencement of laytime. Such clauses could be drafted thus:
1.        "Time lost in waiting for berth to count as loading time" and "time lost in waiting for berth to count as discharging time".
2.         "Whether in berth or not"
3.         "Time... to commence on being reported at custom house”
4.         ”In regular turn”. E.g. the cargo is to be loaded in regular turn as customary commencing when notice is given of steamer being ready to load..."
5.         "Demurrage in respect of all times waiting”
6.         "To be loaded as per colliery Guarantee”
7.         “Time to count twenty-four hours after arrival at or off the port..."

In North River Freighters Ltd. V. President of India, the Radnor was chartered to carry soya beans from "one safe berth Dairen (Manchuria)" to Mandras and Calcutta. The charterparty provided, by clause 17, that laydays should begin twenty-four hours after notice of readiness to load had been given by the master. It also stated "Time lost in waiting for berth to count as loading time". When the ship anchored in the quarantine anchorage at Dairen, custom and port official sealed up the radio, took away a number of ships documents and banned communication with the shore. Seven days later, the ship was taken to berth (though not loaded there) and on the following day the master was able to give notice of readiness. The court of appeal held that the ship owner was entitled to count the eight days as time used although the notice had not then been given.

It is equally pivotal to understand that even in the case of a port charterparty, the beginning of laytime can be postponed, in spite of the ship having arrived at the port, being ready, and having given notice, if she must await her "regular turn". It is possible for the notice and the regular turn provisions to be so closely linked as to suggest that laytime begins when notice is given, but this may not be the case. The consequence of this is avoidable confusion.

SUSPENSION OF LAYTIME.

A good drafter of charterparty agreement must educate the parties thereto on the imperative to ensure the charter agreement contains a laytime exception clause that will list certain eventualities that can interrupt the running of laytime. The most important of these circumstances is Bad Weather.

The Concise Oxfords Dictionary define weather to include the atmospheric conditions prevailing at a place and time, combination produced by heat or cold, clearness or cloudiness, dryness or moisture, wind or calm, high or low pressure, electrical state of local air and sky..." When any natural phenomenon falling within this definition has the effect of preventing work from being done, or would have that effect if anyone had been working (they having not worked for some reason other than the weather), then laytime is interrupted if the laytime clause refers to 'weather working days'.
Other natural phenomenon which may constitute bad weather includes earthquakes, rain, snow, storms and ice surf.

In Dampskibsselskabet Botnia A/S V C.P Bell and Co., the charterparty provided for the loading of pit props in Finland in mid-November at a specified rate "per weather working day". The ship was ordered to Mollersvik, Middle Finland, which was normally blocked with ice from about the middle of November. At first cargo could be towed out in the form of rafts but later in November ice formed and loading was impossible. The ship sailed with a part cargo because the charterer told the master that they could load no more. The port was then closed for the winter. The court per Bateson J. held that the shipowner was not entitled to any dead freight rejecting his argument that ice was not weather.

 Bad Weather Before Laytime Begins

It is probable before the commencement of laytime the ship may still be on her way to her destination in order to load or discharge in which case bad weather can have no effect on laytime calculations. If the ship is delayed at sea, any loss of time is on the account of the ship owner. If the ship is delayed by bad weather immediately outside but before reaching her contractual destination whether that be a berth, port or other place, the charterer will not be responsible since he has not caused the delay.

But if the charterer has brought about a delay, by for example, creating congestion through an unreasonable and abnormal amount of chartering, he may be liable to pay detention damages to the shipowner.

Bad Weather After Laytime Begins
Whether bad weather occurring after laytime has begun will suspense the running of laytime or not is generally dependence on the terms of the laytime clause in the charterparty agreement. For instance,
a.         If the charter clause reads "weather working days", the day where work is not done due to weather will not be counted.
b.         Where the bad weather is for only part of a normal working hours, the hours (period) affected by bad weather will generally be excluded in calculating laytime unless the affected hours were substantial enough to affect almost the whole day. In the latter case, the day would be excluded.

It must be noted that what determines a working hours generally depend on the port, port area, trade, ship etcetera including overtime which is more of a rule than an exception at ports.

Apart from bad weather, laytime may be suspended or excluded on Sundays, Saturday and holidays. Time will also not run against the charterer where the inability to load or unload is due to a sudden strained in the relationship of two affected countries or hostile government policy. It may also be suspended due to labour union strikes or strikes of shipowner. The holidays may be general or local for example, Christmas day is general while October 1st Independence Day celebration in Nigeria is local. Local holiday may also be a day peculiar to a particular port. It is however necessary to note that the general rule of labour union strike suspending laytime will not be applicable if by the time the strike started, the charterer was already in breach of the laytime agreement. Similarly, the moment a vessel is on demurrage, no other exceptions will operate to prevent the demurrage from continuing to be payable unless the exclusion clause in the charterparty agreement expressly provides otherwise. Where a ship is detained by relevant government on ground of overloading or improper loading, time will generally continue to run.

In addition, port congestions, lights and customary shifting could also suspend the running of laytime. Some standard charterparty form also contains situations when laytime may be suspended. Clause 6 of the Asbatankvoy Charterparty Form suspense laytime, where the delay is out of the charterer’s control.

REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF LAYTIME PROVISIONS
a. Demurrage: This is the general and main remedy available to the shipowner when the charterer fails to load or unload the ship within the agreed time. Demurrage is primarily due from the charterer, but recovery may also be made from a bill of lading holder provided the bill of lading incorporates the terms of the charter and the demurrage clause is worded so as to encompass the liability of a bill of lading holder. So long as the shipowner is desirous of continuing the contract his entitlement for breach of laytime would be the agreed demurrage.

b. Right to repudiate the contract: The shipowner will not generally be entitled to terminate the charter and sail off at the expiration of laytime. His right to terminate will arise only when the period of delay after the expiration of laytime may either be express as a period of "unreasonable delay" or of such delay so as to frustrate the commercial purposes of the contract. Depending on the circumstances of the particular case, the shipowner is entitled to terminate the contract at once without the need to wait till the end of the period of the day[48].

c. Right to Sue for Damages for Detention:
Damages for detention are the un-liquidated damages which accrue to a shipowner in respect of the wrongful detention of his ship. Wrongful detention can result from failure by the charterer to load or to give orders for a loading or a discharging place or some other breach by him. Such damages for detention become due either where there is no demurrage stipulation, the laytime (whether fixed, calculable or reasonable) having been exhausted or where there is the now rare stipulation that demurrage should run for a fixed time, that fixed time having expired. Demurrage is liquidated damages but damage for detention is generally un-liquidated having not been earlier agreed upon.

In conclusion, what determines laytime, calculation of laytime and demurrage for breach of laytime is generally dependence of the terms (clauses) of the charterparty and to some extent the prevailing port policies. In other to effectively reduce the challenges of calculating laytime, the agreed period for loading the cargo should be separated from the period for the discharge of same. A saving of time on one operation can be used to offset demurrage incurred on the other. Laytime can be averaged in which case two separate statements are drawn up and time saved on one operation can be credited against the other. The introduction of an extension of time clause into the charterparty agreement will enable the parties to regularize whatever challenges they may have.

Κυριακή 17 Νοεμβρίου 2019


Most voyage charterparties make the commencement of laytime conditional on the tender of a valid notice of readiness. If the notice is invalid, then in the absence of a waiver by charterers laytime will not commence at all, even if the charterers knew or ought to have known that the vessel was in all respects ready.

Overview
The tender of a valid notice of readiness and the subsequent commencement of laytime has been a fertile area of debate in the English courts and given the financial consequences, will no doubt continue to be litigated.

If a notice is required but none is given then strictly, laytime will not start to run. Arbitrators may, however, take a more commercial view and decide on the facts that the charterers were aware or ought to have been aware that the vessel was ready to load and knew that loading was taking place, and that therefore laytime should commence on loading. The burden of proof, however, is on the owners to show that laytime should start to run even though a notice of readiness was not given. This is not satisfactory from the owners’ point of view as there is no assurance for them that laytime will commence at all. 
Where a notice is required then in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, this is required only at the first load port and not at the subsequent load ports or at the discharge port(s).
At common law, the notice may be given orally or in writing. Where the charterparty requires service of the notice, e-mail will not be considered permissible unless expressly provided for in the charterparty – see the “PORT RUSSEL” [2013] EWHC 490 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 57. Best practice is to make sure when fixing the vessel that the charterparty provides for service of the notice of readiness by e-mail as some older forms still refer to telex. 
The contents of the notice of readiness
The notice of readiness is the notice to the charterer, shipper, receiver or other person as may be required under the charterparty that: 
(1) The vessel has arrived at the specified destination where the notice of readiness can be given. The question of whether the vessel is an ’arrived’ one for the purposes of commencement of laytime has been the subject of much discussion and case law which is outside the scope of this article. However, it can be said briefly that the specified destination will depend on the terms of the contract. If the charterparty is a berth charterparty then the specified destination is the nominated berth or, if a berth has not been nominated, it will be the first available berth to which the vessel is ordered and the notice of readiness may be tendered at that place subject to the other conditions being satisfied. If, however, the charterparty is a port charterparty then the notice of readiness must be tendered when the vessel is in berth within the specified port or, if a berth is not available, when the vessel is within the port limits and at the waiting area where vessels usually wait for a berth.
Various clauses in the charterparty may put forward the time that the vessel may tender the notice even though she may not be at the specified destination. The most familiar is the WIBON (whether in berth or not) provision which means that under a berth charterparty, if the berth is not immediately accessible, the notice of readiness may be given when the vessel is in the port in which the berth is situated.
Similarly, a WIPON (whether in port or not) provision will enable the notice in certain circumstances to be tendered even if the vessel has not yet entered the port area.
(2) The vessel is ready to load or discharge the cargo as the case may be. This means that the vessel must be both physically ready in that the holds are ready to receive the cargo and legally ready in that all documentation necessary to enable her to commence loading is in order. If, however, the vessel is ready subject only to a mere formality then the notice may still be able to be tendered. For example, if customs clearance is only obtainable on berthing but the notice can be tendered when the vessel is off berth then this will not affect the vessel’s readiness.
(3) All other requirements under the charterparty concerning the form, timing and the party to whom the notice is to be tendered have been complied with.
Validity of the notice of readiness
A notice of readiness therefore contains several statements of fact. In order to be a valid notice, those statements must be true. If the statements are incorrect the notice is invalid and a nullity so far as the contract is concerned and ineffective to start laytime. Further, as was made clear in the leading authority of the "MEXICO I" [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 507 (CA)  if the statements were untrue when they were made, the notice does not subsequently become valid when the circumstances change. If therefore, there is any doubt as to the validity of the notice, it is always advisable for the master to tender a further notice.
The "MEXICO I"
The owners let their vessel to the charterers for the carriage of a part cargo of maize from Argentina to Angola. Under the charterparty, the owners had a right to complete the vessel with other cargo. On completion of loading, the vessel was also carrying a cargo of beans for the same charterer under another agreement. Both the maize and the beans were overstowed by parts of the completion cargo. On arrival at the discharge port, the vessel tendered notice of readiness on 25th January. However, at the time of tender neither of the charterers’ cargo was accessible due to the overstow of the completion cargo. The charterers’ maize cargo became accessible on 6th February and the beans on 19th February which is when discharge of both cargoes commenced. The owners claimed that laytime commenced when the cargo became fully accessible on 6 February. Charterers on the other hand claimed that time commenced only when discharge actually commenced on 19 February.
The Court of Appeal held that the notice was invalid and a nullity when given and ineffective therefore to commence laytime even if the charterers knew or ought to have known of the vessel’s subsequent readiness. Accordingly, the charterers were entitled to insist on a further notice of readiness in order for laytime to commence unless they had in the meantime waived their right to a further notice or agreed that it would not be necessary. On the particular facts in this case, the Judge found that although the notice was invalid, the charterers had nevertheless accepted it via their agents on the commencement of discharge. As a matter of principle, however, the judge confirmed that an acceptance of an invalid notice in circumstances where the charterers were unaware of the inaccuracy in the notice could not bind the charterers and they were not prevented from subsequently disputing the effect of the notice. What will constitute a waiver of the defect or acceptance of an invalid notice is considered in more detail below.
Unless there is provision to the contrary in the charterparty, the statements in the notice must relate to the time that they are made and when the notice is given. There is a distinction, however, between an invalid notice and one that is uncontractual in that it has been tendered to the wrong party or at the wrong time of day. A notice that falls within the second category may still be regarded as valid.
The "AGAMEMNON"
The "AGAMEMNON" [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 675 was chartered to load a cargo of steel pipes from Baton Rouge to Brisbane. The charterparty provided that the vessel was at the South West Pass and "ready to proceed to loading port weather permitting". The South West Pass, however, was 170 miles from Baton Rouge and it did not form part of that port. A notice of readiness was tendered at the South West Pass. It was not until two days later, however, that the vessel arrived at Baton Rouge general anchorage but, due to the designated berth being unavailable, loading did not commence until later the following day.
The charterparty provided that if the berth was not available on the vessel’s arrival at the port or so near thereto as she may be permitted to approach, the notice could be tendered on arrival and laytime would then commence as if she were in berth and in all respects ready.
The charterers considered that the notice of readiness tendered at the South West Pass was premature, since it was given prior to the vessel’s arrival at a point so near to Baton Rouge as she could approach, i.e. the Baton Rouge general anchorage, and as no notice was given when the vessel reached that point later, laytime did not commence until loading started.
The charterers failed to persuade the arbitrators to agree with this view, but on appeal, the Judge found in their favour. In accepting their arguments, the Judge relied on the Court of Appeal decision in the "MEXICO I" which made clear that when a notice is to be given in order to start laytime running, this must be a valid notice and not an ’inchoate’ or ’delayed action device’ seeking to commence laytime automatically on the happening of a certain event. In such cases, a fresh notice must be given. Applying that case to the facts before him, the Judge found that the notice of readiness in this case represented that the vessel was at the place at which it was permissible for the notice to be tendered, i.e. the Baton Rouge anchorage. This was clearly not the case and the notice was therefore invalid and could not trigger the commencement of laytime.
The "PETR SCHMIDT"
In this case, the charterparty provided that the notice of readiness had to be tendered to the charterer or his agent within 0600 and 1700 hours local time and laytime was to commence six hours from the receipt of that notice or upon the vessel’s arrival, whichever first occurred. Of the various notices given at the load and discharge ports, one was given at 0100 hours and the other two at 1800 hours. The charterers argued that since the notices were tendered outside the specified period, they were non-contractual being in breach of the relevant clause and therefore invalid and of no effect in accordance with the principles in the "MEXICO I".
It was common ground that (a) when the notice of readiness was given the vessel had then arrived at the appropriate place within the port in question (b) the vessel was in fact ready to load or discharge as required by the charterparty and the statement of readiness was therefore correct (c) the vessel continued to be ready and (d) no further notices were given.
In their judgment, the Court of Appeal confirmed the principle decided in the "MEXICO I" namely, that in order to be a valid notice, it must contain accurate statements of existing fact. In the "MEXICO I" the notice stated that the vessel was ready when in fact she was not and the notice was therefore invalid. In the "PETR SCHMIDT", [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 284; (CA) [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1), however, the notice was correct in that the vessel was ready and at the required place but was sent to the charterers outside office hours. The Court drew a distinction between the requirement to ’tender’ a notice of readiness and to ’give’ or to ’receive’ one. The Court found in this case that the telex notice was sent out of office hours but was ’tendered’ at the receivers’ office opening at 0600 hours the following morning and that this therefore complied with the charterparty requirement. However, the Court also considered what the position would be if the charterparty required the notices of readiness to be ’given’ or ’received’ by charterers within certain periods and they are in fact given or received outside these periods. The Court held that in such cases, provided the notice was otherwise correct, the notice would be non-contractual and therefore wrong but not invalid at the time it was given. The practical effect of a non-contractual notice which is tendered outside the required time is, that while it may not be effective to start the laytime clock running, the defect may be ’cured’ by, for example, the passage of time and laytime will start at that point. As the Court pointed out, whether the defect can be so ’cured’ is a question of fact rather than the law and will vary from case to case.
The charterers may choose to accept an otherwise invalid notice. However, this acceptance must be in clear terms and in these circumstances, owners will leave themselves open to the argument that this acceptance was induced by an incorrect representation in the notice as happened in the "MEXICO I". In those cases, the charterers would not be precluded from disputing the effect of the invalid notice.
Acceptance/waiver by charterers The “HAPPY DAY”
The HAPPY DAY [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 487 (CA) was chartered to carry wheat from Odessa to Cochin. The Master tendered the notice of readiness before the vessel could enter the port due to tidal conditions and no valid notice was subsequently tendered. The vessel entered the port the next day and continued to berth. The charterers did not reject the notice of readiness and ordered the vessel to load and only later contested demurrrage on the ground that laytime had not commenced due to the invalid notice. 
The Court of Appeal heldthat under a voyage charterparty which requires a notice of readiness to be served, laytime can commence even where no valid notice of readiness had been served in circumstances where: 
-       a notice of readiness in the prescribed form is served upon the charterers/receivers prior to the arrival of the vessel; 
-       the vessel subsequently does arrive and is, or is expected to be, ready to discharge to the knowledge of the charterers; and
-       discharge commences to the order of the charterers/receivers without either having given any indication of rejection or reservation in respect of the notice of readiness already served, or any indication that a further notice of readiness is required before laytime commences.
In these circumstances, the charterers may be deemed to have waived their right to rely on the invalidity of the original notice of readiness as from the time of commencement of discharge and laytime will commence in accordance with the charterparty as if a valid notice of readiness had been served at that moment.
In The “SHACKLEFORD” [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 154 (CA) charterers were deemed to have accepted an invalid notice of readiness when they endorsed the notice “accepted” in the full knowledge that it was defective. “
Even where a receiver or agent do not have express authority, they may have implied or ostensible authority to accept a defective NOR” – see “THE NORTHGATE” [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 511.

Conclusion
Demurrage disputes are common, hence the name of legal cost insurance product “Freight Demurrage and Defence or “FDD”. English case law may be slowly moving from the literal to the more practical as evidenced by the cases on waiver. Terms vary between charterparties and grey areas remain. In order therefore, to be absolutely certain that time will start to count at the earliest opportunity, if there is any doubt as to the validity of the original notice the master should issue a further notice of readiness expressly stating that it is without prejudice to the validity of the previous notice(s).

PAYMENT OF HIRE AND RIGHT TO WITHDRAW VESSEL


1 1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TIME CHARTER AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Payment of Hire and withdrawal of vessel for non-payment of hire are very important clauses usually included to constitute the core of the contract in a Time Charter. The terms of a Time Charter vary completely from those of Demise or bareboat Charter, the voyage charter and the Slot Charter. Scholars have posited that this radical difference is as a result of the difference of its function.
In a time Charter, the owner of the ship places the vessel for an agreed period of time in the care and at the disposal of the Charterer who is at liberty to engage it for his own use within the ambit of the contractual terms. The Charterer in a time charter is responsible for the ship throughout the duration of the charter; he controls the commercial function of the vessel and is liable for the consequential expenses and resultant risk that may arise from the master obeying his instructions.
In a Time charter, the charterer pays for the bunker fuel, fresh water, port charges, etc, in addition to charter hire[2].  However, the proficiency of the chartered vessel is of vital importance to the charterer because the success of the commercial initiative depends on it[3]. The Charter party therefore sets out terms and conditions[4] upon which liabilities and warranties are based. According to J. F. Wilson, “there are different views as to the legal significance of such statements and the remedies available in the event of them proving inaccurate.  Thus, while the New York Arbitrators generally regard specifications as to speed and fuel consumption as constituting  continuing warranties that the vessel will maintain such capabilities throughout the charter, English courts treat them merely as warranties as to the state of the vessel at the time of delivery under the charter. In the event of breach of any of these warranties, it would appear that the appropriate measure of damages would be the difference in the market rate of hire between a vessel with the intended specifications and chartered vessel. In the case of a breach of the speed warranty, it has been suggested that an alternative remedy might be to treat the vessel as off hire for the appropriate period” Generally, the weight that will be attached to each situation will depend on the fact and peculiarity of the series of event.
In the course of this discuss, some phrases will be frequently used. It is however important that we define these phrases for easy understanding.
          HIRE: Hire is the price paid for the use of a vessel in a time charter and is usually calculated on the basis of a fixed sum per ton of the vessel dead weight for a specific period of time, such as 30 days or a calendar month.   
OFF-HIRE:This is a Period of time during which a vessel under time charter is unable to meet the requirements agreed between the charterer and shipowner due to some reasons within the control of the latter; in this case, e.g. machinery breakdown, the charterer is not required to pay hire money 
  
2. PAYMENT OF HIRE
Time charterparties usually provide that hire is payable in advance, although the parties sometimes agree that hire is payable in arrears. The charterparty will also specify whether hire is to be paid monthly, semi-monthly, every 15 days or by reference to some other period agreed by the parties[8]. One of the characteristic of maritime trade is such that takes the vessel away for relatively long periods. The constant currency depreciation, fluctuation in the rate of hire and cost of inflation on the aggregate vessel operational cost, all borne by the shipowner, creates the need for explicit terms which will regulate the payment of hire. This exigency thus necessitates clauses such as “Currency Clause” providing for a fixed exchange rate between the stipulated hire payment currency and any other currency of relevance and an “Escalator Clause” providing for a periodic review of hire rate.
An example of a simple hire is provided by Clause 11 of The New York Produce Exchange Time Charter revised 14 September 1993:
 “Payment of hire shall be made so to be received by the owner or their designated payee in ……………… viz, ……………..in ………………….Currency, or in the United States currency, in funds available to the owner on the due date, 15 days in advance and for the last month or part of same the approximate amount of hire, and should same not cover the actual time, hire shall be paid for the balance day by day as it becomes due, if so required by the owner…”

3. PAYMENT IN CASH
Most often, Time charters require payment of hire in cash. This however is not construed in the literal form to mean liquid money in paper or coin form. This simply implies that the money must be available to the ship owner in usable form as at the due date for the payment of hire. In the view of Brandon J in The Brimnes[10]“these words must be interpreted against the backdrop of modern commercial practice. Sointerpreted to me that they cannot mean only payment in dollars bills or other legal tender of the US. They must … have a wider meaning, comprehending any commercially recognized method of transferring funds, the result of which is to give the transferring fund, the result of which it is to give the transferee the unconditional right to the immediate use of the funds transferred.”In practice, banker’s drafts, banker’s payment slip, cheques and other negotiable instruments have been used, the caveat being that the money must be available to the shipowner on the due date for immediate use. On this premise, a charterer has no right to draw funds from an account upon which a banker’s note was issued until the said note has been processed. In The Laconai opinions of the House of Lords was divided as to whether payment order under the London Currency Settlement Scheme falls within the category of bankers’s notes acceptable for the payment of hire.
In The Afovos, Lord Lloyd held that payment of hire by telex transfer from one bank to another constitute payment in cash. He stated that “when payment is made by telex transfer from one bank to another for the account of a customer, the payment is complete when the telex is received and tested by the receiving bank: so that if the owner were to make an enquiry at their bank they would be told ‘Yes, the money has arrived for your account’ it is necessary that the fund should have been credited to the owners’ account. Still less is it necessary that the owner should have been in a position to transfer the funds out of the account. It is enough that the fund should have been received for the owner’s account”. 
A sharp contrast to the decision in The Afovos is the decision of the court in The Chikuma. In this case, monthly installment of hire had been paid into the owner’s bank in Genoa on the due date, but the telex transfer included a “value date” four days later. However, the practice among Italian bankers is that the money will yield no interest whatsoever until the value date and if the owner intents to withdraw same before the value date was due he will have to remit interest to the bank. Following the above condition, the House of Lords held that such a payment was not “equivalent to cash”. A similar case is The Brimnes,where the owner and the charterer both had accounts in the same branch of the same bank, the telex receipt instruction from the charterer to transfer the sum of the monthly installment of hire into the owner’s account did not have the effect of a payment in cash until the appropriate amount was credited into the account and the owner able to draw cash from same.

4. PAYMENT IN ADVANCE
A very vital requirement of payment of hire is that it should be made in advance at monthly (or 30 day) or semi-monthly intervals. Imbursement if required before performance and may be made on or before the hire due date. Situations may arise where the due date falls on a Sunday or a non-banking day, the Court has pronounced that such payment must be made not later than the immediate prior banking day, else the charterer would be held to have defaulted. However, some charters provide that in such situations, the hire shall be paid on the next banking day.
The charterer is expected to pay the complete period of hire up to midnight of the day which the installment is due in which to make the payment. In The Afovos Lord Hailsham opined that “I take it to be a general principle of law not requiring authority that where a person under an obligation to do a particular act has to do it on or before a particular date he has the whole of that day to perform his duty” According to Wilson, it is immaterial that payment can only be effected during banking hours, as long as the charterer is not in default until the expiry of that period. In the judgment of Lord Griffiths, “it is far preferable that so important an obligation …should be fixed at the certain time of midnight rather than it should depend upon the particular hours of business of a particular bank named in a charterparty which are likely, of course, to vary from country to country and even from bank to bank and to be ready source of confusion”.
Where no such provision exists, the final installment of hire due under the charter is payable in full to the owner. This is notwithstanding the fact that the vessel will be redelivered to its owner before the expiry of the relevant period.
It is immaterial in a charterparty that a charters default in paying hire installment as at when due was not intentional. The Obligation to pay hire promptly in advance is strictly construed and the charterer is in default if he fails to make the payment on or before the specified due date. This was given assent by Lord Porter in Tankexpress v. Compaigne Financiere Belge des Petroles, “Apart from some special circumstances excusing performance, it is enough to constitute default that payment has not in fact been made; neither deliberate non-performance nor negligence in performing the contract is required”. 

5. RIGHT TO WITHDRAW VESSEL FOR NON-PAYMENT OF HIRE
At common law, time is not of essence of the contract of hire and a shipowner cannot repudiate the charterparty and withdraw his vessel for late payment of an installment unless the surrounding fact show a clear intent on the part of the charterer not to perform the contract either by for instance expressly repudiating his obligation by recurring non-payment. Nevertheless, a charterparty customarily provide an express contractual right to withdraw the vessel. An Example is found in Clause 6 of the Baltime form:
“In default of payment, the owners to have the right of withdrawing the vessel from the service of the charterers without noting any protest and without interference by any court or any other formality whatsoever and without prejudice to any claim the owners may have on the charterers under the charter.”
A similar provision can be found in Clause 5 of the New York Produce Exchange Form where the shipowner is empowered to withdraw the vessel upon the charterer’s “failing the punctual and regular payment of the hire”. The object of which is to exert some form of pressure on the charterer in default or to re-gain possession of the vessel before it could become an object of debt recovery in a bankruptcy /insolvency proceedings against an indigent charterer. The clause also enables the shipowner to re-possess the vessel where there is a fluctuating hire rate, so that he can re-hire and or re-negotiate hire at the current market rate to the same charterer or another. This inspired the popular quote by Lord Denning MR., in The Tropwind that “when market rates are rising, the shipowner keeps close watch on payments of hire. If the charterer makes a slip of any kind- a few minutes too late or a few dollars too little – the shipowner jump on him like a ton of bricks. They give notice of withdrawal and demand thenceforward full payment of hire at the top of the market rate. Very rarely is the vessel actually withdrawn. Arrangements are made by which she continues in the service of the charterer just as if nothing had happened. Then there is a contest before the arbitrators or in the courts. It is as to whether notice of withdrawal was justified or not”. Though such conducts are devoid of merit, the courts “do not suggest … that the owners [are] guilty of any sharp practice … it [is] just a matter of business – a matter of very hard business”. 
However, withdrawal is often only a sensible option if the vessel is free of cargo. This is because withdrawal of the vessel from the charterers’ service does not bring the bill of lading contract to an end. Where the owners are the carriers under the bill of lading contract (as is commonly the case), they will remain under an obligation to deliver the cargo at the port(s) named in the bills of lading despite the withdrawal of the vessel from the charterers’ service. In such situations, if the bills of lading in question are "freight prepaid" bills of lading, the owners’ prospects of recovering any of the expenses incurred in the carriage and delivery of the cargo to the port(s) named in the bills of lading will be remote. Where the owners are not the carriers under the bill of lading contract, their position will be somewhat better albeit they will still owe a duty of care as bailees of the cargo to those interested in it. It is clear therefore, that an owner should think carefully before withdrawing a vessel which is laden with cargo when the charterers have defaulted in its payment of hire.

6. REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL
For a shipowner to be able to exercise his right to withdraw, the charterer must be in default by either failing to pay an installment or failing to pay on time. It is established that the owners’ right of withdrawal arises not only when a full hire installment is not paid, but also when a timely payment has been made for a sum which is less than the amount due and the outstanding balance is not paid by the due date.
The shipowner is required to give notice to the charterer before withdrawing the vessel in the form of a “Grace period” which simply provides the charterer with an agreed extension to the payment date. Once this grace period lapses and if payment has not been received by the shipowner, then he would be in a position to withdraw the vessel provided proper notice was given. Unless there are express provisions to the contrary contained in the charter party, the notice of withdrawal must be given to the charterers. The owners are not bound to give prior notice of their intention to withdraw to the charterers. All that is required is that the withdrawal notice is unequivocal: i.e., it states clearly that the owner is treating the non-payment of hire as having terminated the charterparty and that the vessel is withdrawn. Continuing to perform the bill of lading contract by carrying the cargo to destination does not have the effect of reinstating the charter. 
In recent development, owing to the hardship suffered by shipowners from perpetual defaulting charterers, BIMCOhas reviewed its Non-payment hire clause to enable a ship owner suspend performance under a time charter following a failure by the charterer to pay hire when due. Due consideration was given to recent case laws like The Pamela and The Li Hai . Both cases emphasize that in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the time for payment of hire will expire at midnight on the due date and the necessity of making it very clear when issuing a notice for late payment of hire that in the absence of payment, the vessel will be withdrawn.

7. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
The shipowner’s right to withdraw may appear absolute as contained in the charterparty. However, he may lose his right to withdraw where he expressly or by implication waives the breach committed by the charterer. Conduct such as acceptance of late payment and subsequent demand for details of deduction coupled with delay in withdrawing the vessel may amount to a waiver.
In The Mihalios Xilas Case, The MV Mihalios Xilas was chartered on the Baltime form with hire to be paid monthly in advance. The charterers mistakenly believed the ninth month to be the last month under the charter party and so they remitted the ninth hire installment less US$31,000.00. The owners queried the deduction and then withdrew the vessel five days later without returning the part payment of the advance hire.The Court of Appeal held that the short payment was not a proper payment and, in the circumstances, the owners could elect to either accept the short payment and not withdraw the vessel or refuse it and withdraw the vessel. The Court further held that the owners’ retention of the short payment, coupled with their demand for further details about the deduction and the fact that the owners took several days to decide to withdraw the vessel, indicated that the owners had waived their right of withdrawal.
Another instance where a shipowner could be said to have waived his right to withdraw is where a course of dealing has been established by the owners accepting late payment without protest, the owners will not be able to withdraw the vessel if a subsequent hire installment is paid late pursuant to that course of dealing. In order to re-establish their right to withdraw in such circumstances, the owners need to give notice to the charterers that they require the charterers to adhere strictly to the hire payment provisions in the charterparty. Only once the owners have re-established that hire must be paid when it falls due will the owners be in a position to exercise their right of withdrawal. This was the position of the Court in The Scaptrade.

8. EFFECT OF EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
The effect of the exercise of a right to withdrawal of vessel for default in payment of hire is that it extinguishes the charterparty. The shipowner has no right to temporally withdraw the vessel in an attempt to put pressure on the charterer to pay the hire unless there is an express term in the charterparty to that effect. Such actions by the owner amounts to a breach of contract for which damages are recoverable. Nor is the owner entitled to take any other action as, for example, withdrawing the charter’s contractual authority to sign bills of lading or instructing the master not to sign pre-paid bills of lading as was the case in The Nanfri.
The effect of exercising a right to withdraw the vessel is to terminate the contract from that point and the shipowner is not entitled to any hire for the remainder of the charter period. Nor is he entitled to retain any unearned hire already paid in advance. See The Mihalis Xilas(supra). Damages for the unexpired period of the charter can only be recovered where default of payment of hire amounts to a repudiation of the contract by the charterer. As time is usually not of the essence of a time charter, default in payment of hire by the charterer will rarely amount to repudiation of the contract and the owner wishing to withdraw the vessel will customarily have to rely on the contractual withdrawal clause.